The second Russian winter offensive of 1943-44 was launched early in
January 1944 against the German Eighth Army sector in the Dnepr bend. The
First and Second Ukrainian Fronts—the latter consisting of four armies,
including one tank army—attempted to cut off German forces deployed from
a point southeast of Kiev to the Dnepr estuary. The Soviet offensive fell
short of accomplishing its purpose, but in twelve days of fighting the
Russians drove a deep wedge southwestward across the Dnepr and captured
the town of Kirovograd. Two large German salients remained, one to the
northwest, the other to the southeast of the Kirovograd area.Despite heavy tank losses, the Russians could be expected to reorganize
their armored forces in the shortest possible time and continue their heavy
attacks designed to push Army Group South farther back in the direction
of the Romanian border. It was evident that the enemy would bend every
effort to destroy the German bulge northwest of Kirovograd, held by elements
of Eighth Army and First Panzer Army.The commander of Eighth Army sent urgent messages to army group; he
expressed grave doubts about continuing to hold the curving line of positions
northwest of Kirovograd which committed an excessive number of men. Pointing
out the Russian superiority in strength, he recommended withdrawal of the
interior flanks of Eighth Army and First Panzer Army by retirement to successive
positions, first behind the Olshanka-Ross River line, and eventually to
the line Shpola-Zvenigorodka-Gorniy Tikich River. Permission for such a
withdrawal, however, was denied on the grounds that the salient had to
be held as a base for future operations in the direction of Kiev.The expected attack was launched by the Second Ukrainian Front, on 24
January, against the right flank, and by the First Ukrainian
Page 35 Front, on 24 January, against the left flank and the rear of the German
salient. By 28 January the armored spearheads of both Russian army groups
met in the area of Zvenigorodka and thereby accomplished the encirclement
of XI and XLII Corps. Having erected the original link-up with elements
of two tank armies, the Russians rapidly committed strong infantry units
from four additional armies which attacked toward the west, southwest,
and south in order to widen the ring of encirclement and provide effective
cover against German counterattacks from the outside.
Section II. PLANS FOR THE BREAKOUT
In this situation the German Army High Command directed Army Group South
to assemble the strongest available armored units along the boundary between
Eighth Army and First Panzer Army. These forces were to execute converging
counterattacks, encircle and annihilate the enemy units that had broken
through, re-establish contact with the pocket force, and regain a favorable
jump-off base for the projected counteroffensive.Actually, the assembly of the German attack force presented the greatest
of difficulties. Two of the panzer divisions of Eighth Army designated
to take part in the operation were still in the midst of heavy fighting
in the area of Kapitanovka. They had to be replaced by infantry units with
frontages extended to the utmost. Two additional panzer divisions, recently
engaged southeast of Kirovograd, were on the march toward the left flank
of Eighth Army. Of these four armored units, only one was at full strength,
while the others, after weeks of uninterrupted fighting, were actually
no more than tank-supported combat teams.The relief attack from the right flank of First Panzer Army was to be
carried out by the four armored divisions of III Panzer Corps. They were
still engaged in defensive operations on the left flank of the army sector,
and could only be brought up after they had completed their previous missions.The two corps inside the pocket were to attack at the appropriate time
in the direction of the Eighth Army and First Panzer Army units approaching
from the south and west. It was clear that any build-up on the southern
front of the pocket could only be accomplished at the expense of other
sectors. Still, Army High Command insisted on holding the entire pocket
area, and not until the situation of the encircled forces became far more
critical was permission obtained for successive withdrawals on the northern
sector. Even then, the pocket had to be kept sufficiently large to afford
a certain freedom Page 36of movement. Also, despite the effort on the southern sector, adequate
forces had to remain available to seal off enemy penetrations elsewhere.The plan for a two-pronged drive by III Panzer Corps of First Panzer
Army from the southwest and XLVII Panzer Corps of Eighth Army from the
south, to coincide with an attack launched by the pocket force, was adopted
on 1 February. The units concerned were ordered to complete their assembly
for the proposed operation during the following two days. Then XLVII Panzer
Corps was to jump off from the area of Shpola, thrusting into the rear
of the Russian forces that were threatening the southern front of XI Corps.
