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Shock Tactics on the Ancient BattlefieldVincent Lopez | November 18, 2008 | one comment | Print | E-mail
For the next several years, Rome did not try to challenge Hannibal’s army on Italian soil, adopting the tactic of avoidance. Hannibal ran rampant in the countryside and was not challenged again until the battle of Zama, in North Africa. These battles, therefore, displayed how morale affected each side’s troops, their governments, and most importantly, the countries’ populations. Hannibal’s status was constantly improved by his brilliant individual leadership; but the results of that leadership – victory after victory – also exercised an impact on his troops’ morale that went beyond the immediate influence of Carthage’s great general. Prelude to Zama: Two Great Generals Several stories surround Hannibal’s early years, but we know is that he was eventually given command of Carthaginian forces in Spain. In 218 B.C.E., Hannibal led his army against the Hellenized city of Saguntum, on the eastern coast of Iberia. Once the city was taken, Rome declared war on Carthage, basing its right to do so on the aggression of Hannibal on Roman territory. Whether or not Hannibal meant for this to happen is unknown, as Roman bias in the historical accounts tend to blame Hannibal regardless. What is clear, however, is that Hannibal was ready for a war, believing that a successful invasion of Italy would prevent Rome from sending armies to Iberia and Carthage. His action of invading from Northern Italy was the first psychological shock tactic used by Hannibal — surprise attack to cause fear — and he was successful. Rome, at its strongest, could count on 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry, while Hannibal would have to raise the majority of his troops from Iberian and Celtic tribes (he could only count on 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry from Africa). A force of about 102,000 men traveled 1,000 miles over five months from New Carthage on the long road toward Italy. After crossing the Rhone River in Gaul, Hannibal had roughly 60,000 troops and 37 elephants left in his force. Once he crossed the Alps into northern Italy’s Po River valley, Hannibal had lost another 36,000 men, leaving approximately 23,000 troops and 10 elephants (by spring of his first year in Italy, only 1 elephant had survived the winter). Hannibal could not count on his elephants for battlefield shock tactics. Once in Italy, Hannibal recruited Gallic allies and defeated two larger Roman armies at the battles of Trebbia and Trasimene. Leading his force into southern Italy, Hannibal successfully defeated the largest Roman field army to date at Cannae. Hannibal maintained an army in Italy for 16 years with no external source of supply. Richard Gabriel has pointed out that, “No general in Western history ever remained in the field for so long, fought so many battles, won so many victories as did Hannibal, who kept his army intact while fighting in a hostile country, and was still able to extricate them successfully from the war zone”. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Military History
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One Comment to “Shock Tactics on the Ancient Battlefield”
I would like to commend the author for his insight and analysis. I agree that the psychological side of war is too often an afterthought, at best an mythical remnant attached to a commander.
However, I would point out that many of your older readers still think of “shock” in terms of shock weapons (as opposed to missile weapons) as defined by CWC Oman.
I realize that you intend to discuss “shock” in terms of a weapon’s the psychological impact, not simply its potential for blunt trauma. You may find it useful to draw this distinction more clearly at the outset for the benefit of us old-school readers.
I wish you the best of luck in your studies and your certainly promising career as a historian. Well done!
By Martin O on Mar 4, 2009 at 4:19 pm