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Tactics 101 035 – The WithdrawalRick Baillergeon and John Sutherland | February 16, 2009 | one comment | Print | E-mail When we discuss withdrawals we distinguish them in two categories. First, we determine the influence of the enemy during the actual conduct of the withdrawal. Certainly, as planning begins to conduct the withdrawal; you will be under some form of enemy pressure. However, during your mission analysis, you will decide the extent of enemy pressure during the execution. Thus, if you anticipate enemy pressure during the execution you will be conducting a withdrawal under enemy pressure. If you do not believe there will be enemy pressure then it is a withdrawal not under pressure. (Pretty complicated! — Hey that’s doctrine!) The second distinguishing characteristic is the assistance the unit receives from outside the organization. Normally, this assistance comes in the form of the security force (discussed later). If a unit receives an outside security force; it is conducting an assisted withdrawal. If the security force comes from within; it is an unassisted withdrawal. (Once again, PHD level stuff!) However, in both cases, it is critical to know if it is under pressure or not under pressure; or assisted or unassisted. Planning The Withdrawal Organization In any operation, it is critical you structure your force for success. This is no different in the execution of a withdrawal. In fact, the organization of your forces for the withdrawal is certainly one of the keys to accomplishing the mission. What makes it so difficult, is that you may have to conduct the organization in the heat of battle because the decision to withdraw can occur very quickly. Below we will detail the elements you will want to designate for the withdrawal. Security Force – Without a doubt, the security force is the most important cog in the execution of the withdrawal. Within the withdrawal, the security force is the element that essentially maintains contact with the enemy enabling the rest of the force to withdraw to the rear. In an unassisted withdrawal, the security force is resourced from within. In an assisted withdrawal, the security force is provided by another unit. The mission of security force is extremely challenging. First, they must provide the main body with the necessary time and forward protection they require to withdraw from their current positions to assembly areas to their rear. Second, depending on the situation, they may have to be ‘crafty’ enough to sell the enemy that they are the entire force and a withdrawal is not taking place. Finally, to cap it off, they must themselves be able to break contact and withdraw when the time comes. This force is appropriately called a Detachment Left in Contact (DLIC). The DLIC is a smaller element of the overall security force. As the name suggests, it is the last force to initiate the withdrawal. Truthfully, there is no more difficult mission a unit could be assigned. This unit must be prepared to attack, defend, delay, etc…. The challenge is that the unit leadership will have little time to decide. Make the wrong decision and the results could be catastrophic. To achieve the above, the security force/DLIC must be a self-contained, combined arms organization. They must possess the lethality, the multipliers to enhance the lethality, and the logistical support to accomplish their critical tasks. Depending on the organization, a cavalry unit is certainly well-suited for the mission. If that is not an option, a commander and his staff must be creative. The formation of the security force must be the first decision made in terms of organization. The other pieces fall into place from there. In terms of total strength, it is not uncommon for the security force to total at least 1/3 of the unit’s overall combat power Reserve – Often overlooked is the necessity to designate a reserve during the execution of the withdrawal. As you delve more into this article; you will readily see what a fluid and rapidly changing operation a withdrawal this. Because of this, a commander must have a reserve to utilize if the situation dictates. In the withdrawal, there are several situations that could arise where a reserve could be the difference between mission failure and success. These include: 1) An enemy flank attack on the main body 2) Assisting the DLIC or other security forces in breaking contact with the enemy 3) Defeating possible enemy attacks at the final assembly area. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Tags: 20th-21st century warfare, Scholarship
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One Comment to “Tactics 101 035 – The Withdrawal”
One does not have to look far or abroad to find experts for the most difficult military task: Withdrawal under fire. Confederate General William Joseph Hardee is an acknowledged expert. Here an excerpt gleaned from the Internet.
By the way: descendent of the Hardee family live in Fernandina Beach, Florida.