Simultaneously, III Panzer Corps was to launch a surprise attack in the
general direction of Medvin, where enemy units were operating against the
southwest front of the pocket defended by XLII Corps. After destroying
these Russian units, III Panzer Corps was to pivot due east to effect close
co-operation with the attacking elements of XLVII Corps coming from the
south.During a commanders' conference on 3 February, the Eighth Army commander
voiced serious doubts whether, in view of the limited forces available
and the muddy roads, this ambitious plan was practicable. He recommended
instead that the attack by III Panzer Corps be led in a more easterly direction
which would assure early co-operation with the advancing elements of XLVII
Panzer Corps. This recommendation was turned down.Meanwhile, the enemy had committed strong infantry and armored units
in an attack toward Novomirgorod, temporarily tying down two of the panzer
divisions that were to take part in the relief operation from the south.
The muddy season was rapidly taking effect and as the roads deteriorated
all movements became extremely difficult.Similar conditions prevailed in the area of III Panzer Corps. Engaged
in continuous fighting on its left flank, this corps also suffered considerable
delay in the assembly of its units for the projected relief thrust and
could not be expected to launch its attack until 4 February.The forces inside the pocket, in an attempt to keep the enemy from separating
XI and XLII Corps, had shifted their main effort to the south front of
the perimeter. Despite heavy losses in defensive engagements they could
not afford to give ground in that sector, as their only remaining airfield,
at Korsun, had to be kept out of range of the Russian artillery. At the
high rate of casualties, however, a continued stand along the entire perimeter
of positions was obviously out of the question. To conserve its strength
and reduce the threat of Russian penetrations, the pocket force eventually
obtained permission to execute limited withdrawals on the northern and
eastern sectors while bolstering its defenses to the south.Page 37The full impact of the muddy season soon made itself felt on all fronts
and, in addition to causing losses of motor vehicles and other equipment,
began to endanger German air supply operations. The requirements of the
encircled force called for supplies to be flown in at the rate of 150 tons
daily. Despite the most determined efforts of the Luftwaffe units, this
quota was never reached. Enemy antiaircraft fire from at least three flak
divisions in the Russian-held strip of terrain and interception by enemy
fighter planes had seriously reduced the number of available transport
aircraft. To prevent further losses, strong German fighter forces had to
be committed in protection of the vital air supply line instead of supporting
preparations on other sectors for the impending relief operation.With the start of the muddy season, the lack of paved runways further
aggravated the situation. One airfield after another became unusable, and
even the Korsun field, the only one inside the pocket, had to be partially
closed. Airdropping supplies, because of a shortage of aerial delivery
containers, met only a small part of the actual requirements. Eventually,
because of the road conditions, the two corps approaching from the outside
also became dependent in part upon airborne supply, which forced a wide
scattering of the air effort.Time was obviously working against the Germans. As their difficulties
continued to increase, it became clear that each day of delay further reduced
their chances for success.
Section III. THE RELIEF OPERATION
The assembly of an attack force on the western flank of XLVII Panzer
Corps (Eighth Army) bogged down in a series of heavy local counterattacks
south of Lebedin and Shpola. A small German force gained a temporary bridgehead
at Izkrennoye and inflicted serious losses on the enemy. In all these engagements,
however, the strength of XLVII Panzer Corps was constantly being whittled
down until, by 3 February, it had only 27 tanks and 34 assault guns left.
