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Tactics 101 035 – The Withdrawal, Page 2By Rick Baillergeon and John Sutherland | Tactics101|War College | Published: February 16, 2009 at 1:07 pm“Of all operations of war, a withdrawal under heavy enemy pressure is probably the most difficult and perilous. Indeed it is recorded of the great Moltke, that when he was being praised for his generalship in the Franco-Prussian War, and was told by an admirer that his reputation would rank with such great captains as Napoleon, Frederick, or Turenne, he answered, “No, for I have never conducted a retreat.” – Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin
Last Month In our last article, we provided you some things to think about when conducting a defense. We emphasized the wise commander utilizes all the resources he has at his disposal. He understands what he can achieve with each resource and just as important, what he can not. We highlighted it is critical for the commander to synchronize the effects of his resources at the right time and right place. When the commander has accomplished this, he has truly set the conditions for victory in the defense. This Month One of the most challenging operations any unit can execute is the retrograde. Yet, despite its’ complexities, it receives minimal discussion and more importantly, little or no more training in the field or during staff exercises. Why does retrograde receive this apparent lack of respect? Several reasons come quickly to mind. First, the sheer act of moving away from your foe instills negative feelings in many. After all, what unit filled with the warrior ethos would turn tail on their enemy? Second, the training of retrograde simply does not stir up the competitive juices of Soldiers and staff planners. Tell a unit they are going to train on withdrawal operations and you will likely get a bunch of blank stares. Finally, and most unfortunate, most commanders do not understand how vital a well-executed retrograde operation can be in the ultimate outcome of a campaign Whatever the case, the commander who ignores training and discussion of retrograde operations is truly doing his unit and Soldiers a huge disservice! It is the wise commander who understands the old adage, “live to fight another day” is well grounded in history. It is the wise commander who knows reinforcing defeat is a senseless waste of Soldiers lives. Finally, it is the wise commander who realizes there are times on the battlefield when the conditions for success just do not exist. With the wise commander in mind, we will focus on retrograde operations in our next two articles. This month, we will first provide you a review of retrograde. Then, we will focus on our first retrograde type – the withdrawal. Next month, we will discuss the other critical type of retrograde – the delay and retirement. So without DELAY – let’s begin. Retrograde – A Quick Review Retrograde operations are an organized movement (maneuver) to the rear, away from your opponent. There are numerous reasons for conducting a retrograde. These include: *Disengage from combat operations because the conditions are not there for victory *Gain valuable time without fighting a decisive engagement *Force your enemy into culminating by lengthening his logistical tail or inflicting additional casualties *Draw your enemy into an unfavorable situation so you may seize the initiative *Preserve your forces or avoid combat because the situation no longer affords you the potential for success *Based on the current situation; reposition forces to a more favorable position * Position a portion of your forces elsewhere on the battlefield to assist in future operations * Shorten your lines of communication (LOCs) to assist in logistical sustainment * Based on the current situation (and to posture yourself for the future) position forces where it can safely conduct reconstitution (rearm/refit/retool) * Adjust your defensive scheme to accomplish your purpose * Deceive the enemy to set the conditions for future operations As you see, the possible reasons to conduct a retrograde are numerous. There are three forms of retrograde. They are delay, retirement, and withdrawal. As we delve into these forms the next few months, you will find that each share many similarities with one another. Depending on the environment, you could conceivably move from one form of retrograde to another. The key consideration distinguishing the forms of retrograde is the specific intent or purpose. These purposes are:
Since we will focus this article on withdrawal; let’s briefly discuss delay and retirement. Delay – This is a form of retrograde where a unit under pressure trades space (terrain) for time. It does this by slowing the enemy’s momentum (physically and hopefully psychologically) and inflicting damage (casualties, destroying assets, etc.) on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged. The last part is the most challenging! It is extremely difficult to achieve the above without becoming decisively engaged. If this occurs the objective of the delay will not be achieved. Retirement — This is a form of retrograde in which the unit is not in contact with the enemy and wants to move away to prepare for other operations. Obviously, this is the easiest (not that any of the forms is easy to execute) to conduct and involves the least risk. Normally, units executing a retirement will move away from the enemy in a tactical road march. As in any combat operation, a unit should be prepared to fight, but the chances of this are less likely than in a delay or withdrawal. Withdrawal – Definition Is a form of retrograde in which a unit is in contact, but not necessarily under pressure. In this operation, the unit disengages from the enemy and moves to an assembly area or a new defensive position. A unit may conduct a withdrawal unassisted or with assistance from other friendly forces. Within the withdrawal, there are two basic types – under enemy pressure and not under enemy pressure. We will discuss each in detail momentarily. First, we will highlight some basic principles that are critical to achieving success in either type. ![]() The May 1864 Confederate Withdrawal from Resaca “A Retrograde Which Postured Forces for Future Operations” Principles When planning the withdrawal, there are several principles you must consider. These include:
