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Tet With Tanks – The NVA Easter Offensive, 1972Frederick F. Lash Jr. | September 11, 2007 | 15 comments | Print | E-mail DRAMA AT PHU BAI; VICTORIES AT QUANG TRI AND AN LOC“Gentlemen, if Phu Bai falls, it will be the equivalent of 10 USS Pueblos falling into North Korean hands,” Army Lieutenant Colonel J. Wesley Loffert, Phu Bai’s deputy commander, announced the day after Camp Carroll’s surrender. Loffert’s words stunned the huddled group of American officers who provided security and logistics for the intelligence unit. Each of these men well remembered the national disgrace four years earlier when the Pueblo’s captain surrendered his ship, caught patrolling off North Korean waters, without firing a shot. They knew that the Pueblo’s crew was unable to destroy classified documents and sensitive equipment. They now realized they were guarding similar but even more sensitive electronic eavesdropping equipment. The loss of Camp Carroll was particularly devastating. Nearly 2,000 ARVN troops surrendered. In addition, the enemy captured 22 artillery pieces intact, including four long-range 175 mm guns, the most significant artillery fire support weapons between Phu Bai and the DMZ. As a white flag was raised and NVA soldiers penetrated Camp Carroll’s outer defensive positions, the American adviser group, including Lieutenant Colonel Camper and Major Brown, quickly boarded an American Chinook helicopter piloted by Captain Harry Thain, who braved intense artillery and small-arms fire to whisk away the group to safety. Sadly, Thain was killed a month later when his helicopter was destroyed by enemy fire while supporting operations of the 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery just north of Phu Bai.
At Phu Bai, the Americans heard of Thain’s rescue of the U.S. advisers at their nightly briefing. Camp Carroll’s ignominious surrender – with the U.S. advisers vainly prodding the ARVN soldiers to fight – was not perceived as a ringing endorsement of President Nixon’s vaunted “Vietnamization” policy. Yet the soldiers at Phu Bai weren’t worried about political policies; they were more concerned that the North Vietnamese would soon attack them. Their concerns seemed well grounded. For four days in mid-April, the Americans at Phu Bai watched a steady stream of panicked ARVN soldiers and Vietnamese civilians heading south along Highway One. The moving mass included men and women on foot carrying bundles, as well as some riding motorbikes laden with suitcases, and others packed into small Asian-made buses or larger ARVN military trucks. At one point, one of the dangerously overloaded ARVN trucks overturned, spilling soldiers and civilians over the road. Yet the crowd of refugees continued to move forward, ignoring their injured compatriots whom they left for the Americans at Phu Bai to administer first aid to. The crowd proceeded unhappily, moving down from Quang Tri and Hue, 12 miles to the north, and from numerous surrounding hamlets. Sometimes a few meters separated groups of refugees, while at other times it was a solid mass of humanity. Clearly, the NVA had failed to win the “hearts and minds” of this region’s population as they scrambled desperately to escape the onslaught. By the third afternoon of that exodus, all but a handful of Phu Bai’s Vietnamese security guards, who manned the perimeter watch towers and bunkers, had slipped away. The situation was not encouraging: NVA troops were overrunning the defensive line to the north and moving toward Phu Bai; reports of enemy tanks trickled in; every civilian within miles of Phu Bai was gone or headed south; and there were no combat troops at Phu Bai. That night, the few remaining security guards and American Soldiers from the intelligence unit formed an ad hoc defensive security force. Loffert’s concerns were justified. By early May, the situation in South Vietnam was desperate. To the north, the North Vietnamese held the entire northern province of Quang Tri and its namesake capital city, and they were applying pressure toward Hue, Vietnam’s ancient imperial capital. Hue had been one of the primary targets of North Vietnam’s famous 1968 Tet Offensive, and its strategic importance was significant. On May 1, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam sent a confidential message to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird predicting that Hue would fall, a defeat that would likely end the rule of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. [continued on next page] Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help Armchair General by bookmarking to
           
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15 Comments to “Tet With Tanks – The NVA Easter Offensive, 1972”
I also was stationed TDY at Firebase Sarge and wouldd like to hear from anyone that was on the firebase…. I was in Vietnam for19 months total and stationed at Phu Bai Our Commanding Officer was Lt. Col Gerard M. Dirx. Please feel free to contact me.
By Brian A Leon on Dec 8, 2008 at 2:39 pm
To Brian Leon,
In late November 1971 the 27th Combat Engineer Bn. based at Camp Eagle designed and built a bunker on Firebase Sarge for the 8th RRFS to house self-contained remote monitoring equipment. I took photos of the firebase in December 1971 including the bunker. Around mid-2000 locational information and the photos were shared with the then J.T.F.F.A. in Hawaii to aid their search for Westcott and Crosby, MIA’s.
