US vs Iran

[Axis of Evil]

US vs. Iran

“We’re not dealing with a set of National Security Council option papers here,” the former high-level intelligence official told me. “They’ve already passed that wicket. It’s not if we’re going to do anything against Iran. They’re doing it.”

-- Seymour Hersh, New Yorker (17 Jan 2005)

Iran

Population: 68,017,860
GDP: $516.7 billion
GDP per capita: $ 7,700
Military Expenditure: $4.3 billion (2003 est.)
Country Budget: revenues: $43.34 billion expenditures: $47.7 billion

Land Area: 1,648,000 square kilometers
Area Comparative: slightly larger than Alaska

Causus Belli

• Iranian nuclear weapons proliferation is the prime issue of US/Israli/EU/GCC national security policy in Iran.
  
• Sponsorship by Iran of Shi'ite Islamicist terrorist groups, including Hizbollah and Hamas, is a seconary issue.
  
• Threats to global energy supplies (oil, natural gas) and Persian Gulf SLOC, will be vital but downplayed to avoid criticism this is an "oil war."
  
• US pressures against Iran, another Islamic state, will be increasingly portrayed by Iran as a secular Western and/or Christian religious war against Islam.

Goals

• Destroy Iranian nuclear weapons production capacity, setting back plans for production 5 years or more.
  
• Destroy key strategic high-priority targets, including command and control, air defense, WMD production, logistics, terrorist support facilities, and other sites.
  
• Contain Iranian strikes of advances beyond its borders threatening Iraq, Afghanistan, GCC, or Central Asian Republics.
  
• Protect SLOC and avoid costly "tanker war" jeopardizing global energy supplies.
  
• Sieze oil and gas fields, pipelines and production systems
  
• Produce Regime Change in Iran
  
• Limit global terrorism, avoid spread of destabilization and anarchic conditions
  
• Minimize US casualties or costs

Assessments

Iran Is Judged 10 Years From Nuclear Bomb

Since 1995, U.S. officials have continually estimated Iran to be "within five years" from reaching that same capability. So far, it has not.

The new estimate extends the timeline, judging that Iran will be unlikely to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient for an atomic weapon, before "early to mid-next decade," according to four sources familiar with that finding. The sources said the shift, based on a better understanding of Iran's technical limitations, puts the timeline closer to 2015 and in line with recently revised British and Israeli figures.

-- Washington Post

Khuzestan: First Front in the War on Iran?

Last June, former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter warned that the U.S. is building up military capabilities in Azerbaijan, on Iran's northern border, and sponsoring rebel bombings inside Iran. The obstacles to a full-scale invasion of Iran would at first glance appear to be formidable. As Ivan Eland has observed, "invading Iran would likely make the bloody quagmire in Iraq look like a picnic. Iran has nearly four times the territory and three times the population of Iraq. Also, Iran's terrain is much more mountainous than Iraq's and even more ideal for guerrilla warfare." -- Zmag.org

Salient New Weapons Systems

(see 22 September 2003: Iranian Military Parade):

• Zulfiqar 3 MBT (Abrams-like MBT, also spelled "Zolfaqar")
• SCUD SS-1 IRBM (8 squadrons)
• Shahab-3A/3B IRBM - 2 SSM squadrons (each 6+ transporter/erector/launchers each) - 3A: 1,300-1,700 km range, 800-1,200kg warhead. 3B: 2,500 km range, 500kg warhead
• Indigenous-built version of Chinese C-802 anti-ship missile
• P270 Moskit SS-N-22 Sunburn

Combined with a heavy warhead, the basic Shahab-3A should be considered an effective conventional ballistic missile against anything but targets heavily protected by anti-ballistic missile defences, even if the usual reports about the precision of its guidance system cite a CEP between 100 and 200m. -- Shahab 3: an Advanced IRBM

Russia Ready to Vaporize the Jewish State (And then kick America out of the Eastern Hemisphere’s oilfields)

About one month ago, Russia discreetly invoked MAD again, but this time in the Middle East in direct response to hysterical Israeli threats to nuke Iran with submarine-launched American Harpoon missiles. Quietly and with the minimum of fuss, Russia deployed its most advanced tactical nuclear missiles and crews to both Syria and Iran, thereby sending an unmistakable diplomatic signal that if Israel attacked Tehran or Damascus with nuclear weapons, Russia would in return instantly and anonymously vaporize the Jewish State.