Types of Withdrawals When we discuss withdrawals we distinguish them in two categories. First, we determine the influence of the enemy during the actual conduct of the withdrawal. Certainly, as planning begins to conduct the withdrawal; you will be under some form of enemy pressure. However, during your mission analysis, you will decide the extent of enemy pressure during the execution. Thus, if you anticipate enemy pressure during the execution you will be conducting a withdrawal under enemy pressure. If you do not believe there will be enemy pressure then it is a withdrawal not under pressure. (Pretty complicated! — Hey that’s doctrine!) The second distinguishing characteristic is the assistance the unit receives from outside the organization. Normally, this assistance comes in the form of the security force (discussed later). If a unit receives an outside security force; it is conducting an assisted withdrawal. If the security force comes from within; it is an unassisted withdrawal. (Once again, PHD level stuff!) However, in both cases, it is critical to know if it is under pressure or not under pressure; or assisted or unassisted. Planning The Withdrawal Organization In any operation, it is critical you structure your force for success. This is no different in the execution of a withdrawal. In fact, the organization of your forces for the withdrawal is certainly one of the keys to accomplishing the mission. What makes it so difficult, is that you may have to conduct the organization in the heat of battle because the decision to withdraw can occur very quickly. Below we will detail the elements you will want to designate for the withdrawal. Security Force – Without a doubt, the security force is the most important cog in the execution of the withdrawal. Within the withdrawal, the security force is the element that essentially maintains contact with the enemy enabling the rest of the force to withdraw to the rear. In an unassisted withdrawal, the security force is resourced from within. In an assisted withdrawal, the security force is provided by another unit. The mission of security force is extremely challenging. First, they must provide the main body with the necessary time and forward protection they require to withdraw from their current positions to assembly areas to their rear. Second, depending on the situation, they may have to be ‘crafty’ enough to sell the enemy that they are the entire force and a withdrawal is not taking place. Finally, to cap it off, they must themselves be able to break contact and withdraw when the time comes. This force is appropriately called a Detachment Left in Contact (DLIC). The DLIC is a smaller element of the overall security force. As the name suggests, it is the last force to initiate the withdrawal. Truthfully, there is no more difficult mission a unit could be assigned. This unit must be prepared to attack, defend, delay, etc…. The challenge is that the unit leadership will have little time to decide. Make the wrong decision and the results could be catastrophic. To achieve the above, the security force/DLIC must be a self-contained, combined arms organization. They must possess the lethality, the multipliers to enhance the lethality, and the logistical support to accomplish their critical tasks. Depending on the organization, a cavalry unit is certainly well-suited for the mission. If that is not an option, a commander and his staff must be creative. The formation of the security force must be the first decision made in terms of organization. The other pieces fall into place from there. In terms of total strength, it is not uncommon for the security force to total at least 1/3 of the unit’s overall combat power Reserve – Often overlooked is the necessity to designate a reserve during the execution of the withdrawal. As you delve more into this article; you will readily see what a fluid and rapidly changing operation a withdrawal this. Because of this, a commander must have a reserve to utilize if the situation dictates. In the withdrawal, there are several situations that could arise where a reserve could be the difference between mission failure and success. These include: 1) An enemy flank attack on the main body 2) Assisting the DLIC or other security forces in breaking contact with the enemy 3) Defeating possible enemy attacks at the final assembly area. Main Body – After determining the composition of your security force and reserve; the remainder of the unit is essentially your main body. Depending on the time you have available; you want to posture your main body units in locations that facilitate the overall withdrawal. Thus, position those units that you want to withdraw first in locations that enable them to withdraw first. These units would include: 1) Assets to conduct reconnaissance of the next position 2) Assets to prepare the next position for occupation 3) Combat Service Support assets to facilitate the withdraw 4) A security force to secure the next position 5) Indirect fire assets not needed to support the forward security force 6) Any non-essential units that could clog up your withdrawal routes. Control Measures During planning, one of the most important actions is to develop the control measures you will utilize to command and control the withdrawal. As discussed earlier, the withdrawal can be a highly fluid operation. Because of this, it is necessary to establish some well-defined and analyzed control measures. Just as importantly, these control measures must be understood and placed in the hands and minds of the units that will utilize them. Below you will find a list of potential control measures a commander and his staff may utilize and why they are important.