Gerhardt Thamm
William Joseph Hardee
(Supplemental Biography From The Confederate Military History)
Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee was born in Camden county, Georgia, in November, 1815. After receiving a military education at West Point, he entered the army with the class of 1838, as a second-lieutenant of the Second cavalry, and was promoted first-lieutenant in 1839, and served in the Florida war of 1840. He was then sent to Europe by the government as a member of a military commission to study the organization of foreign armies, and in that capacity visited the military school at St. Maur, France.
In 1844 he was promoted captain, and in 1846 crossed the Rio Grande with General Taylor. He behaved with gallantry in the Mexican war, was taken prisoner at Curricito, but exchanged, and for his valor at La Hoya was brevetted major. In 1853 his professional accomplishments caused his selection by the secretary of war, for the compilation of a system of infantry tactics, which was adopted in March, 1855. In the following year “Hardee’s Tactics” was introduced at West Point, where he was appointed commandant with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1861 he resigned this commission and entered the Confederate service as colonel of cavalry March 16th, being assigned to command at Fort Morgan, Ala. On June 17th, he was promoted to brigadier-general, in which rank he organized a brigade of Arkansas regiments, and operated in that State until called with his men across the Mississippi, when he was commissioned major-general and put in command of a division of the army in Kentucky and Tennessee under Albert Sidney Johnston. He led the advance from Corinth in command of the Third army corps, and commanded the first line of attack at Shiloh, where he was wounded, but managed his command with such energy that he was promoted major-general.
In the following summer he was put in immediate command of the army of the Mississippi, afterward called the army of Tennessee, and during the Kentucky campaign he commanded the left wing of Bragg’s army. In the battle of Perryville he bore a conspicuous part, and he was immediately afterward promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. At the battle of Murfreesboro the left wing under his masterly leadership was successful in the fight, and he was especially commended by General Bragg “for skill, valor and ability.”
General Hardee had now well earned the exalted rank which he held and a military reputation which was tersely expressed by his soldiers in the cognomen “Old Reliable.” In 1863 he was detailed to defend Mississippi and Alabama, but returned to the command of his corps at Chattanooga, and commanded the right wing at Missionary Ridge, where General Thomas declared he was “the most efficient general the Confederacy had on the field.” The subsequent maneuver of his troops at Cassville and his masterly retreat in echelon of divisions won the renewed admiration of his opponents. On December 2, 1863, he succeeded General Bragg in command of the army, but soon turned this over to General Polk, who in turn gave place to Gen. J. E. Johnston. Under the latter and his successor, J. B. Hood, he commanded a corps of the army of Tennessee through the Atlanta campaign, taking a prominent part in the fighting at Resaca, Kenesaw Mountain, and other points, and particularly at Peach Tree Creek and the battle of July 22d, where he commanded the flank movement against the Federal left wing. His corps was again engaged at Jonesboro and the last fighting of the campaign.
In October, 1864, he was assigned to command the department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, with the task of collecting at Savannah forces to operate against Sherman’s advance. The troops he required were no longer to be found in the South, and by one of the most masterly retreats of the war he evaded Sherman’s overwhelming force before Savannah, and withdrew to Charleston and thence to Columbia. At Averysboro, in March, 1865, he punished the enemy effectively, and a few days later he led in the battle of Bentonville the last charge that was made by the Confederacy’s war-worn soldiers, and his only son, sixteen years of age, was among the last to fall. In this last battle of the four years, with undiminished spirit, the general, as Johnston has described it, “with his knightly gallantry dashed over the enemy’s breastworks on horseback in front of his men.” It is told of General Hardee, illustrating his thoroughness as a soldier, that he was the only lieutenant-general who personally inspected the arms and accoutrements of each soldier of his corps. General J. E. Johnston said of him that “he was more capable of commanding twenty thousand men in battle than any other Confederate general.” General Hardee died at Wytheville, Va., November 6, 1873, and his remains were interred at Selma, Ala., where he had resided after the war.
By Gerhardt Thamm on Feb 21, 2009 at 10:07 am