This is not an idle or exaggerated threat. The Russian missile type deployed in Syria and Iran is the P270 Moskit [Mosquito], known in NATO circles as the SS-N-22 "Sunburn", once described by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher as "the most dangerous anti-ship missile in the Russian, and now the Chinese, fleet.” The ship borne version of this missile is launched from deck mounted quad tubes, but since Rohrabacher made his comments, Russia has adapted the Sunburn for submerged launch from submarines, air launch from Sukhoi 27s, and single surface launch from modified 40’ flatbed trucks. Nowadays, western defense experts unambiguously view all versions of Sunburn as the “most dangerous missiles in the world”.

Joe Vialls, 23 Oct 2003

The above presumes the Russians have given nuclear warheads to Syria and Iran, which is unwarranted to presume. It has indeed given them the missiles, which present anti-ship and strategic land target threats.

Iran was said to have purchased intermediate-range cruise missiles that could fitted with a nuclear warhead, according to an investigation in Ukraine. A leading Ukraine parliamentarian and politicians said a police investigation has determined that Iran bought missiles with a range of up to 3,000 kilometers from Kiev. The pro-government parliamentarian, Grigory Omelchenko, identified the cruise missiles as the Kh-55. -- Russian Federation Missile Index

20 such missiles were sold, but "the missiles themselves were not in very good shape, according to one US official." They may have been bought more for study than actual deployment.

Missile Threat

• Significant antiship missile threat due to SS-N-26 Yakhont and SS-N-22 Sunburn hypersonic missiles. Risk to US Naval assets or commercial shipping and tankers.
• IRBM ranges out to 1,500 km put Afghani, Iraqi, Saudi, GCC, Central Asian, Turkish and Pakistani bases at risk. Civilian targets could extend as far as Israel, Istanbul, India, Ukraine, Egypt.
• Longer-range Sahab-3B capable of 2,500 km and Ukrainian Kh-55 Granat with 3,000 km range increase threats to central Europe (Italy, Greece, Germany), Horn of Africa, and India.
• Missiles could also be fitted to aircraft or even packed aboard container ships to be launched from remote locations at even more distant targets -- even targeting the US if launched from the Mid-Atlantic. (Possible tactic noted by GlobalSecurity.org)

Iranian Military Spending

Iran has cut its military expenditures since the Iran-Iraq War, and it has done so in spite of the fact it lost some 40-60% of its holdings of major land weapons during the climatic battles of the war in 1988, and much of its military inventory is becoming obsolete. US government estimates indicate that Iran’s real defense spending is now less than one-half of the level it reached during the Iran-Iraq war, but that Iranian military expenditures still average over $4.0 billion a year.

...

Iran seems to have made a strategic decision after its defeat in the Iran-Iraq War not to engage in a major conventional arms build-up and to concentrate on economic development.

...

Iran has made major cuts in its new arms agreements with Russia since 1996, and has increasing had to rely on lower quality suppliers like China.

...

Iran mad a number of carefully focused arms purchases that helped correct some of the more critical weaknesses in its land, air, and naval forces. It also bought a mix of submarines, missile patrol boats, mines, torpedoes, and anti-ship missiles that greatly improved its capability to threaten shipping in the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman, and potentially to intimidate its neighbors.

-- Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts, Anthony H. Cordesman (PDF), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 30 Oct 2000

Rivalries between the regular armed forces and the Revolutionary Guards Corps during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War precluded effective cooperation between the two... They are not known ever to have held a single joint exercise. It is unclear whether they could operate together effectively in the event of a crisis.

...