From Phase Line Red to the FEBA (Forward Edge of the Battle Area) is essentially the battle space your security forces are occupying. Within this area, it is critical you have control measures that facilitate defensive operations. This is vital because it is likely your security forces will engage the enemy. Thus, control measures such as sectors/boundaries, battle positions are imperative. As the situation develops, it may be necessary for elements of the security force to withdraw. Because this is such a chaotic period, it is fruitful to preplan passage of lines control measures. This will facilitate any future passage of lines that the security force would execute. In the above diagram, you will see three passage points (7, 8, and 9) and routes through occupied battle positions have been established. To set the conditions for the actual withdrawal of the main body, control measures are essential. Without them, chaos would be inevitable. Typical control measures in this period are initial battle positions, be-prepared battle positions to occupy if the situation warrants, be-prepared positions for your reserve to occupy, sufficient maneuver routes to withdraw (these include start points and release points), alternate maneuver routes to prepare for contingencies, phase lines and checkpoints in order to monitor and control maneuver, and a final assembly area for units to eventually occupy. As in any operation, these control measures must be made available and understood by the units conducting the withdrawal! Preparing The Withdrawal Once a viable plan is set, a unit must use their preparation time to its’ fullest! In the case of a withdrawal, this time could be extremely limited. There are several actions you should strive to conduct which will greatly assist you during the actual execution of the withdrawal. These include:
Executing The Withdrawal ![]() The 1950 Retrograde Operation of the 10th Corps in the Korean War. “Despite Horrific Conditions, The US 10th Was Able To Preserve Soldiers And Equipment In A Remarkable Operation.” As in any mission, the execution of a withdrawal is not a lock-step process. As highlighted earlier, in a retrograde operation the change from the various types of retrograde (withdrawal, delay, retirement) can occur quickly. In fact, depending on the size of the unit, it is likely different elements within the unit can be conducting different types of the retrograde. For the purposes of this article, we thought we would provide you a sequence of a withdrawal (one going as planned!) so you can see how the pieces connect.
Summary To summarize this month’s topic, we thought there was no better expert to reflect on lessons learned regarding the withdrawal than Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin. During World War II, von Mellenthin served in nearly every campaign the German Army fought. Von Mellenthin aptly discusses these campaigns in his superb book, Panzer Battles. Within Panzer Battles he describes at great length the German Army’s experience in planning and executing withdrawal operations. Below you will find von Mellenthin’s thoughts on the withdrawal as shared in Panzer Battles. The vast majority of his recommendations are still extremely relevant today.
His most critical comment regarding withdrawal and the German Supreme Command follows: “During World War II, the German Supreme Command could never decide on a withdrawal while the going was good. It made up its mind either too late or when a retreat had been forced upon our armies and was already in full swing. The consequences of this stubbornness were usually disastrous for the commanders and the troops.” Next Month In part two of our discussion of retrograde operations we will concentrate on delay. This operation, to many, is the most difficult mission to accomplish. It is the ultimate challenge in terms of command decision-making. Stay in contact too long with your opponent and you face decisive engagement. Do not synchronize the use of all your combat multipliers and you will fail. It is truly a complex operation! Tags: 20th-21st century warfare, Scholarship
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One does not have to look far or abroad to find experts for the most difficult military task: Withdrawal under fire. Confederate General William Joseph Hardee is an acknowledged expert. Here an excerpt gleaned from the Internet.