At that point it became clear that Eighth Army could do no more than to
tie down enemy forces by continued holding attacks. Thus the original plan
which provided for two converging relief thrusts had to be abandoned.Neverthless, on 4 February, First Panzer Army attacked toward the north
in order to take advantage of favorable tank terrain, achieve surprise,
and avoid any further loss of time. Successful during the first day, it
was, however, unable to maintain this direction of attack, as terrain and
road conditions grew worse by the hour.Meanwhile, the situation inside the pocket had become more critical
and made it imperative to establish contact with the encircled forcesPage 38over the shortest possible route. Therefore, on 6 February, Army Group
South issued new orders to First Panzer Army. After regrouping its units
III Panzer Corps was to attack due east, its right flank advancing via
Lisyanka toward Morentsy. At the same time the encircled corps were ordered
to prepare for an attack in the direction of III Panzer Corps, the attack
to be launched as soon as the armored spearhead of the relief force had
approached to within the most favorable distance from the pocket.Planned for 8 February, the attack of III Panzer Corps, because of unfavorable
weather conditions, did not get under-way until three days later. It was
initially successful and, by the end of the first day, led to the establishment
of three bridgeheads across the Gniloy Tikich River. Concentrated enemy
attacks, however, prevented any further advance. In the difficult terrain
east of the Gniloy Tikich, the German armored units were unable to make
any progress, and this attack also came to a halt in the mud.Army group now realized that it could no longer accomplish a reinforcement
of the pocket. The encircling ring, therefore, had to be broken from the
inside. The divisions of III Panzer Corps were ordered to engage and divert
the Russian forces located in the area of Pochapintsy-Komarovka-Dzhurzhentsy,
and to establish on the high ground northwest of Pochapintsy a forward
rescue position that could be reached by the units breaking out of the
pocket. By 1105, on 15 February, the breakout order was transmitted by radio
to General Stemmermann, the commander of the encircled German forces. It
read, in part, "Capabilities of III Panzer Corps reduced by weather
and supply difficulties. Task Force Stemmermann must accomplish break-through
on its own to line Dzhurzhentsy-Hill 239 where it will link up with III
Panzer Corps. The breakout force will be under the command of General Lieb
[XLII Corps] and comprise all units still capable of attack."Further instructions, radioed on 16 February, emphasized the importance
of surprise and proper co-ordination: "During initial phase of operation
tonight hold your fire so as to achieve complete surprise. Maintain centralized
fire control over artillery and heavy weapons, so that in the event of
stronger enemy resistance, especially at daybreak, they can be committed
at point of main effort in short order. Air support will be available at
dawn to protect your flanks."
Section IV. THE BREAKOUT
During the operation that was to follow, two separate phases could be
clearly distinguished. At first everything went according to plan. In the
proper sequence and under perfect control, the troops movedPage 40into position at night, despite the most difficult road and weather
conditions. As they were compressed into a narrow area, unit after unit
had to be channeled across the only existing bridge at Shenderovka which
was under heavy enemy fire.The bayonet assault started on schedule. The complete surprise of the
enemy demonstrated that the attack had been properly timed. Without much
action, and suffering but few casualties, the German breakout force penetrated
the enemy lines and in a relatively short time reached the vicinity of
Lisyanka. On the opposite front of the pocket the rear guards held fast
and thus assured the success of the initial breakout.The second phase, the evacuation of the remaining pocket force, rapidly
deteriorated into a wild surge toward the west. Following closely behind
the successful spearhead, altogether about 30,000 men broke through the
Russian lines in front of the pocket. At daybreak, however, they ran into
an unsuspected enemy front of antitank guns, tanks, and artillery, located
on the line Dzhurzhentsy-Pochapintsy. Under massed enemy fire, enemy tank
attacks, and infantry counterthrusts, the German force was split into numerous
small groups, each attempting on its own to get through to the west wherever
there might be a possibility. Their guns, tank destroyers, and heavy weapons,
which up to now had been dragged along laboriously through snowdrifts and
over broken terrain, had to be left behind and were destroyed after the
last round of ammunition had been fired. Here too, as the last vehicles
were blown up, the wounded taken along at the insistence of their comrades
had to be left to their fate.Meanwhile a new complication arose that was to have disastrous consequences.
