Ollie North’s "War Stories" documentary on the desperate fighting at the Pusan Perimeter during the Korean War that aired on the Fox Network, Sunday, July 3, included some damning comments about General Douglas MacArthur’s command decisions before and during the war. Frequent ACG forums participant, Romulo "Mo" Ludan thinks there are some facts that Ollie left out. Here is his web article he hopes will set the record straight.
 
For more on the life and career of Douglas MacArthur be sure to read the November 2005 issue of Armchair General, featuring our Battlefield Leader article on the controversial general.

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Commentary on TV documentary: "The Desperate Battle for the Pusan Perimieter" War Stories, narrated by Host Ollie North and aired on Sunday 7/3/2004, Fox Channel

Let me, if I may, clarify a few points on this otherwise fine TV documentary:

Point #1. The reason why MacArthur thought that chances of Red China entering the war were "very little" was simply logical.  Any attacking Communist commander must face the probability of being annihilated by a quick and massive retaliation by the U.S.  This was a virtual certainty unless, of course, the enemy was tipped off that there would be no such devastating response to follow, which was exactly the course Truman took against the advice of his field commander in Korea.

As Frazier Hunt pointed out  in "The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur": The enemy commander would logically think that if a large invasion force struck the U.N. armies, MacArthur would then be permitted to use his air arm, with its deadly potential of atomic bombs and radioactive waste.  Within a matter of hours this unwrapping of his air would mean the destruction of the bridges over the Yalu, of enemy airfields, troop concentrations, supply lines and every important base and target in Manchuria (note that at the time, U.S. enjoyed superiority over the Soviets in air and naval power, strategic bombers, and atomic arsenal ).

Point #2.  MacArthur’s intelligence knew that there were 400,000 Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria and another 200,000 camped along the Yalu.  The criticism that he did not know or underestimated their strength was therefore incorrect.  What he did not know was that Truman would countermand his order to bomb the bridges across the Yalu, all six of them, which could have ended the war (Frazier Hunt, ibid.).

Point #3.  TV documentary failed to mention the extent of Soviet infiltration of the Truman administration (Ann Coulter, "Treason").  How it enabled the notorious Cambridge trio of master spies Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess to use their sensitive positions in the British Foreign Service to pass on every U.N. battle plan to the Soviets, who then relayed it to the Chinese.  One notable exception was Operation Chromite code name for Inchon Landing.  Suspecting security leaks in Washington, MacArthur deliberately delayed sending his final battle plan for several hours.  As a result, the enemy was caught completely by surprise (William Breuer, "Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea").

Point #4.  TV documentary tried to blame MacArthur for the sorry state of his 8th Army, now reduced to only 4 divisions of mostly green recruits.  The fault however lay squarely with the Truman administration and its so-called "budget economy."  In just a span of 5 years after WW2, Truman, known for his cost-cutting days in Congress, cut the defense budget from $15 billion requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to $6 billion.  Between 1945 and 1950 until the outbreak of the Korean War, his administration downsized the army from 8 million to 592,000, marines from 480,000 to 75,000, and aircraft carriers from 40 to 11 (William Triplett II: "Rogue State: How a Nuclear Korea Threatens America").

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