Despite its junior status, the Revolutionary Guards air force may eventually supplant the regular air force as the dominant air service as a result of its access to funding, its active recruitment of the best graduates from technical degree-granting programs, and the rising influence of Revolutionary Guards–affiliated politicians, such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. By contrast, the regular air force has struggled to compensate for the loss of growing numbers of experienced technical personnel and aircrews to retirement; it has responded by pooling the existing technicians into centralized task forces.

...

In light of these problems, it is not inconceivable that Iran’s two air force services might eventually merge in order to create a leaner, more efficient, and more effective organization better able to deal with the challenges Iran is likely to face in the future.

...

Today, Iran’s aviation industry produces modern flight avionics and communications gear, two types of engines, airframes, in-flight refueling gear, and flight simulators. In addition, the regular air force has produced a variety of ordnance, including both “dumb” and guided bombs, and air-to-air, air-to-ground, and surface-to-air missiles, including the Fatter air-to-air missile (a Sidewinder look-alike), the Sedjil (an air-to-air version of the Hawk surface-to-air missile), the AGM-379/20 Zoobin, the GBU-67/B Qadr, and the Sattar laser-guided air-to-ground missile.

...

Iran’s senior military leaders know that Iran’s air forces would not be able to resist an invasion by a major power such as the United States. As a result, Iran has not focused on creating a large military, but rather has focused on developing the abilities to conduct continuous (day and night) operations through the acquisition of night vision equipment; to wage asymmetric warfare by creating a large popular militia (the Basij) and sea denial capabilities; and to strike even its most distant enemies by acquiring reconnaissance satellites, high altitude reconnaissance and strike UAVs, and long-range rocket and medium-range ballistic missile systems.

-- Iran’s Air Forces: Struggling to Maintain Readiness, 22 Dec 2005

_____

Iranian Army

350,000 personnel
1,613 MBT (480 T-72)
645 AFV
600 APC
2,085 towed Arty
310 SP Arty
890 MRLS
350 SSM

4 Armored Divisions (1 fully equipped: 92nd)
6 Infantry Divisions (2 mechanized: 28th, 84th)
1 Special Forces Division
1 Parachute Division (brigade)
12 SSM Squadrons

Niruyah Moghavemat Basij - Mobilization Resistence Force aka "Basij"

2,000 Ashura battalions were announced to be organized (20 Sep 2005)

Existing Strength
90,000 active duty full-timed uniformed
300,000 reservists

Potential Strength
Civil defense reserve claims Basij membership is "11 million members across the country." But more reasonably, "That study [by Center for Strategic and International Studies] adds that the Basij can mobilize up to 1 million men."

Iranian Air Force

See also:

Islamic Republic of Iran Air Arms (Scramble)

Iranian Air Force Equipment

Fighters/Close Air Support
20-25 F-14A
45-60 F-5E/F
40-65 F-4D/E
25 F-7 (China J-7)
25 MiG-29A/UB
15 MiG-23
7-10 Su-25K
40 EMB-312 Tucanos
30 Su-24MK
25 Mirage F-1
6-30 Azarakhsh (F-5F equivalent)

Support/Transport
1 IL-76 AEW
5 RF-4E Recon
4 707/747 Tanker
17 C-130E/H
6 707/727
40+ Misc. Transport
35 Helos (S/R, Transport)
180 Trainers

UAV
?? Ababil and Mohajer models

SAM

Theater Defense
50 SA-2/HQ-2J
10 SA-5/S-200
6+ SA-10/S-300 batteries (96 missiles)

Tactical
50 SA-6
29 SA-15/Tor-M1
150 I HAWK
30 Rapier
15 Tigercat
5 HQ-7/FM-80
?? SA-7 MANPADS
?? SA-16 MANPADS
?? Stinger MANPADS