Subjected to heavy enemy fire, counterthrusts, and armored attacks, the
great mass of German troops breaking out of the pocket had deviated from
their original direction of attack. No longer did they advance according
to plan toward the area northwest of Pochapintsy. Instead of approaching
the forward rescue position established by III Panzer Corps, they passed
by at a considerable distance farther south. Here, their advance to the
west was blocked by the course of the Gniloy Tikich, the enemy holding
the near bank of the river. There were no crossings, nor had III Panzer
Corps established any bridgeheads, since a link-up in that area had not
been foreseen.Although greatly exhausted, the German troops were now forced to overcome
the resistance of the Russian security detachments along the river and
to swim across, leaving their last weapons behind. They suffered considerable
losses as both banks of the river were under heavy enemy fire and not until
they had placed this last obstacle behind them were they finally received
by the forward elements of III Panzer Corps.Page 41The German holding forces on the eastern sector of the pocket maintained
contact with the enemy and successfully covered the breakout of the main
body. This mission accomplished, they made their way westward according
to plan and entered the lines of III Panzer Corps during the night of 17-18
February.Contrary to expectations, the breakout had to be executed without air
support. Unfavorable weather conditions during the entire operation made
it impossible for the air force to play its part in the liberation of the
encircled units.
Section V. LESSONS
The developments mainly responsible for the encirclement near Cherkassy
and its serious consequences might be summarized as follows:1. Only the insistence of Army High Command to hold the Dnepr bend northwest
of Kirovograd led to the isolation of two German corps in that area. Despite
repeated requests, permission for a breakout was not obtained until too
late. The enemy had grown too strong along the entire ring of encirclement,
while the German pocket forces had been weakened to such an extent, through
losses of personnel and equipment and shortages of supply, that they were
forced to surrender their freedom of action and maneuver to the enemy.2. The two German corps encircled by the enemy were the flank corps
of two adjacent armies. Immediately after their encirclement, XLII Corps,
heretofore part of First Panzer Army, was placed under the command of Eighth
Army. While this assured unity of command inside the pocket, the same was
not true of the relief operation in which forces under the command of two
different armies were involved. The absence of a unified command on the
army level made itself felt particularly as the need arose to co-ordinate
the actions of the pocket force (Eighth Army) with those of III Panzer
Corps (First Panzer Army).3. The mission of III Panzer Corps on the day of the breakout was to
divert and tie down those Russian units that blocked the path of the German
troops emerging from the pocket. Because of terrain difficulties and shortage
of fuel, the corps' forward elements failed to reach and occupy the commanding
ground originally designated as forward rescue area. Thus the enemy was
able to throw considerable weight against the German units breaking out.
Also—as the breakout continued in an unexpected direction—the exercise
of command in the relief force was not flexible enough to adjust to the
changed situation and improvise a new forward rescue position along the
Gniloy Tikich River. As a result, the pocket force remained virtually un-Page 42 assisted in its efforts at breaching the Russian lines and fighting
its way out.4. The Luftwaffe, as mentioned above, was prevented from taking any
part in the operation; an effective means of support that had been counted
on was thereby eliminated.The two German corps succeeded, to be sure, in cracking the enemy ring
and breaking out of the pocket; but they were so seriously weakened that
they required a long period of rest and rehabilitation before they could
again be committed on the Russian front. Their absence had an immediate
effect upon the defensive effort of Army Group South which was trying to
counter heavy Russian attacks aimed at a break-through in the Uman area.
Soon the entire southern sector was split wide open and the German Sixth
and Eighth Armies were pushed across the Yuzhny Bug (Ukrainian Bug River)
into Romania.
*This description of the encirclement west of Cherkassy
was prepared by a German staff officer at army group level on the basis
of his personal recollections and is presented as a supplement to the preceding
narrative.