Of course, the US military can’t and won’t brutalize civilians or raze villages, but there is still a lesson here. In a successful counterinsurgency, one must raise the cost of helping the insurgent and lower the cost of turning them in. In early 2007, the US military instituted the “surge” in Iraq; they flooded Baghdad with American and Iraqi soldiers and cleaned out the city block by block. However, what they did next was even more important: they stayed. Suddenly, if an Iraqi civilian helped an insurgent, he was likely to be caught. At the same time, if an Iraqi civilian turned in an insurgent, the insurgent was likely to be caught. Controlling the population is the key to winning a counterinsurgency.

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The US Army’s Take on the Spanish Insurgency
These lessons are not lost on the US Army. Prior to taking command of Coalition forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus spearheaded the development of the US Army’s new counterinsurgency manual (FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006). The following is an excerpt from Chapter 4, “Designing Counterinsurgency Campaigns and Operations.”

Campaign Assessment and Reassessment?
"During Napoleon’s occupation of Spain in 1808, it seems little thought was given to the potential challenges of subduing the Spanish populace. Conditioned by the decisive victories at Austerlitz and Jena, Napoleon believed the conquest of Spain would be little more than a “military promenade.” Napoleon’s campaign included a rapid conventional military victory but ignored the immediate requirement to provide a stable environment for the populace.

"The French failed to analyze the Spanish people, their history, culture, motivations, and potential to support or hinder the achievement of French political objectives. The Spanish people were accustomed to hardship, suspicious of foreigners and constantly involved in skirmishes with security forces. Napoleon’s cultural miscalculation resulted in a protracted occupation struggle that lasted nearly six years and ultimately required approximately three-fifths of the Empire’s total armed strength, almost four times the force of 80,000 Napoleon originally designated.

"The Spanish resistance drained the resources of the French Empire. It was the beginning of the end for Napoleon. At the theater level, a complete understanding of the problem and a campaign design that allowed the counterinsurgency force to learn and adapt was lacking."

Source: US Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: 15 December 2006), 4-1-2.

Major Pat Proctor (US Army) is an Iraq War veteran with over fifteen years of active service. As a joint operational planner, he participated in the 2007 campaign redesign for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds master’s degrees from the US Army Command and General Staff College and School of Advance Military Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent those of the Department of Defense.

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