Iranian Navy

20,000 personnel
1 DDG (Mouj)
6 SS
3 FFG
2 Corvette
25 Missile Craft
5 MCM
2 Minelayers
4 LST
3 LSM
3 LSL
4 P-3F Naval Recon
20 SH-3D Sea Kings
?? AB212 ASW
?? Dassault Falcon 20Es and Fokker F27-400M (Naval Patrol)
3 LCT
6 ACV

Strategies

• CONPLAN 8022-06 "Global Lightning" - Iranian Nuclear Program Strike
  
• OPLAN 1019-06 Arabian Gauntlet - Control SLOC Straights of Hormuz, Tanker War
  
• OPLAN 1002-06 Arabian Peninula Defense - Khuzestan Offense - Oil field defenses & siezures
  
• OPLAN XXXX-06 Northern Interdiction - Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan
  
• OPLAN XXXX-06 - Invasion, Drive on Tehran, Regime Change
  
• OPLAN XXXX-06 - Post-Invasion Nation-Building

Requirements

• For the initial "Global Lightning" strike, a force of 40,000 - 50,000 personnel, comprised primarily of US Navy, Air Force, Marines and Special Forces, would be required to neutralize the widely-disbursed Iranian nuclear and missile production, storage, and launch facilities and systems. Between 100-500 targets could be hit by cruise missiles, ground strikes and tactical operations, similar to Operation Desert Fox. Operational success would be destruction of targets. Effectiveness of SAM defenses or interception of ground forces may result in US casualties.
  
• Arabian Gauntlet would require 100,000-200,000 personnel to sieze, strike and/or blockade key port and base facilities along the Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf. Forces would be comprised of US Navy, Marines, Air Force and Army elements, along with allied GCC states. The wide range would depend on the amount of targets desired to be siezed and held versus neutralized. 2-3 carrier groups, 2-3 MEUs, and 2-3 Army divisions. US forces would be at serious risk of missile strikes from hypersonic missiles. International energy supplies could be halted or delayed with serious ramification to Japanese, Chinese, and other dependent economies. Iranian submarine and surface assets would probably present little tactical military challenge but provide operational security concerns. Worst case would be a breakout of vessels beyond blockade lines resulting in loss of shipping, piracy, and oil infrastructure damage (platforms and refineries).
  
• Arabian Peninsula Defense require 50,000 - 100,000, depending on whether there were more or less forces committed to Arabian Gauntlet. If less forces were deployed forward to Iranian shore siezures, then commeasurate forces would need to remain behind in GCC states to protect from Iranian air or sea-based strikes and protect Gulf offshore facilities. Most of these forces would consist of the GCC defenses themselves. If a Khuzestan Offense was added, 50,000 - 100,000 troops would be required to occupy the area and protect the Iranian border with Iraq. Deployment commitments for an offensive may be sequential to Arabian Gauntlet operations, allowing force or air/naval asset redeployment. 100,000 OIF troops are required for continuing stabilization operations. Actions in Iran might lead to increased terrorism, increased recruitment for insurgency, or massive civil uprisings in Iraq.
  
• Northern Interdiction would require 20,000 - 50,000, for either border patrol to prevent Iranian incursions, or, at the higher-end, would strike or move into northern Iranian areas to attack key targets. Mission depends highly on permission of Central Asian state governments. These nations have large Islamic populations, and it is possible US basing could touch off anti-US government actions, protests, domestic terrorism or insurgencies. Azerbaijan would be potentially "hostile territory" to operate from. Only in 2004 did it agree to abide by international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols. Islamicists still use Azerbaijan for widespread international drug, arms, and jihadi movements. Turkmenistan is a highly-repressive authoritarian and Islamic society that could swing away from the US, since Russia is pressuring it. As recently noted, "But the US geopolitical position has eroded markedly in 2005 – a fact underscored by Uzbekistan’s decision to evict US forces from an airbase, known as Karshi-Khanabad." Further regarding Uzbekistan: "At the same time, one senior US official says there is growing concern in Washington that the "correlation of forces" in the region is shifting against the United States." Armenia remains the strongest possibility in joint cooperation with NATO and the PfP program, but too much pressure could bring down trouble on the fragile state. This entire part of a containment strategy might need to be cancelled, instead focusing on Afghanistan only. Present force commitments of 19,000 Coalition forces waging war against insurgents, and 9,000 NATO troops providing peacekeeping will be joined by 6,000 NATO troops in the 1st quarter 2006. These would be joined by 20,000 - 50,000 more troops beyong OEF commitments. (See Nato's Afghanistan troop dilemma.) Likely possibility that complete containment of Iran would prove impossible, allowing arms and oil shipments to continue through Central Asia on to supplies from Russia and China. Diplomatic pressure would minimize but not halt such traffic.
  
