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"In any problem where an opposing force exists and cannot be regulated, one
must foresee and provide for alternative courses.  Adaptability is the law
which governs survivability in war as well as in life."

-Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart "Strategy"

LAST MONTH

In our last article, we began a series focusing on air assault operations. In our initial piece, our goal was to set the conditions for future articles tied to the planning, preparation, and execution of air assault operations. With that in mind, we keyed on the following subject areas: 1) A brief history of air assault operations. 2) What air assault operations can do for you. 3) What air assault operations cannot do for you. 4) The tactical employment of air assault operations. 5) The operational guidelines of conducting operational guidelines. We hope last month provided you sufficient background so you can truly grasp the intricacies of air assault operations. If you have been involved in an air assault before; we believe you will quickly find just how challenging it can be. Of course, this challenge if met will likely result in huge benefits!

THIS MONTH

In this month’s article, we will key in four areas. First, we will begin with a little ‘war story’ from our past. Hard to believe this was almost 25 years ago! Second, we will highlight the second most critical element of an air assault (after the Soldier) – the helicopter. Third, we will define some critical terminology related to air assault operations. Finally, we will briefly describe how an air assault should be executed by the book. (Of course, the book normally does not read as planned). These areas will set the conditions for the upcoming articles focused on the air assault planning sequence.

INTRODUCTION

Summer in the Mojave Desert, 1985: As a member of the US Army’s opposing forces (OPFOR), chartered to replicate the then current resident threat of the Soviet Union, I had fought against every unit in the US inventory. On this particular occasion we were facing a heavy-light enemy consisting of a mechanized infantry brigade reinforced by an air assault battalion. We had our work cut out for us. The enemy had Abrams Tanks and Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles and, if that wasn’t enough, they had an air assault battalion. The ‘sky troopers’ came packing a deadly and elusive company of TOW Hummers and the lift required to move the whole shooting match. We were not optimistic, but we were determined to give it our best.

My motorized rifle battalion (MRB) began the rotation by defending a remote cluster of hills nicknamed ‘Australia’. The name referred to the ‘outback’ location surrounded by desert—an island in a sea of sand. We laid in a motorized company (MRC) as a forward security element (FSE) ten kilometers north of our Alamo defense. They sat in a narrow gap of a hull ridgeline called the Whale Gap because the ridge looked like Moby Dick on the map. Their mission was not to defeat the attacking enemy forces, but to damage them, slow them down, and make their passage through the gap difficult. They would buy our main defense time to continue preparation and would direct deep artillery. Once the enemy was close to breaking their position, they would withdraw to the main defense ‘down under’. This was standard Soviet doctrine.

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