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	<title>Comments on: The Next War?</title>
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		<title>By: Rob</title>
		<link>http://www.armchairgeneral.com/the-next-war.htm/comment-page-1#comment-8162</link>
		<dc:creator>Rob</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2009 16:43:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Interesting scenerio, but what you have failed to address is covert operations.  Since by definition, what these operations might consist of is unknown, but doubtless some thought has been given to covert methods of dismantling Pyongyang&#039;s command and control capabilities, possibly including the assassination of key leadership figures.  This article also assumes an order of battle that closely follows that of the first Korean conflict.  With the availability of UAV&#039;s, stealth aircraft and highly accurate cruise missles, that is unlikely.  While poor weather may ground conventional aircraft, it would not necessarily be an issue for Tomahawks with GPS guidance which would no doubt be heavily used against air defense and command and control facilities.  The only real threat would be from NKPA infantry and artillery, a significant threat, but one that is heavily reliant on a vulnerable logistics system.  As an army commander, I would concentrate my forces, particularly my attack helicopter forces against NKPA supply lines and hope to interdict them to a degree that it significantly slows the advance of infantry units until the weather improves enough to resume air operations.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting scenerio, but what you have failed to address is covert operations.  Since by definition, what these operations might consist of is unknown, but doubtless some thought has been given to covert methods of dismantling Pyongyang&#8217;s command and control capabilities, possibly including the assassination of key leadership figures.  This article also assumes an order of battle that closely follows that of the first Korean conflict.  With the availability of UAV&#8217;s, stealth aircraft and highly accurate cruise missles, that is unlikely.  While poor weather may ground conventional aircraft, it would not necessarily be an issue for Tomahawks with GPS guidance which would no doubt be heavily used against air defense and command and control facilities.  The only real threat would be from NKPA infantry and artillery, a significant threat, but one that is heavily reliant on a vulnerable logistics system.  As an army commander, I would concentrate my forces, particularly my attack helicopter forces against NKPA supply lines and hope to interdict them to a degree that it significantly slows the advance of infantry units until the weather improves enough to resume air operations.</p>
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