Currently in the FATA, al Qaida and the Taliban have teamed with the tribal leaders against the federal government. The tribes have vehemently rejected the federal government’s plan to eradicate opium. Al Qaida and the Taliban have offered their services to fight alongside the tribes against government troops, namely the paramilitary Frontier Corps, in return for a portion of the opium proceeds. Drug sales and local support, coupled with the safety of the mountains, have aided al Qaida and the Taliban’s recent resurgence. Furthermore, the tribal leaders’ latest accord with the Pakistani government for more autonomy in exchange for the pledged safety of federal troops, has led to a flawed solution that fails to address opium, al Qaida, and the Taliban. Effectively signing away the federal government’s ability to reign in the terrorists, this agreement has thwarted Pakistan’s capacity to prevent future terrorist attacks.

For Pakistan to address the lawlessness, drugs, and growing terrorist safe-haven status of the FATA, it must become serious about effecting change. Once it decides this, the path that it could follow is that which Bangladesh tread in 1997 with the CHT.

Template for success
After winning the 1996 Bangladeshi general elections, we executed a carefully orchestrated rehabilitation strategy in our troubled tribal region. Understanding that the root problem had to be solved politically, not militarily, and that it could not be mediated by outside forces was central to the rehabilitation. The implementation of this strategy had three basic tenets: 1) a peace summit for the tribal, central government, and neighboring countries’ leaders focused on highlighting competing concerns and identifying a common ground, 2) a comprehensive weapons turn-in program, and 3) replacement of opium fields with corn fields to make the tribes’ livelihood more legitimate and provide severely needed food. In the end, the peace accord returned the more than one million Chittagong inhabitants back into the fold of Bangladesh, precipitated the return of 64,000 Chittagong refugees from India, produced a greatly needed food source in corn, and secured peace in the region that previously had seen over 20,000 deaths between 1976 and 1997.

The peace summit consisted of public negotiations in Parliament and secret, high-level meetings with the leaders of tribes and neighboring countries. While the Parliamentary Special Committee led by Abul Hasnat Abdullah made some in-roads, the benefits of bilateral meetings with the tribal leader Shantu Larma, the leaders of the Indian West Bengal State, and the Indian Prime Minister were much more fruitful. The crux of the summit was based on tribal acknowledgment of central government sovereignty in exchange for rehabilitation of the CHT. The accord outlined rehabilitation of the tribal inhabitants by building schools, hospitals, and roads. Incredibly important was having the federal troops work on these projects so that their image would change in the eyes of the tribes.

Unconditional surrender of the tribes’ weapons ensured that elevated tensions in the CHT could not be sparked by a few divisive hot-heads. Although emotionally difficult for the tribes to turn in their weapons as they had fought with them for many years, once this roadblock was lifted, the rest of the process fell into place. At the turn-in points, we had journalists, diplomats, leaders from all political parties, and civil society to provide for the widest distribution of news about this momentous occasion.

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