• Drive on Tehran and Regime Change would require 400,000 - 500,000 troops. These would be drawn from existing committed assets of Arabian Gauntlet, Arabian Peninsula Defense (especially Khuzestan Offense), and from Afganistan offenses. Air and ground superiority would be achieved, but tactical surprises could produce costly losses. Iranian Air Force has not been under interdict for a decade like Iraq and could present serious occasional challenge. US air strikes at Iranian facilities could be potentially matched by Iranian strikes on US air bases by IRBMs and cruise missiles, though balance would be greatly in US favor. Major extenuation of logistics train and supply lines to coast and Afghani bases would lead to significant rear-echelon security requirements to prevent ambushes and even siezures of supplies. Major cities would need to be taken through costly MOUT assaults, policed or bypassed. No expectation for friendly reception by indigenous groups. If government leaders disbursed, taking Tehran might not achieve regime change but present major security management challenge.
  
• Post-Invasion Nation Building would require supporting levels of 300,000 - 400,000 personnel. Iran is more than twice the population of Iraq, almost three times the size. There is no reason in the world to presume it would require any less forces on a per capita or area basis. Unlike in Iraq where large minorities of Kurds and Shi'ites would be willing to stand aside to remove the minority Sunni Ba'athist regime, the Iranian regime enjoys great domestic support, and an invasion would inflame nationalistic sentiments. Whereas the insurgency in Iraq is about 20,000 - 40,000 personnel, Iran could well support over 100,000 and resonably upwards of 400,000 or 500,000 at present and potentially 1 million irregular troops. The nation could easily require 3-7 years of occupation.

Final Summation

An attack on Iran to simply destroy or seriously degrade its nuclear, missile and WMD programs would take 40,000 - 50,000 personnel in an "Operation Desert Fox" style remote strike.

Simply striking Iranian targets would not contain or stop Iran, which could then attack Israel and/or Gulf states with IRBMs, target Persian Gulf tankers and oil platforms, launch a true wave of international terrorism, possibly even incite limited revolt against regimes that support the United States instead of a fellow member of the OIC and OPEC, and otherwise cause the US-GCC alliance to become destabilized. The US, if it mismanaged international relations, could lose regional credibility. GCC states may tactfully decide to become neutral rather than support US efforts in the region. States as far away as Turkey and Egypt, Greece and even Italy could be swayed by threats of IRBMs and terrorism from participation.

A full-scale war to topple the Iranian regime would take a war as large or larger than Vietnam. If the conflict did require 3-7 years of involvement, it could inflict, in moderate terms, 4,000 to 8,000 dead, 30,000 to 50,000 wounded, possibly result in the first US carriers lost to combat since World War II, and cost the United States over $1 trillion. If a US aircraft carrier or other large naval vessel were hit, catastrophic casualties could add hundreds or thousands more dead in a single incident.

Copyleft 2006 Peter Corless "It's okay to distribute as long as you attribute." (this was posted by a member of another forum and I did not come up with this myself and was given promission by the author via email to use it)

[Pruitt]

Where are we going to get 2 to 3 MEUs and 2 to 3 Army Divisions? Would we be sending Heavy or Light Divisions? What are we going to use for munitions?

This plan supposes that we have the men, equipment and ammo to go in and do these things. We don't have the extra stuff. We have not replaced what we used and are still using in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is North Korea and other "peaceful" democratically led countries going to do while we fully commit our military?