By Richard Kirchner on Feb 18, 2009 at 6:48 pm
I was one of a few 407th soldiers who helped build the bunker on Sarge that December. I remember a nick name of one of the guys from the engineer unit named “Okie”. I ran into him at Phu Bai after we were evacuated from the DMZ area in Mar-Apr. He looked at me like I was a ghost. I was one of the guys who stayed on Sarge after the bunker was built. The other guys name was Crosby. I was moved to Con Thien in the beginning of 72 and Crosby stayed on Sarge. Of course, as you probably know Crosby and Wescott were killed on Sarge 30 Mar 72. Okie didn’t know I had moved to A-4(Con Thien) and of course his reaction to me there at Phu Bai that day. Always have good memories of the engineers. They helped us build up other areas that proved to save our lives from heavy artillery (130 mm) on A-4. We all survived on A-4 and a few of us are still in contact. Over and out.
By Chuck Martin on Mar 1, 2009 at 11:42 pm
Richard
I would like to see the pictures from Sarge if possible.
By Chuck Martin on Mar 2, 2009 at 12:01 am
Thanks for the account. If you have pictures of Sarge, Quang Tri or any of the other northern locations on line somewhere, I like Chuck Martin, would surely be interested in seeing them. I was a member of the 407th RRD and have posted an account of the Easter Offensive from our perspective at the detachment (www.geocities.com/gdwhit2001).
thanks again,
- duane
By G Duane Whitman on Mar 3, 2009 at 12:38 pm
In my opinion and from my research – this statment:
“In this crucial battle, American advisers played a critical role, coordinating B-52 strikes and offshore naval gunfire and, in many cases, planning complex operations. Nonetheless, ARVN ground forces – backed by critical U.S. fire support – were the central players, displaying tenacity, resourcefulness and courage.”
-while it is true…does not tell the whole story that our vets, our American soldiers, that were there and fought, provided multiple support roles and paid dearly, some even with their lives, deserves to be told.
When is the whole story going to be told and not just what we are told to think? Please help do all of our Vietnam vets justice.
Vets, like my husband who was an eighteen year old kid, who wasn’t a medic, doing medivacs with the 571st Evac and on his own helicopter because most of the medivac units were gone due to the U.S. pullout.
The veterans that he served with. The veterans that gave their lives.
How come their story doesn’t get told? They are not just ‘ U.S.fire support’. They are men…men that fought, bled, saved and some died there. They were heros.
By Fran Lawrence on Apr 4, 2009 at 2:35 pm
Thank you for telling the Marines story. Every single Marine that served in the Easter Offensive should be recognized as all of our men and women that served there then.
Thank you.
By Fran Lawrence on Apr 4, 2009 at 2:50 pm
Also, March 29-30 1972 at Quang Tri, was the first time that SAMs and regular AAA weapons were used. The NVA introduced the Soviet-built SA-7 (Strella) heat-seeking, shoulder-fired missile, for use against low and slow-flying Allied aircraft. It was deadly, and numerous Allied aircraft losses were attributed to the weapon.
Air cavalry units with the primary mission of supporting South Vietnamese Army forces were the only active Army combat units in Vietnam throughout 1972. Both the 11th CAG and the 12th CAG, (Combat Aviation Group), were there until at least Feb. 1973.
Many of these men fought, supplied logistical lift and provided medevacs in support of the ARVN troops in the biggest battle of Vietnam, ‘The Easter Offensive’ or ‘The Spring Offensive’. ‘The Easter Offensive’ began and ended in ‘The Second Battle of Quang Tri’. Some of these men died there.
Until USAF fire power could be transported back from Saigon, (sent there from the ‘drawdown’), 1st Calvary, Combat Aviation Groups held down the fort with help from the Marines that where still there. There were still some Navy offshore that helped too later with firepower. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, backed by the United States Army, shelled more than 80,000 tons of ordnance, the destructive capacity equivalent to almost six Hiroshima-size atomic bombs.
When the massive firepower was first unleashed, unsuspecting NVA soldiers reporting for duty were in the city at the time and Quang Tri was referred to as ‘Hamburger City’ by some that saw the aftermath.
As well, leading out of the city was still ‘The Highway of Horrors’ from when South Vietnam had earlier lost its Quang Tri Province on May 1st, 1972 and the NVA cut down masses of panic civilians, war refugees, who were fleeing the city and got stuck at Truong Phuoc Bridge because of the traffic jam after an enemy artillery shell heavily damaged the bridge. Chaos occurred when enemy artillery began a rain of many hundreds shells from their 130mm guns on the refugees. A moment later, Communist foot soldiers attacked the crowd with infantry weapons that included mortars and grenade launchers.
When ‘The Second Battle of Quang Tri’ was over, (Sept. 16, 1972 the city was taken back. On Oct. 22, 1972 Quang Tri Province firebases were secured), not one building remained standing. The intense bombing, combined with U.S. use of the Agent Orange defoliant, turned the land into a virtual moonscape.
