Good article on both sides. Too bad we can’t take the best of both to form a strategy. We can not pattern our response on what the Soviets did. How can we get rid of the present bunch of crooks? The Soviets tried and look where it got them. Can we find a better guy than Karzai? Can we find a way to recruit the Pathans?

Pruitt

By Richard Pruitt on Nov 1, 2009 at 12:48 pm

While both contributors raise interesting and important points, Sutherland ultimately makes the best case. His suggestions possess a refreshingly neutral tone and prove more sensitive to the situation on the ground. His is the proscription made by one who’d like to see results. While sympathetic in his decrial of the loss of American lives—Peters offers little but a series of questions. (“What are we trying to achieve?” “Is it achievable?”) He complains that both administrations have been too “cowardly” to ask/answer these questions but offers no answers himself. Infinite deferral will solve nothing. Sutherland, on the other hand, does that which is both more difficult and potentially incendiary: he offers a positive, proactive, bona fide Plan. It’s not risk-free, but it might be the only catalyst strong enough to turn the tide in what has become a somewhat stagnate situation. His comparison to the Iraq War is compelling, as is his point that the surge has the support of a good deal of international leaders. In a time when America could use (though need not compromise for) some popularity in the global community, such considerations are not easily dismissed. His point that casualties drop as troop numbers rise makes a great deal of sense. The question is: does the United States government have enough foresight to see that this will be the case? The Vietnam analogy need not persist. Both Peters and Sutherland are right in that we absolutely should not continue on in a half-hearted manner, accomplishing little and suffering much. In his consideration of Pakistan, the dynamics of a tribal society (which might end up finding us more powerful allies than the Taliban), and the cultural elements specific to Afghanistan (the “warrior ethos,” etc.), Sutherland offers the more nuanced and compelling view.

Peters’ main argument consists in ‘waving the bloody flag,’ a gesture to which it is unpopular not to concede. He relies on heady, emotionally-charged rhetoric to appeal to Americans’ impatience and constant appropriation of ‘the troops’ for partisan debate. Every American loss is a profound tragedy, but perhaps a sense of proportion would be good. If we compare the losses in Afghanistan to those in pre-Desert Storm wars, we might wonder what our ancestors would think of our lack of fortitude. Peters frequently makes blanket statements without supporting them with any evidence (“40,000 is insufficient,” this would be a “generational commitment,” etc). Perhaps this is just the inevitable result of the fact that both men’s proscriptions are, in the end, unavoidably speculative.

Most disturbing about Peters’ rhetoric, however, is the tone he assumes when discussing Afghan culture. While no American probably feels 100% benign toward a country that is making it difficult for us to conclude this bloody conflict—we have to take into consideration the fact that current state of Afghanistan has arisen out of a political and cultural context diametrically opposed to ours, and to most states’ in the West. Sutherland acknowledges that making things work there requires serving/reconciling two masters: “We want a government that works for Afghanistan and is not a threat to the U. S. homeland.” “Works for Afghanistan” is the key phrase, and Peters seems to think that, since turning them into “third-rate Americans” hasn’t worked, we shouldn’t bother. He says revealingly that “Nation-building efforts are folly in a fractured, hate-ridden and violent tribal society.” I don’t hear any answers there—just cultural prejudice and an insensitivity for the fact that many of these Middle Eastern, Eastern European, and African ‘states’ are completely artificial. They are “fractured” and “tribal” (and, thus, “hate-ridden”) because Western powers have historically carved them up and used them economically for centuries. Our efforts there are not the unfortunate result of, as Peters puts it, “that most dangerous American vulnerability, good intentions.” Rather, they are an attempt to contain the damage of the social fragmentation and fundamentalism that are at least partially the result of years of colonialism. By referring to Afghanistan as “primitive” (a bad word in the Academy, and one that should at least be qualified by considering cultural, economic, and political context) and “medieval,” Peters betrays an imperialist attitude more dangerous than an increase in American presence in Afghanistan would seem. He has passed judgment, lost hope, and washed his hands.

We should just bite the bullet on this one and get something long-lasting done. And if we need incentive, let’s look to the Democratic Peace Theory.

By EAS on Nov 1, 2009 at 8:43 pm

The problem I have with this “surge strategy” is we don’t have properly trained and acclimatized troops to carry it out. We can get away with a surge in Iraq because the area of operation is low level and our troops only need to get used to temperatures and lack of humidity. Afghanistan is not Iraq.

Afghanistan is mountainous. Preferably we need troops trained to work in mountains. The only troops we have that have experience there are Rangers and some Marines that trained in Norway. We would need at least five Light Infantry Brigades of THREE Infantry Battalions each, trained in Mountains. We don’t have them. The 10th Mountain Light Infantry Division is stationed in New York state and Louisiana. The highest hills in New York are nowhere as high as the lowest point in Afghanistan. Troops going into Afghanistan need to train in high altitudes. No Army base is located in such an area, although several Air Force bases might help.

