Gen. of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces, Korea, guides visitors around
the fighting front. Included are Eighth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway (left) and I Corps
commander, Maj. Gen. Frank W. Milburn (right rear). (National Archives)

Subscribe Today

• Subscribe to Armchair General Magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!
 

More appalling was Truman’s failure to equip South Korea, against pleadings by MacArthur, to counter Soviet arming of the North.  To compound his error, Truman decided in June 1949 to transfer responsibility for the South’s civil and military affairs from MacArthur’s Tokyo-based Far Eastern command to Washington’s U.S. State Department, leaving behind a token force of 472 peace-keeping personnel. MacArthur was effectively cut off from any policy-making role over Korea.  (Wm Breuer, op. cit.).

Host Ollie North failed to mention that in a speech before the National Press Cub in January 1950, Secretary of State Acheson excluded Korea (and Formosa) from America’s line of defense, which he defined as "running along the Aleutians to Japan, and then goes to the Ryukyus (Okinawa), and from there to the Philippine Islands."  5 months later, North Korean forces struck.  The bloody Korean War had begun.

Point #5.  The TV show chided MacArthur for being aloof and insensitive to his men, e.g., Lt. Col. "Brad" Smith whose "Task Force Smith" had bought time for MacArthur in Pusan to prepare for the Inchon counter-attack.  On the contrary, MacArthur had always admired acts of daring and gallantry. Following the success at Inchon on September 15, 1950, MacArthur proudly proclaimed: "Say to the fleet: the Navy and Marines have never shone more brightly than this morning" (Wm Manchester, "American Caesar").

Point #6.   TV Host Ollie North closed with the statistic that "36,000 U.S. troops" died in the war.  The actual figure was 54,246 dead, 103,284 wounded (Dean Acheson, "Present at the Creation").  In fact, the U.S. suffered more casualties after MacArthur left his post (Wm Manchester, ibid.).

CONCLUSION: Let’s hear it from the leading combatants themselves.  Curiously, none of these sentiments were aired on TV.

General Jim Van Fleet, outgoing commander of U.S./U.N. forces in Korea: "We could have beaten the Communists in the spring of 1951.  Our offensive caught the Chinese by complete surprise.  We could have followed up our success, but that was not the intention of Washington.  Our State Department had already let the Reds know that we were willing to settle on the 38th Parallel" (Wm Breuer, op. cit.).

Far Eastern Air Force General George Stratemeyer: "You get in war to win it.  You do not get in war to stand still and lose it, and we were required to lose it" (John F. McManus, "Changing Command").

Gen. James Gavin, famed airborne hero of ETO (European Theatre of Operation) and Pentagon’s specialist in Korea:  "I have no doubt whatever that the Chinese moved confidently and skillfully into North Korea, and, in fact, I believe that they were able to do this because they were well-informed not only of the moves Walker (8th Army commander) would make but of the limitations on what he might do.  I am quite sure now that all of MacArthur’s plans flowed into the hands of the Communists through the British Foreign Office" (Wm Manchester, op. cit.).

Red Chinese General Lin Piao: "I would never have made the attack and risked my men and military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and communication" (Wm Manchester, ibid.).

Help Armchair General by bookmarking to