No Encirclement at Stalingrad?
By Dana Lombardy, Associate Editor

Published Monday, March 10, 2008  |  Comments  | Print  | E-mail

At Rzhev in late 1942 the German lines had been stable since late 1941 and consisted of fortified zones occupied by veteran German divisions. At Stalingrad, the Soviet breakthrough attacks were against smaller and weaker Romanian divisions in the open steppes of southern Russia. At Rzhev, the German 9th Army had four panzer divisions and two motorized divisions in reserve. At Stalingrad, only one panzer and one motorized division were available to stop or counterattack the Soviet armored thrusts.

The 9th Army’s commander, Walther Model, was a skillful defensive general who would earn the nickname the “Führer’s Fireman” for his ability to save deteriorating situations. Model also stood up to Hitler when he disagreed with Germany’s dictator. By comparison, 6th Army’s commander Friedrich Paulus was a competent but not imaginative commander who fought the battle “by the book” and blindly obeyed Hitler.

These are the reasons why the two huge Soviet winter offensives in 1942 turned out so differently. But was there really any alternate outcome at Stalingrad?

Paulus not only used one of his precious few panzer divisions (the 16th ) and motorized divisions (the 3rd ) to hold a stretch of the frontline, he also decimated two more panzer divisions in the repeated attacks to take Stalingrad (14th and 24th ). Hitler never sent Paulus any fresh divisions, so the “reinforcements” fed into the urban combat were stripped from other sections of 6th Army’s front.

These four divisions could have provided 6th Army with about the same mobile reserve force that stopped the Soviets at Rzhev. Even if these four weakened divisions were badly outmatched in the open steppes outside of Stalingrad, they might have delayed the Soviet armored pincers and could also have attempted to link up with the German relief forces that attacked in December (Operation Winter Storm).

It did not require fantasy decisions by Hitler or imaginary divisions to avert the German debacle at Stalingrad. Better management of his divisional assets could have given Paulus the best chance to prevent the disaster that befell his army.

Join the Forum discussion about this topic. Weigh in with your opinion:

“Was there any possibility for the Germans to prevent the disaster at Stalingrad? Or was the Red Army going to eventually win there no matter how well the 6th Army handled its reserves?” [discuss at the bottom of this page!]

————–

Dana Lombardy recently joined the staff of ACG Online as an Associate Editor. Since 1971, Dana has contributed as an editor, writer, cartographer, graphic artist and designer for more than 100 history books and magazines and two dozen wargames, including his award-winning Streets of Stalingrad (three separate editions since first released in 1979). A frequent speaker on the seminar circuit, he has made nearly twenty television appearances, including multiple episodes of The History Channel’s "Tales of the Gun" series. Dana was Publisher of Napoleon Journal from 1996-2000.