Hannibal and Scipio both ordered their infantry to advance. The Celtic-Iberian troops were sent into battle before the rest of his army, but Hannibal did not support them, knowing that they could not hold for long. The result was that the foreign soldiers gave way believing that they had been shamelessly abandoned by their own side. The first line broke and retreated towards the second line, the Carthaginian levy. Soon the Carthaginian levy also retreated, leaving a roughly equal number of veterans on each side. Perhaps this was part of Hannibal’s plan, allowing his less dependable troops to tire the Romans so that his veterans could easily dispatch them. If this was Hannibal’s plan, it did not work. At this point, the spirits of all but the Carthaginian veterans were broken, while the morale of the Roman army was at its peak. Yet, there was still hope for Hannibal’s forces. His veteran infantry from his Italian campaign was sent forward, attempting to win the battle against the Roman infantry before Scipio’s cavalry returned. At this moment, however, Scipio reformed his ranks to match the battle line of Hannibal’s veterans, hoping that this new formation would prevent Hannibal’s infantry from flanking the Roman line while buying time for the Roman cavalry to return. Unfortunately for Hannibal, his troops’ skill was matched by Scipio’s Roman veterans, and, in time, a charge of Roman cavalry crashed into the backs of the Carthaginian line, encircling Hannibal’s army. Although Hannibal’s troops remained calm and continued to fight bravely, the Carthaginians now fought against the odds. A short while later, what was left of Hannibal’s army was forced to retreat — Scipio Africanus had led Rome to victory.

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Richard Gabriel concluded that, “It was only when Hannibal faced a general who had studied his own successes and abilities that he was defeated in the field, and then, only under conditions so unfavorable, that it is unlikely that any general could have succeeded where Hannibal failed.” Great generalship and the well-trained, veteran troops they led, not the psychological impact of shock tactics, proved the deciding factor in the Battle of Zama.

Conclusion
Although shock tactics and the psychological aspects of warfare affected ancient battles, any evaluation of the effect these tactics had on battles in antiquity must be conducted by placing them within the context of the men who fought and the generals who led them. Shock tactics, as implemented through chariots, cavalry, and elephants, could turn the tide of battle, but their success ultimately depended on the training, experience and willpower of the soldiers who filled the ranks on each side, and on the competence and leadership ability of the generals in command. As exhibited by all the victorious generals mentioned in this article, great commanders understand the strengths and weaknesses of their forces, as well as comprehend the variables of combat, such as: manpower; distance; terrain; supply; and shock tactics. Shock tactics were a variable in Greco-Roman warfare, not the variable that always determined the outcome of ancient battles.

Vincent Lopez is a student in Norwich University’s acclaimed Master of Arts in Military History program. For more information on this outstanding program, visit Norwich’s Web site.

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