By the way: descendent of the Hardee family live in Fernandina Beach, Florida.
Gerhardt Thamm
William Joseph Hardee
(Supplemental Biography From The Confederate Military History)
Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee was born in Camden county, Georgia, in November, 1815. After receiving a military education at West Point, he entered the army with the class of 1838, as a second-lieutenant of the Second cavalry, and was promoted first-lieutenant in 1839, and served in the Florida war of 1840. He was then sent to Europe by the government as a member of a military commission to study the organization of foreign armies, and in that capacity visited the military school at St. Maur, France.
In 1844 he was promoted captain, and in 1846 crossed the Rio Grande with General Taylor. He behaved with gallantry in the Mexican war, was taken prisoner at Curricito, but exchanged, and for his valor at La Hoya was brevetted major. In 1853 his professional accomplishments caused his selection by the secretary of war, for the compilation of a system of infantry tactics, which was adopted in March, 1855. In the following year “Hardee’s Tactics” was introduced at West Point, where he was appointed commandant with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In 1861 he resigned this commission and entered the Confederate service as colonel of cavalry March 16th, being assigned to command at Fort Morgan, Ala. On June 17th, he was promoted to brigadier-general, in which rank he organized a brigade of Arkansas regiments, and operated in that State until called with his men across the Mississippi, when he was commissioned major-general and put in command of a division of the army in Kentucky and Tennessee under Albert Sidney Johnston. He led the advance from Corinth in command of the Third army corps, and commanded the first line of attack at Shiloh, where he was wounded, but managed his command with such energy that he was promoted major-general.
In the following summer he was put in immediate command of the army of the Mississippi, afterward called the army of Tennessee, and during the Kentucky campaign he commanded the left wing of Bragg’s army. In the battle of Perryville he bore a conspicuous part, and he was immediately afterward promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. At the battle of Murfreesboro the left wing under his masterly leadership was successful in the fight, and he was especially commended by General Bragg “for skill, valor and ability.”
General Hardee had now well earned the exalted rank which he held and a military reputation which was tersely expressed by his soldiers in the cognomen “Old Reliable.” In 1863 he was detailed to defend Mississippi and Alabama, but returned to the command of his corps at Chattanooga, and commanded the right wing at Missionary Ridge, where General Thomas declared he was “the most efficient general the Confederacy had on the field.” The subsequent maneuver of his troops at Cassville and his masterly retreat in echelon of divisions won the renewed admiration of his opponents. On December 2, 1863, he succeeded General Bragg in command of the army, but soon turned this over to General Polk, who in turn gave place to Gen. J. E. Johnston. Under the latter and his successor, J. B. Hood, he commanded a corps of the army of Tennessee through the Atlanta campaign, taking a prominent part in the fighting at Resaca, Kenesaw Mountain, and other points, and particularly at Peach Tree Creek and the battle of July 22d, where he commanded the flank movement against the Federal left wing. His corps was again engaged at Jonesboro and the last fighting of the campaign.
In October, 1864, he was assigned to command the department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, with the task of collecting at Savannah forces to operate against Sherman’s advance. The troops he required were no longer to be found in the South, and by one of the most masterly retreats of the war he evaded Sherman’s overwhelming force before Savannah, and withdrew to Charleston and thence to Columbia. At Averysboro, in March, 1865, he punished the enemy effectively, and a few days later he led in the battle of Bentonville the last charge that was made by the Confederacy’s war-worn soldiers, and his only son, sixteen years of age, was among the last to fall. In this last battle of the four years, with undiminished spirit, the general, as Johnston has described it, “with his knightly gallantry dashed over the enemy’s breastworks on horseback in front of his men.” It is told of General Hardee, illustrating his thoroughness as a soldier, that he was the only lieutenant-general who personally inspected the arms and accoutrements of each soldier of his corps. General J. E. Johnston said of him that “he was more capable of commanding twenty thousand men in battle than any other Confederate general.” General Hardee died at Wytheville, Va., November 6, 1873, and his remains were interred at Selma, Ala., where he had resided after the war.