Pearl Harbor article misses the point

Jim Stobie | January 26, 2007  | 0 comments  | Print  | E-mail

Editors,
I was deeply troubled with the total lack of historical understanding or scholarship when I read Jay Kimmel’s "Pearl Harbor–History’s Most Costly Hit and Run". His account of the attack AT Pearl Harbor is full of distortions and historical inaccuracies.

First, Pearl Harbor was not the intended target; it was the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) would much rather have attacked the Pacific Fleet at the Lahaina anchorage than Pearl Harbor (aircraft from an escort surveyed the Maui anchorage prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor). Mr. Kimmel’s distortions are truly abound in his paragraph questioning why they did not follow up their attack on Pearl Harbor. The primary objective of the attack at Pearl Harbor was to remove the threat of the Pacific Fleet on the flank of the Japanese attack on the Southern Resource Area, the Netherlands (or Dutch) East Indies and Malaya. Attacks on the Pacific Fleet and the Philippines protected the flank of the attack and the route of the critical resources they would exploit from the East Indies.

Second, Admiral Yamamoto was the major force behind the planning of the attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, not the reluctant officer as depicted in Mr. Kimmel’s essay. Many other admirals continued to fight against the attack. When it was approved with only four carriers, Yamamoto threatened to resign unless all six fast carriers were tasked with the attack.

Third, Clark Field was not struck "the following day," but several hours later. The international dateline separated the Philippines and Hawaii. While bad weather delayed the aerial attack on the Philippines, the major reason why the assaults were not simultaneous is daylight. Mitsuo Fuchida discusses this after the war.

Fourth, the CNO war warning dated 27 November 1941 listed three possible targets for Japanese aggression: the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. The Thai or Kra Peninsula (which today is Thailand and Malaysia) was attacked one and a half hours BEFORE the Pacific Fleet at Kota Bharu in British Malaya. The Philippines were attacked (aerial attack on Clark Field and landings on Batan Island) hours after the attack on the Pacific Fleet. British Borneo (the northern portion) was attacked 15/16 December when escort vessels became available after the Malaya landings.

While racist views of the Japanese convinced everyone, intelligence professionals and warfighters, that the Japanese could not conduct these simultaneous operations, it was uncharacteristic for the IJN to tackle more than one enemy at a time (the book KAIGUN highlights this).

Fifth, he discusses the convenience that the American aircraft carriers were underway at the time of the attack; therefore, they were spared.

SARATOGA was being repaired stateside. The other two carriers, HORNET and LEXINGTON, were shuttling aircraft to Wake and Midway. Both of these islands were attack in that first day of war, with Wake eventually falling to the Japanese after a stout defense by the Marines.

Sixth, comparing the code of World War II Japanese to the code of feudal samurai is truly a stretch. Better histories and comparisons show that these were false comparisons exploited by the government of Japan. There are plenty of interviews with Japanese pilots who flew on the Pacific Fleet who stated they did not know there had been no declaration of war.

The 14-part message was to be delivered at 1:00 PM Washington DC time (7:30 AM in Pearl Harbor), giving the US effectively 30 minutes of warning. Errors and incompetency prevented Ambassador Nomura from delivering the message until after the attack (strangely, American intelligence decrypted, typed and distributed the 14-part message prior to the Japanese).

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