This is a pipedream.

Pruitt

[Tater]

Originally Posted by Pruitt

This is a pipedream.

Attachment 16354

Yeah, let's not do anything because it just might be difficult. We can let Iran get nukes so they can parcel them out to their terrorist buddies . We can save a dew million bucks and a few thousand lives in exchange for having major cities wiped out.

[Combatengineer]

Originally Posted by Tater

Attachment 16354

Yeah, let's not do anything because it just might be difficult. We can let Iran get nukes so they can parcel them out to their terrorist buddies . We can save a dew million bucks and a few thousand lives in exchange for having major cities wiped out.

Right, when are the current leaders going to start making these hard choices??? We need the forces, equipment, and logistics capability to do this, ball has been in the admin's court for years now, no action.

[The Doctor]

Originally Posted by Pruitt

Where are we going to get 2 to 3 MEUs and 2 to 3 Army Divisions? Would we be sending Heavy or Light Divisions? What are we going to use for munitions?

The active duty US Army has the equivalent of 37 combat brigades, 12 of which are currently deployed overseas (10 in Iraq/SW Asia, 1 in Afghanistan and 1 in South Korea). That leaves 25 brigades/ACR's that are not deployed...about 6 Divisions.

The ARNG has the equivalent of 39 combat brigades, 4 of which are currently deployed overseas. That leaves 35 brigades/ACR's that are not deployed...almost 9 Divisions.

Much of the Army's heavy equipment is pre-positioned in Kuwait, Diego Garcia, Jordan, etc. Additional heavy equipment which was deployed for OIF has been retained in theater...part of the reason stateside units lack heavy equipment.

The Marine Corps consists of 4 combat divisions, three of which are part of Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and one is in reserve (MEU's are battalion sized units). One MEF is generally deployed to Iraq/SWA; the other two MEF's are available.

Originally Posted by Pruitt

This plan supposes that we have the men, equipment and ammo to go in and do these things. We don't have the extra stuff. We have not replaced what we used and are still using in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We have the men. We have the equipment. We have the ammo. We would need to ramp up production of materiel if we had to invade Iran.

Originally Posted by Pruitt

What is North Korea and other "peaceful" democratically led countries going to do while we fully commit our military?

Not much of anything. One US brigade and the entire large and powerful ROK armed forces would remain below the 38th Parallel.

Originally Posted by Pruitt

This is a pipedream.

Pruitt

It wouldn't be easy and it would require the activation of a lot of reservists and the extension of overseas deployments; but it is not a "pipedream".

[Tater]

Originally Posted by Combatengineer

Right, when are the current leaders going to start making these hard choices??? We need the forces, equipment, and logistics capability to do this, ball has been in the admin's court for years now, no action.

See post #5...

Originally Posted by The Doctor

Not much of anything. One US brigade and the entire large and powerful ROK armed forces would remain below the 38th Parallel.

Not to mention that if NK got frisky I doubt the Japanese defense forces would just sit idly by.

[Pruitt]

Doc,

If you know something about equipment levels of the units and munitions, please feel free to share it with the rest of us. Out of those available 25 Regular Army Brigades and 35 National Guard Brigades, how many are deployable right now? We have been leaving a lot of equipment in Iraq when the units leave. The 3rd Infantry Division is supposed to be unready for combat right now because it lacks equipment. That is three or four of your "unused" Combat Brigades right there. Would we have to strip all the Stateside units to deploy a dozen or so Combat Brigades for action in Iran?

If a dozen Combat Brigades can't do the job of pacifying the Iraqis, why is it enough for Iran, a much bigger place?

Yeah, I agree we once had POMCUS stocks in Diego Garcia and Kuwait. Where is it said it was put back and if it was, was the ENTIRE stock returned?

We have been using munitions faster than we have been making them. It isn't the dumb bombs that are being used fast either, it is the smart munitions. We have had the capability of "ramping up" production for a number of years and we have not done it yet.

