|
|
No Encirclement at Stalingrad?Dana Lombardy, Associate Editor | March 10, 2008 | 6 comments | Print | E-mail Perhaps the most famous turning point on the Eastern Front in World War II was the Red Army’s victory at the battle of Stalingrad. For two months, from mid-September to mid-November 1942, and with its back against the Volga River, the Soviet 62nd Army grimly hung on to a steadily shrinking perimeter of this industrial town as elements of the German 6 th Army made repeated attacks to conquer Soviet dictator Josef Stalin’s city. On November 19, as winter set in, a massive counter-offensive overran the 6 th Army’s weak flanks and trapped twenty-three German and Romanian divisions and nearly a quarter million men inside a huge pocket. After a relief attempt by ground and supply of the besieged troops by air both failed, the last German units surrendered on February 2, 1943. Only 91,000 Axis soldiers were left to march into captivity. Without substantial reinforcements that were not historically available, or a different attitude by Germany’s leader Adolf Hitler to permit the immediate breakout of 6 th Army in November, was a different conclusion really possible? An alternative outcome at Stalingrad is not just a fantasy “what if” scenario. However, in order to present this hypothesis, we need to examine what happened that November 1942 about 600 miles north of Stalingrad in the German bulge around Rzhev near Moscow. For many years after World War II, the disastrous 1942 Soviet attack outside of Moscow remained buried in their archives virtually unknown in the West. In 1999, the University of Kansas Press published historian David Glantz’s groundbreaking study Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat (reprinted in paperback in 2005). This book revealed that there were two major offensives planned by Georgi Zhukov, Stalin’s Chief of the General Staff, that winter: Operation Uranus at Stalingrad, and Operation Mars at Rzhev. The two operational objectives were similar: break through the enemy lines at two opposing points with tanks and then push on with these armored “pincers” to link up and encircle the Axis forces. At Stalingrad, the Soviet plan worked. At Rzhev, despite initial success, the Soviet assault became a catastrophe – the Red Army lost 1,600 tanks and more than 330,000 soldiers in just three weeks. Why? Soviet forces employed directly in both operations were about the same. Operation Mars: 668,000 men; 2,000 tanks; 1,170 planes. Operation Uranus: 700,000 men; 1,400 tanks; 1,463 planes. So what was different? [continued on next page] Pages: 1 2Help Armchair General by bookmarking to
           
|
|
|
|
||
What is Armchair General?Armchair General (ACG) and ACG online feature a unique, interactive editorial approach that invites the reader to decide the course of action in challenging historical scenarios, to step into the shoes of a battlefield commander. Leading historians and contributors lend integrity and credibility to this fresh presentation of historical and contemporary events. Armchair General is the INTERACTIVE history magazine where YOU COMMAND and decide the course of action! |
What We Write About
|
Our Other Magazines |
Weider History Network: HistoryNet | Armchair General | Great History | Achtung Panzer! Copyright © 2004-2008 Armchair General L.L.C., All rights reserved. |
||
6 Comments to “No Encirclement at Stalingrad?”
This is hypocracy. The German Army near Moscow had familiatrity with the landscape as they had traversed it one year before. They could fall back to familiar reinforced defensive positions, and were not bogged down in rural fighting in a city which had captured the epitomy of the German and Russian concept of victory. I would also add the lines of communications were much better for the pre-established German forces before Moscow from the previous failures the winter before. (Railway tracks had been relaid to accomodate German freight, road maps made, work arounds on problems in all climates, etc. etc. )
By Gerald on Aug 25, 2008 at 7:12 pm
I would disagree with Gerald on the lines of communication. Central Russia was heavily forested whereas the Russian steppes were fairly devoid. The German’s used the forest to their advantage to channel the Russian tanks, creating kill zones. They didn’t have a lot of defensive lines to fall back on outside of Moscow, they just did it better.
The Romanian’s, Italian’s & Hungarian’s although generally good fighters, lacked the leadership & weapon’s especially anti tank guns to stop the Russians. But, if the German mobile forces had been keep in reserve rather than chewed up piecemeal, they could have done just like Manstein did in the spring to the Russian forces. They would most certainly have given the 6th Army time to withdraw (if Paulus had the guts)but could also have given Manstein more punch when he started his relief effort.
By Dave on Aug 27, 2008 at 4:27 pm
Such disparity is certainly due to a number of factors… no one thing could have caused two drastically different outcomes. However, as a former regular Armor officer I can tell you that any flat, open area is considered by tankers to be “tank country”. I think that is a key factor in the success of the Stalingrad breakthrough.
During the days of the Cold War, we constantly worried about sudden Soviet advances into West Germany. And, the area we worried the most about was Northern Germany because of its flat plains… tank country. When tanks break through defenses in open areas you cannot predict the paths they will take even if you know their destination!
By Eurastus on Apr 10, 2009 at 1:47 am
regards 6 army at stalingrad. when attack by russians began if the germans had had an effective panzer force to support the italian and rumanian forces they may have blunted this attack and been able to stop the enciclement. The speed at which the russian forces rolled up the italians and the romanians caught the germans by surprise and not having effective reserves they just could not react to the attack. Paulus should have known better and ensured his flanks were covered by german units capable of thwarting russian attacks of this nature and could have done so relatively easily had he managed his available resources better. He was doomed by being shortsighted and should have used italian and romanian forces in stalingrad allowing german units bettor fighting opportunitys in the steppes regions. The german high command was also shortsighted as they also took their eye off the ball and focused only at Stalingrad instead of a much wider area around the entire city and region. Given this they could have had an opportunity to draw the russian attack in and stopped it cold. Once done Stalingrad would have fallen, the Volga river would have been cut and german forces could then have attacked south into the oilfields.
By kent hickie on May 18, 2009 at 6:49 pm
Eurastus is right! That was the secret…altough was very simple to anticipate…Stalingrad was 95% destroied by germans before september 1942. Big mistake to insist on 5% insted to consolidate flanks. Don’t blame the romanian soldiers…good fighters…remember Odessa, Sevastopol, Crimeea, Caucasus…they where just poor equiped at the Don Bend.
My opinion was a bad decisions from german command center to insist on the city of Stalingrad.
By Dan on Aug 30, 2009 at 5:43 pm
The real difference was that the Italians “never stopped running”, as a German general told Count Ciano in response to his question about the fighting ability of the Italians at Stalingrad. It was as simple as that. The Romanians were at least trying to fight as the ran. The Italians never looked back.
By Tim Allgood on Oct 19, 2009 at 4:56 pm