Longstreet and the Battle of Gettysburg

[Zouave]

I would like to ask a simple question to my fellow forum members. How do you guys evaluate the performance of Longstreet during the battle of Gettysburg?

I know this question has been asked to death. My apologies for starting yet another thread on the subject.

Greets,
Zouave

[TomDeFranco]

Originally Posted by Zouave

I would like to ask a simple question to my fellow forum members. How do you guys evaluate the performance of Longstreet during the battle of Gettysburg?

I know this question has been asked to death. My apologies for starting yet another thread on the subject.

Greets,
Zouave

As a whole, he performed well enough to not be credited with losing the battle. There were mistakes made by others that exceeded any error(s) that Longstreet committed - including Lee.

Longstreet's errors came in not determining with Captain Johnston the reality of the existence of a "concealed route" to the Peach Orchard. Also, his early morning day 3actions could be called into question.

[Boonierat]

He should have marched his Corps more rapidly on Day 2, he could have been in position around noon instead of 4pm. Also he should have studied the terrain for his attack more carefully, the Devil's Den in particular totally disorganized Hood' s Division, and maybe risk sending a brigade south of the Round Tops.
That said, his late afternoon attack was well executed and wrecked III Corps, too bad Pickett wasn't up.

[mgronski]

I believe it is current opinion that Lee never demanded an early morning attack on 7/2. On 7/1 when Longstreet arrived and was meeting with Lee observing Cemetery Ridge, it was already dark and the area decided on for the next day's attack had not been set. Pfanz's , Cemetery and Culp's Hill, Lee was still arguing continuing the battle south of town with Ewell well into the evening on 7/1.
It was curious that neither Longstreet nor Ewell wanted to be the brunt of attack on 7/2, and argued for the other to lead, in the meantime not relenquishing any men to help in that attack on the other's front, which was Lee's purview.

[Boonierat]

Today I ordered Pfanz's Gettysburg The Second Day. I had it on my list for quite some time now and this discussion prompted me to do it, is it as good as Gettysburg The First Day?

[mgronski]

Let me know how you enjoy it, I imagine there is some overlap with Cemetery and Culps Hill.

[Hufflepuff44]

I agree with the post Boonie made earlier, Longstreet's attack would have been far more effective if he had moved his corps up quicker.

[Zouave]

Thanks for all the replies. Am I right to assume that Longstreet could have done a better job at Gettysburg? Well, I think the same goes for Lee, Stuart and Ewell.

I have one more question ( after reading two articles written by Jeffry D. Wert ), Was Longstreet right? Should the Confederates have disengaged after the first day ( especially after the second day ) and moved around Lee?

America’s Civil War: Robert E. Lee and James Longstreet at Odds at Gettysburg

"...Before sunrise Lee rode to Longstreet’s position, near the position known ever since as the Peach Orchard, where he expected to find preparations for the assault underway. When he did not find the men forming, Lee sought Longstreet and an explanation.

‘General,’ Longstreet said in welcome, ‘I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade’s army and maneuver him into attacking us.’

Lee clearly was angry; he had heard enough. He pointed toward Cemetery Ridge and said, ‘The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him.’

As Longstreet saw the situation, Lee wanted too much. Longstreet said that a direct assault on the Federal position was doomed — that it would mean ‘the sacrifice of my men.’ As Longstreet recalled later: ‘I felt then that it was my duty to express my convictions. I said, ‘General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as anyone, what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.”

The exchange was a defining moment between the two generals — the culmination of three days of disagreement over the army’s tactics. From the afternoon of the 1st, Longstreet had seen Lee taking risks, willing to accept casualties while striking the enemy. Now, Lee was asking even more, a frontal assault with no chance of success, with an enormous loss of life a certainty. The idea went against the basic beliefs and characteristics of Longstreet’s generalship."

This article was written by Jeffry Wert and originally published in the August 1994 issue of Military History.

http://www.historynet.com/americas-c...gettysburg.htm


James Longstreet: Robert E. Lee’s Most Valuable Soldier

"...Longstreet joined Lee on the battlefield at Gettysburg late on the afternoon of July 1, after the Southerners had routed the Union I and XI corps. When they talked, Longstreet proposed marching the army south in a broad turning movement and awaiting an attack from the enemy. Lee rightly rejected the idea, as he did not know where the other five Union corps were located, he had insufficient cavalry to screen such a movement and his veterans had given him the initiative on the battlefield. Lee’s assertion that he would resume the offensive the next day disturbed Longstreet. Twice more, on July 2 and 3, Longstreet would present the idea, and twice more Lee would reject it."

This article was written by Jeffry D. Wert and originally published in the August 2006 issue of Civil War Times Magazine.

http://www.historynet.com/james-long...le-soldier.htm

[Jon Jordan]

Lee placed too much faith in his massed artillery on Day 3, and both Longstreet and Alexander knew it. They simply lacked the ammunition for an adequate bombardment after Day 2.

[Boonierat]

Originally Posted by mgronski

Let me know how you enjoy it, I imagine there is some overlap with Cemetery and Culps Hill.

I'm not sure, The Second Day covers only the western half of the battlefield (Round Tops, Devils Den, Wheatfield, Peach Orchard...). Pfanz always felt the battle for Culp's Hill was ignored by most Gettysburg histories, thats why he wrote two books.

PS: Does anyone know if he's planning a book on the last day?

[Eric Wittenberg]

Boonie Rat,

Harry's son Don, a staff historian at Fredericksburg, is an old friend. Don tells me that Harry, at close to 90, is done. He pretty much ran out of gas writing the first day book, which is why it seems incomplete and not up to the standard of the first two, and that there is no way that he's got it in him to write the day three book. Jeff Wert's fine book on the third day will have to substitute for it.

Eric

[Boonierat]

Cheers Eric, had no idea he was that old.

[TomDeFranco]

Originally Posted by Boonierat

He should have marched his Corps more rapidly on Day 2, he could have been in position around noon instead of 4pm. Also he should have studied the terrain for his attack more carefully, the Devil's Den in particular totally disorganized Hood' s Division, and maybe risk sending a brigade south of the Round Tops.
That said, his late afternoon attack was well executed and wrecked III Corps, too bad Pickett wasn't up.

Lee didn't give Longstreet his orders until 11 am and then authorized Longstreet's request to wait until Law's brigade was up. Where Longstreet erred was in not confirming that there was no true concealed route with Captain Johnston. So given that, there was no way he'd have his men in position to attack by noon. That is especially true in light of the fact that the deployment had to be altered to meet the changed situation. In reality, Longstreet took about as long to reach his jump off point as Jackson took at Chancellorsville (and this through unfamiliar terrain as opposed to Jackson's march). In addition Longstreet didn't consume nearly as much time to deploy as Jackson did.

[TomDeFranco]

Originally Posted by Hufflepuff44

I agree with the post Boonie made earlier, Longstreet's attack would have been far more effective if he had moved his corps up quicker.

It wasn't entirely Longstreet's fault. See my other posts for explantion.

[TomDeFranco]

Originally Posted by Zouave

Thanks for all the replies. Am I right to assume that Longstreet could have done a better job at Gettysburg? Well, I think the same goes for Lee, Stuart and Ewell.

I have one more question (after reading two articles written by Jeffry D. Wert ), Was Longstreet right? Should the Confederates have disengaged after the first day ( especially after the second day) and moved around Lee?

And Hill could have performed better, too. Yes. I don't think Lee trusted (and for good reason) the cavalry he had at hand to run a screen for such a move though.