I am not opposed to slapping the Iranians, I just want to use a steel glove to do it with, not a velvet one. Cruise missiles and attack planes can only do so much. You need boots on the ground to make sure.

You have to be able to sustain an action like this. We are scrimping on equipment buys and munitions to pay for operations in the Middle East. We need to buy more equipment and munitions to re-build our stocks. The Reserves are being told they will get Army hand downs when they are replaced by the next generation of equipment. They are not funding this new generation, yet, so in effect it is an IOU.

If you want the Japanese to get in it with the North Koreans you are not smoking tobacco. Who says the South Koreans will even let the Japanese on their territory? The threat of nuclear tipped missiles will keep Japan out of Korea. Who says China and Russia would not help a North Korean effort?

Pruitt

[The Doctor]

3ID lacks stateside equipment because it was left in Iraq and/or Kuwait. They are preparing for their third deployment to Iraq/Kuwait since 2003. They do no bring all of their heavy equipment back and forth on each deployment.

[Combatengineer]

Originally Posted by The Doctor

3ID lacks stateside equipment because it was left in Iraq and/or Kuwait. They are preparing for their third deployment to Iraq/Kuwait since 2003. They do no bring all of their heavy equipment back and forth on each deployment.

Correct, so unless they deploy to Iraq they don't have equip to fall on to, makes it hard to go to Iran doesn't it????

[piero1971]

I like this thread...

but.. .always remember what is the political reason for going to war? or rather "why?"

I mean it's NEVER just for ideals... it's always for real gains... (or at least I hope).

here's an interesting political "why":
http://www.antiwar.com/moore/?articleid=9794

[The Doctor]

Originally Posted by Combatengineer

Correct, so unless they deploy to Iraq they don't have equip to fall on to, makes it hard to go to Iran doesn't it????

I just assumed that any invasion of Iran would stage from Iraq. If we think we might need to hit Iran (or Syria) it kind of makes sense to keep as much heavy equipment over there as we reasonably can, right?

There's no question that the wear and tear of combat operations has reduced the mission capability of ARNG and stateside regular Army units. However, the Army is maintaining a high degree of readiness of in-theater equipment and they are increasing the reset expenditures.

From Armed Forces Journal...

Combat fatigue
Vehicle wear and tear in Iraq jeopardizes U.S. Army readiness
By Lawrence Korb, Loren Thompson and Caroline Wadhams

Only 15 percent to 20 percent of the service's equipment is in-theater at any given time, but it takes a beating when it is. According to research conducted by the Rand Corp., a year of service in Iraq causes as much wear and tear to equipment as five years of peacetime training...

Despite the many stresses at work in Iraq, the Army has done a good job of preserving and protecting deployed equipment. Mission-capable rates for ground vehicles exceed 90 percent, and mission-capable rates for helicopters approach 80 percent. Virtually every U.S. vehicle in the country that did not arrive already equipped with armor now carries it, and in many cases the armor has been strengthened to provide greater protection. The Army has established a comprehensive program for maintaining combat systems in-theater, and rotating them back to the U.S. when heavy repairs are required.

The fact that the service is able to maintain its diverse and aging inventory of equipment in such a high state of readiness while waging a multifront war is testament to the diligence and expertise of the Army Materiel Command...

The Army refers to its equipment recovery initiatives as "reset." There are at least four types of activity included in reset: sustainment, restoration to standard, recapitalization and replacement...

Reset expenditures have grown in every year since the Iraq campaign began — from $1.2 billion in 2003 to $3.7 billion in 2004, $6.5 billion in 2005 and about $9 billion in 2006. The latter figure will support repair and overhaul of 85 helicopters, 700 tanks, 1,200 armored infantry vehicles (Bradley's and M113s) and 9,000 Humvees. This money is provided as part of emergency supplemental appropriations outside the Army budget, which has raised concerns that funding may dry up before reset is complete. If it does, the Army will exit Iraq in a diminished state, forced to choose between near-term recovery of aging systems and investment in future capabilities...