We need to raise some more Light Infantry Divisions and I don’t mean retraining Armor or Mechanized units for it. We need to give our combat troops more down time in the CONUS. We need to start doing things properly, instead of the slight of hand policies we got in the Rumsfeld period.

We need to quit converting Reserve Combat Brigades into Combat Support Brigades. We need MORE Light Infantry, not MP, Engineer, Transport and other such units. If it is already Infantry, leave them so. All those Brigades we have now operating with two Combat Battalions (Armor/Infantry) need to get back to a mix of three Armor or Infantry Battalions. All infantry Brigades need three such Infantry Battalions.

We need a strategy to lure the Pathans to us. We get along well enough with the other ethnic groups.

Pruitt

By Richard Pruitt on Nov 1, 2009 at 11:28 pm

i wonder if we should be looking to assist the pakistani army in its offensive against pakistani taliban with a concurrent offensive of our own on the other side of the border, to create great pressure from both sides at once.

I agree with a lot of what as been said and written here, the choices in front of us arent many, and we are at fault for a lot of that lack of choice, but we must not let those who have died do so in vain, a solution must be found, and must be prosecuted with the same vigour an determination already shown by our troops on the ground. And everyone must pull their weight…

By Galland on Nov 2, 2009 at 5:43 am

There is nothing in Afghanistan worth fighting for. The average Afghan doesn’t want Western forces in their country and certainly doesn’t want the country turned into a Democracy along Western lines.
Too many of the bravest and brightest of our troops are paying for our leaders indecission and political correctness with their lives or their health ( amongst the only people doing well out of this war are the makers of prosthetic limbs).
Pull our troops out and make it clear that any threat to Western interests sponsored or launched by elements based within Afghanistans borders will result in swift, decisive and effective reprisals. If they want medieval, let them have it AND keep it within their own borders.

By dogsbody67 on Nov 4, 2009 at 11:37 am

The same people saying leave them all with their @$%&* mediaval state, the same explain (before or after) that usa have to blast or even nuke rogue states.
You know in europe we don’t have this problem because we lost our power after the two world wars and the failled decolonisation. So we know the errors we have done. And so today we think.
So usa should think about the world and think about his way of life.
Sutherland searchs a positive solution for both, so you gat more questions after than before read. On the oposite Peters seems to have responses for all and a strong point of view, he is sure of what he think.
So at the crossroad i could say there is an easy way, simple ; But everyone here knows that the way to the truth is hard, with lot of questions to be answered humbly.

By Grosnain on Nov 5, 2009 at 5:16 pm

As European citizen, I’am sure that NATO troops have to leave Afghanistan . For 7 years, money was given to corrupted president and ministers. The building ou re-buildind of roads, hospitals, schools, water and electricity networks is not realized.
Think over : by killing some hundred talibans, is that policy a warranty to eliminate social, economic, and cultural reasons giving terrorism ? Remember that most of “kamikaze” are recruited among the poorest and more desperate people.

Just an aknowledgement : Do you no that afghani governement (ministers and people around them) is the most important producer of heroin in the world ? Could they be supported by Western countries ?

By Dédé73 on Nov 7, 2009 at 5:45 pm

and do you know there are more heroin addicted in pakistan and iran than in europe? Things are not complex but they are stratified, so we’ve gat to think.

By Grosnain on Nov 10, 2009 at 4:41 pm

Growing up during Vietnam and barely missing the draft for that war, I can say that it is an exercise in futility to “Nation Build” corrupt governments that the indigenous people do not support. I can also say that a democratic republic does not always work well in third world countries. Afghanistan is a tribal patchwork of communities with a few larger cities. Instead of pushing a democracy, it would be better to construct a government with the local tribal leaders and war lords in on the power sharing. The King’s Peace would be imposed upon the country, but the Government should not be corrupt and provide law and security. Those that wish to favor the Taliban should be treated as Sherman treated Georgia during our Civil War, they should feel the hard hand of war. I think we need to have a Norman Medievial mentality in dealing with Afghanistan.

By Tom Maloney on Nov 10, 2009 at 9:10 pm

Afganistan is a very complicated area of the world. Those who have ventured into this country who did not study the past history of the would be invaders of the past who tried to set their forms of government and ways on these peoples did not profit from wisdom. The very tribal nature, the terrain, economy and the culture of this country bears great military, political and culture history and planing. We did none of the above as well as we should have done. It would take a utterly ruthless and devastating form of warfare to get the people so beat down that they would almost have to be destroyed before you could raise them into the modern world. We need to go back to the drawing board on this one.

By Robert on Nov 17, 2009 at 1:34 pm