Comments on: Guest POV – The Siege of Ulsan http://www.armchairgeneral.com/guest-pov-the-siege-of-ulsan.htm All things military history! Thu, 19 Nov 2009 16:45:27 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: Bruce Maclean http://www.armchairgeneral.com/guest-pov-the-siege-of-ulsan.htm/comment-page-1#comment-7954 Bruce Maclean Thu, 09 Apr 2009 22:03:47 +0000 http://www.armchairgeneral.com/?p=6014#comment-7954 Based on the history presented here, Yang Hao committed several grave errors that turned a potential victory into defeat. The first error was insufficient scouting of the surrounding area during the days of the initial assault. During a siege you have two fronts to mind; the inward one and the outward one. Kato Kiyomasa's successful gaining of the element of surprise on his arrival indicates that Yang Hao likely did not deploy and scout with both of these fronts in mind. Only after Kato Kiyomasa had already gotten in with critical supplies does it sound like Yang started to take the outward front seriously. Without those supplies for the Japanese and the morale boost of their leader's presence, the entire siege would likely have ended quite swiftly. The second major blunder was the refusal to negotiate with the starving Japanese garrison. Perhaps this was due to the personal enmity against Kato Kiyomasa, but it was clear that Yang Hao had lost sight of the objective: capture Ulsan. Sun Tzu wrote 'A surrounded army must be given a way out.' The previous blunders had led to a situation where continuing the siege was risky in terms of the attacking armies supplies, troop morale, and even of fending off continued relief efforts from outside Japanese forces. Yang Hao should have negotiated, and offered the Japanese the chance to leave Ulsan on their own. If this had been done, perhaps there would have been enough time to claim the fortifications and change the outcome of Mori Hidemoto’s arrival. Based on the history presented here, Yang Hao committed several grave errors that turned a potential victory into defeat. The first error was insufficient scouting of the surrounding area during the days of the initial assault. During a siege you have two fronts to mind; the inward one and the outward one. Kato Kiyomasa’s successful gaining of the element of surprise on his arrival indicates that Yang Hao likely did not deploy and scout with both of these fronts in mind. Only after Kato Kiyomasa had already gotten in with critical supplies does it sound like Yang started to take the outward front seriously. Without those supplies for the Japanese and the morale boost of their leader’s presence, the entire siege would likely have ended quite swiftly.

The second major blunder was the refusal to negotiate with the starving Japanese garrison. Perhaps this was due to the personal enmity against Kato Kiyomasa, but it was clear that Yang Hao had lost sight of the objective: capture Ulsan. Sun Tzu wrote ‘A surrounded army must be given a way out.’ The previous blunders had led to a situation where continuing the siege was risky in terms of the attacking armies supplies, troop morale, and even of fending off continued relief efforts from outside Japanese forces. Yang Hao should have negotiated, and offered the Japanese the chance to leave Ulsan on their own. If this had been done, perhaps there would have been enough time to claim the fortifications and change the outcome of Mori Hidemoto’s arrival.

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