Hopefully a sudden redeployment away from Iraq (The Murtha Plan) won't dry up the reset budget.

[GCoyote]

Originally Posted by piero1971

I like this thread...

but.. .always remember what is the political reason for going to war? or rather "why?"

I mean it's NEVER just for ideals... it's always for real gains... (or at least I hope).

here's an interesting political "why":
http://www.antiwar.com/moore/?articleid=9794

Attacking Iran would IMHO push oil over $100/bbl overnight. Might just as well ask the Democrats what color carpeting they want installed in the Capitol AND the Whitehouse.

[Combatengineer]

Originally Posted by The Doctor

I just assumed that any invasion of Iran would stage from Iraq. If we think we might need to hit Iran (or Syria) it kind of makes sense to keep as much heavy equipment over there as we reasonably can, right?

There's no question that the wear and tear of combat operations has reduced the mission capability of ARNG and stateside regular Army units. However, the Army is maintaining a high degree of readiness of in-theater equipment and they are increasing the reset expenditures.

From Armed Forces Journal...


Hopefully a sudden redeployment away from Iraq (The Murtha Plan) won't dry up the reset budget.

On the first point I'm assuming that the current forces in Iraq 10-12 BTC Army and 3 RCT Marines would still be need there and that the forces and equipment would not be available to hit southern Iran.

Yes the forces equipment and manning in Iraq are quite high, just I dont see how with the current non-deployed forces you could field 2-5 division in order to execute the plan in the article. You'd have to maintain 2-3 just to hold southern Iranian oil fields plus all hell would break lose in southern Iraq, you'd need 2-5 extra BTC down there.

Without a congressional declaration of war (which gives you the authorization for total mobilization of the armed forces) any Iranian scenario that requires taking and hold much Iranian territory is as stated above, a "Pipedream" (IMHO of course)

[Metryll]

Doc,

The active duty US Army has the equivalent of 37 combat brigades, 12 of which are currently deployed overseas (10 in Iraq/SW Asia, 1 in Afghanistan and 1 in South Korea). That leaves 25 brigades/ACR's that are not deployed...about 6 Divisions.

But because of unit rotation the number of 'used' brigade has to be doubled. Hence, even if not counting South Korea, this is 22 brigades out 37 that are not available leaving only 15 brigades available.

Metryll

[Axis of Evil]

Originally Posted by Pruitt

Where are we going to get 2 to 3 MEUs and 2 to 3 Army Divisions? Would we be sending Heavy or Light Divisions? What are we going to use for munitions?

A mixture of both Heavy and Light will be needed. And by MEU you mean Marine Expeditionary Unit which is roughly the size of a Regiment along with a Fighter Squadron. A MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) is the size of a Division with a Marine Aircraft Wing attacted to it. One MEF is already deployed in Iraq and that leaves the other two free. The Army Divisions however would be much harder to come up with (yes, I am aware the Army is bigger than the Marine Corps) due to the fact there are more Army units in Iraq and A-stan than Marine. This is why we will have to wait until the Iraqi Army and Police can stand on their own without are help. As for the munitions... You are forgetting one thing... WE HAVE ENOUGH POWER TO DESTROY THE EARTH 10 TIMES OVER. So I don't see why we could not come with the firepower needed to invade Iran.

This plan supposes that we have the men, equipment and ammo to go in and do these things. We don't have the extra stuff. We have not replaced what we used and are still using in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is North Korea and other "peaceful" democratically led countries going to do while we fully commit our military?

I don't think any invasion of Iran will take place until the Iraqi and Afghan militaries can hold their own against the insurgents. I think many people understand this. We have the weapons and ammo to invade but not the man power. If we need more troops then the draft will come back. What I think we should do once we destroy the leadership is pull out of the country and not rebuild. Now, there are many people whom we don't like that might come in a set up shop... But would you rather have them in charge without nukes or the current wacko government with nukes??

This is a pipedream.

Not really...

Pruitt

Axis of Evil

I hope this clears things up.