This all took place during ‘Operation Ceasefire’ when we were standing down and turning over the bases to the ARVN.
Americans still have little knowledge of this time in Vietnam and the part that brave American troops, including U.S. Army Air Calvary, Combat Aviation Groups, took in it.
As well, the brave nurses and doctors, many that volunteered, during this horrific time.
By Fran Lawrence on Apr 7, 2009 at 1:42 pm
I was at Phu Bai from December, 70 to August 71. I transferred to Con Thien 407th in August to November, 71. Our bunker several direct hits until a delayed fuse rocket imploded and hit Floyd Youngblood and me. We had to rebuild it anew. others there were Richard Petry, Kelvin ‘kool breeze’ Hunt, Greg Andrews, Ron Messinger, Carrol, and myself , Felix Rodriguez.
By Felix M. Rodriguez on Apr 22, 2009 at 3:31 pm
I was in the marines and we were brought in because danang was being overrun during this. I can’t find hardly anything to support my va claim on how we got hit with everything almost every night. I have lost hearing due to the fire fights rocket and mortar attacks with the sappers blowing themselves and other up and I still have the dreams of fighting at night. If anyone has anything on this time around Danang please contact me. james.joseph.green@gmail.com
By James Green on May 9, 2009 at 5:47 pm
I have enjoyed your article. I am trying to contact G Duane Whitman, I was with him at the 407thrrd the last days of its existence in 1972 Quang tri. I have made contact with other of the last nine there and would like to relay this information to him. Thank you if it is possible for you to do this for me . Larry Smith
By robert larry smith on May 12, 2009 at 9:47 pm
Larry, you can contact me at gdwhit2001@yahoo.com or visit my new web site at http://www.thelastsevendays.com and leave a comment … I tried emailing you at the last address I had for you, but did not get a response.
- duane
By G Duane Whitman on Jun 15, 2009 at 8:42 am
I was in Attack Squadron VA-94 aboard the USS Coral Sea during Easter, 1971. Our A7-E aircraft had all been grounded due to mishaps on take-offs from carriers caused by engine failures, but when the Easter offensive began the planes were quickly airborne. I copied the following from the VA 94 web site that I found a couple of days ago:
The VA-94 Mighty Shrikes
The Mighty Shrikes flying the A-7E Corsair II first deployment on United States Ship Coral Sea CVA 43. This was the Shrikes’s seventh combat cruise to Western Pacific/Vietnam.
Navy Unit Commendation
15 Dec 1971 to 01 Jul 1972
• April 16, 1972:
Commander D. L. Moss in A-7E BuNo. 156860 was shot down by a SAM, over North Vietnam. Commander Moss was rescued.
• May 1, 1972:
Lieutenant M. D. Surdyk in A-7E BuNo. 156888 was shot down by a SAM, over North Vietnam. Lieutenant Surdyk was was rescued.
• May 9, 1972:
The squadron participated in Operation Pocket Money, the mining of Haiphong harbor. Aircraft from VA-94, as well as the other attack squadrons deployed aboard United States Ship Coral Sea CVA 43, planned and executed the mining of the harbor.
• May 24, 1972:
Lieutenant Commander H. A. Eikel in A-7E BuNo. 156877 was shot down by a SAM, over North Vietnam. Lieutenant Commander Eikel was rescued.
• May through June 1972:
VA-94 participated in operation Linebacker I, heavy air strikes against targets in North Vietnam.
By Bill Thomas on Jul 24, 2009 at 4:10 pm
I was at Tan My for the entire offensive and watched a good portion of it from a 40ft tower that shook 24/7 from the B52 strikes. I was USAF Security Police. We were same place as the fox/4th Air Cav. We had two marines and a platoon of the 196th helping with security. The mass exudus of the South Vietnamese was scary when, at night, you are seeing the war getting closer and closer. Spookies and Cobras were awesome to watch. We saw plenty.
Mike Thomas, SSgt
DaNang, 366SPS Det 1 TanMy 1972
By Mike Thomas on Aug 4, 2009 at 10:50 am
Thank you General Truong for giving credit to the Americans that were there assisting the ARVN in the Battles of Quang Tri during the Easter Offensive until the very end and calling them by name. It means so much to me – especially since it has been the only reference that I have found on the Internet doing so.
Our own American military have given them no public credit whatsoever, these troops that stayed and fought and served long after the all of the ground troops went home in August 1972.
But you gave them credit where credit was due. Thank you.
May you rest in peace.
Ngo, Lieutenant General Quang Truong, The Easter offensive of 1972. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980.
“In addition to support provided the U.S. Air Force, I Corps forces also received much assistance from the U.S. Army 11th Combat Aviation Group whose activities were closely coordinated with those of ARVN units. This group provided essential support with troop lift logistical support and gunships.”
By Lizzie on Oct 18, 2009 at 7:09 am