The Hub of the Matter

The Ground Tactical Plan

“It may be of interest to future generals to realize that one makes plans to fit circumstances and does not try to create circumstances to fit plans. That way lies danger”. – Gen. George S. Patton

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LAST MONTH
In our last article, we focused on two basic things. First, we highlighted the various types of helicopters utilized in air assault operations. Each of these ‘birds’ has a distinct role in the conduct of an air assault. Second, we provided you a primer on air assault terminology. As we always stress, everyone must be talking the same language. These basics will assist you in your understanding of the remainder of the articles tied to air assault operations.

THIS MONTH
In this article, we will begin getting into some detail on the key components of an air assault operation. We will begin with the Ground Tactical Plan. Clearly, everything revolves around the operations on the ground. We will discuss what is addressed in the plan, how to utilize all your assets in the plan, and some keys to success. To get the blood flowing a bit, we will start with a ‘there we were’ story.

INTRODUCTION
Summer 1985, Debnam Pass in the Fort Irwin Mojave Desert in California: The 4th Motorized Rifle Battalion (MRB) of the 32nd Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (GMRR) (Opposing Forces or OPFOR) is assigned the mission to defend Debnam Pass against a heavy/light Brigade Combat Team (BCT). As a heavy/light BCT, the Blue brigade consists of an Armor Battalion Task Force (TF), a Mechanized Battalion TF, and an Air Assault Battalion.

Before we begin — Debnam Pass is narrow gap in a rugged mountain complex north of Fort Irwin proper. The gap chokes down to around 600 meters at its narrowest point and forms a 2 km lane from west to east.

So there we were …

During prep, around 18 hours before we expected the attack, the sky to our west filled with Blackhawk Helicopters. It appeared that the enemy was coming much sooner than we expected. We scrambled our BMP’s and Tanks to their fighting positions while the infantry clamored up the walls of the narrow pass to their holes in the desert.

The Blackhawks set down on the west side of a hilltop about 6km away from us. In just a minute, the birds were back up and headed back in the direction from which they came. It had all happened too fast for us to react to, at a time we hadn’t expected, and in a location that seemed useless to them.

We were on the edge for the rest of the day and into the night. As the sun set, there was still no sign of the infantry that must have emerged from those helicopters. Around 2300, the valley filled with the unmistakable sound of engine noise from armored vehicles. Soon, we realized there were six Sheridan tanks making there way towards us. These were armored recon vehicles (no longer in the inventory). We had a brief engagement with the Sheridan’s in which one or two of them were hit and the rest withdrew. Again, nothing came of it and we waited.

A few hours later, I heard a noise behind my position. I looked from my hatch and couldn’t see anything, but I could clearly hear voices. As I concentrated, it soon became apparent that I was seeing the troops who had unloaded from the helicopters some 15 hours earlier. A company of infantrymen was descending upon me and I knew I was done for.

This unit knew what it was doing. They knew our motorized rifle battalion had firepower, air defense, artillery support and mobility so they didn’t try to land on top of us. They also didn’t land in an open area that we could easily drive to. They landed within the security zone and immediately faded into the rugged mountain terrain that our armor could not negotiate. We had to wait for them and they came in the dead of night from the rear. The time and place was excellent and played to the Air Assault Task Force (AATF) strengths.

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