| |

Shock Tactics on the Ancient BattlefieldVincent Lopez | November 18, 2008 | one comment | Print | E-mail The second method of using cavalry for shock tactics was to charge directly into enemy infantry. This was the weaker of the two tactics in antiquity, as a well disciplined phalanx with spear or sarissa could defeat this tactic easily. In this era before the invention of the stirrup, this tactic relied on skillful horsemanship and a resolute and unflinching will of the horsemen to advance. It also required a gap or weak place in the enemy line to break through. Moreover, war horses in this era had no armor protection, and could easily be impaled easily upon spear and sarissa. Alexander’s success in using this cavalry tactic was demonstrated in his victory over Darius III at Gaugamela. Alexander knew when and where to strike, exercised perfect control of the cavalry charge, and exhibited firm leadership with his ability to stop and reform for the next attack. At Gaugamela, Alexander held his elite Companion cavalry back, waiting for the chance to strike. Once he saw his moment, he arranged his cavalry into a wedge formation and charged directly towards the Persian front line. The Companion cavalry smashed into the Persian center, quickly killing Darius’ Royal Guard, causing a vast drop in Persian morale. Darius, at the sight of Alexander’s strength, turned and fled. As Alexander was about to chase Darius, he obtained a message that his loyal general Parmenion was about to be overrun. He quickly reformed his ranks and led his cavalry to assist Parmenion. Yet, Alexander was the exception to the rule in antiquity. This use of the direct cavalry charge for shock tactics would not truly be efficient again until the much later development of Parthian Cataphracts and Medieval Knights. Shock Force III: Elephants In the year 280 B.C.E., Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, came to defend the Greek city, Tarentum, from Roman aggression. Pyrrhus entered Italy with a professional army consisting of twenty five thousand troops and twenty elephants. He is also credited with being the first commander to place towers atop elephants, providing a platform from which his archers could rain arrows from above onto their opponents. At the Battle of Heraclea, Roman forces were awed by the sight of elephants. Pausanias wrote, “When on this occasion they came in sight the Romans were seized with panic, and did not believe they were animals”. The elephants quickly demoralized the Romans and they soon panicked. As the ground shook, one could only imagine the fear that overcame each soldier, unaware of how to deal with the new threat. The mere smell of an elephant was hated by horses, creating the inability of cavalry to charge, and causing the horses to flee. Understandably, this caused the morale of the Romans to drop during the battle. Those who were not frozen with fear ran away. Pyrrhus went on to be undefeated against Rome in battle, but, ultimately, he lost the war. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Military History
|
|
|
|
||
What is Armchair General?Armchair General (ACG) and ACG online feature a unique, interactive editorial approach that invites the reader to decide the course of action in challenging historical scenarios, to step into the shoes of a battlefield commander. Leading historians and contributors lend integrity and credibility to this fresh presentation of historical and contemporary events. Armchair General is the INTERACTIVE history magazine where YOU COMMAND and decide the course of action! |
What We Write About
|
Our Other Magazines |
Weider History Network: HistoryNet | Armchair General | Great History | Achtung Panzer! Copyright © 2004-2008 Armchair General L.L.C., All rights reserved. |
||
One Comment to “Shock Tactics on the Ancient Battlefield”
I would like to commend the author for his insight and analysis. I agree that the psychological side of war is too often an afterthought, at best an mythical remnant attached to a commander.
However, I would point out that many of your older readers still think of “shock” in terms of shock weapons (as opposed to missile weapons) as defined by CWC Oman.
I realize that you intend to discuss “shock” in terms of a weapon’s the psychological impact, not simply its potential for blunt trauma. You may find it useful to draw this distinction more clearly at the outset for the benefit of us old-school readers.
I wish you the best of luck in your studies and your certainly promising career as a historian. Well done!
By Martin O on Mar 4, 2009 at 4:19 pm