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RKKA (The Russian Army) in World War IIDiscuss the Russian armed forces in World War II. Hosted by our resident Russian expert, AMVAS. Please visit his RKKA in WW2 Website.
View Poll Results: Best Marshal of the soviet union
I always find the story about rivality between konev and zhukov strange , since its zhukov who ask stalin to give konev some leadership in the beginning of barbarossa no?
Before your words I didn't know Konev was a commissar (in the Civil War, as I understand).
I suppose that you have a VERY biased opinion about commissars and communists.
A commissar of the Civil War was the Party's representative in troops. It was only a Communist.
In WWII it was not too important who was a commissar in the Civil War and who was not.
And your initial phrase about distrusting to commissars.... You like logic.
Konev was a Commissar. You said it was impossible to trust to a Commissar. It means that it is impossible to trust to Konev because he was a Commissar... Doesn't it?
Nobody knows exact reason why Konev offered to advance to Berlin from south when Zhukov was attacking Zeelov Highs.
The Westerners suppose that Konev envied to Zhukov and began his advance to Berlin for personal pride (to enter in Berlin before Zhukov).
But there is an opinion that Konev thought not only about personal pride but about the interests of the struggle against Hitler's Germany. The two blows from two directions were more effective than one blow so Konev's action was good for the victory in the battle for Berlin.
May be, Konev thought about both the reasons. But it is necessary to remember about the second one and not about first one only.
The role of the commissar is not unique to the Red Army. Many armies in revolution such as Cromwell's and the French had their watchdogs to ensure the political correctness of the military. And I distrust them all equally. So, don't take it personally.
Konev was a commissar for an armored train, the name escapes me now.
My belief in Konev's personal desire for capturing Berlin is based in part on how hard he drove his subordinates. In fact, in the case of Rybalko, Konev took over directing the army in its run through Wunsdorf up to the Teltov canal. And I cannot believe with his troops within yards of the Reischstag, that it did not chafe him that Stalin finally drew a unit boundary giving the prize to Zhukov.
I might add, Rybalko was also a commissar who jumped to the military side during and after the Civil War. I understand he had the reputation of "a hammer" or "alligator".
__________________
Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.
Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 20 Apr 06 at 07:58..
No problem. They were marshals so they can be here. And Budennyi even got a vote!
Not from me! I think your list was good Andrey, and I said you can't vote for ONE person, heck you said Konev thought about attacking Berlin from the South to help Zhukov! You needed at least two Marshals and their armies for that.
I always find the story about rivality between konev and zhukov strange , since its zhukov who ask stalin to give konev some leadership in the beginning of barbarossa no?
it was during the Battle for Moscow, in October of 1941 when Konev's troops were broken by the Germans. Stalin wanted to punish Konev for that failure but Zhukov asked Stalin to let Konev to command by other troops in Moscow direction.
The role of the commissar is not unique to the Red Army. Many armies in revolution such as Cromwell's and the French had their watchdaogs to ensure the political correctness of the military. And I distrust them all equally. So, don't take it personally.
Hmmm... It is very primitive opinion. It is the same to say all the policemen are bad guys as they are watchdogs for other people. It is the same to say all NKVD-members were cruel butchers.
Commissars were like counter-intelligence agents and also operated as deputies of the commanding officers. Their duty was to care about personnel of their unit. There were many cases when commissars replaced killed or wounded commanding officers and commanded their units in a combat.
Popel also was a commissar.
Quote:
My belief in Konev's personal desire for capturing Berlin is based in part on how hard he drove his subordinates. In fact, in the case of Rybalko, Konev took over directing the army in its run through Wunsdorf up to the Teltov canal.
So what? Konev could think about sooner victory over Germany when he was pushing his troops ahead and ahead.
Quote:
And I cannot believe with his troops within yards of the Reischstag, that it did not chafe him that Stalin finally drew a unit boundary giving the prize to Zhukov.
Of course, Konev was upset that his troops wouldn't take part in the capturing of the Reichstag. So what?
Quote:
I might add, Rybalko was also a commissar who jumped to the military side during and after the Civil War. I understand he had the reputation of "a hammer" or "alligator".
I understand to be "a hammer" is to be persevering or stubborn. Also it can be related to the fact that Rybalko was bald-headed and his head looked like the blowing part of "a hammer". It doesn't related to being a commissar in past, anyone can be like "a hammer".
I suppose it is possible to call Zhukov "a hammer" also if to mean his stubborn character.
Not primitive, began in 1776. We as a people were concerned about inalienable rights and dealing with the state's methods of control -- such as police, standing armies, taxation, ownership of private property.... State watchdogs are ominious in our culture. We have found many of these things necessary, but our daily politics is to balance power--that balancing in practice operates like the dialectics.
Zhukov, initially, kept Konev as his deputy until Stalin cooled down and then later recommended him for an army command. Zhukov may have saved Konev's life, because at this point in the war Stalin would personalize the defeats as individual negligence. He had directed the execution of Generals Pavlov, Klimovskikh, and Korobkov. To Zhukov's credit, he told Stalin this was not the way to handle commanders and it had a detrimental impact on the remaining commanders.
I, too, have wondered why Konev forgot this favor.
rna
__________________
Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.
Last edited by R.N. Armstrong; 20 Apr 06 at 08:18..
Zhukov, initially, kept Konev as his deputy until Stalin cooled down and then later recommended him for an army command. Zhukov may have saved Konev's life, because at this point in the war Stalin would personalize the defeats as individual negligence. He had directed the execution of Generals Pavlov, Klimovskikh, and Korobkov. To Zhukov's credit, he told Stalin this was not the way to handle commanders and it had a detrimental impact on the remaining commanders.
I, too, have wondered why Konev forgot this favor.
rna
Zhukov did it not because he was a large friend of Konev or because he liked Konev. Zhukov did it in 1941 because he thought about the interests of the defense of Moscow.
There is a Russian saying: "Druzhba druzhboi a sluzhba sluzhboi". It is translated: "The friendship between two men must be forgotten if it is necessaru for their service duties."
You again suppose that Konev advanced to Berlin from south for his personal purposes only and not for the interests of the war.
Not primitive, began in 1776. We as a people were concerned about inalienable rights and dealing with the state's methods of control -- such as police, standing armies, taxation, ownership of private property.... State watchdogs are ominious in our culture. We have found many of these things necessary, but our daily politics is to balance power--that balancing in practice operates like the dialectics.
Your opinion about the commissars contradicts with Russian one. The Americans can think about the commissars what they want but I suppose that their current opinion is based on incorrect information.
Your current position equals to German one when the Germans wrote in their propaganda leaflet: “Soviet soldiers, kill the Jews and the Commissars and go home”. The Germans supposed that the commissars forced the soldiers to fight and that the soldiers hated the commissars.
In USSR the commissars were not those guys who in Hollywood movies went behind combat infantry lines and shot in the retreating soldiers from their pistol.
In USSR in WWII commissars had to care about the morale of the troops and to make all necessary efforts to increase it. It meant, for example, to care about warm food, better supply by clothes, to organize the soldiers’ entertainment, to explain the common situation in the war, to speak about the Hitlerites’ crimes, to organize regular supply by newspapers, to control the organization of the washing in baths and so on.
You can define the commissars’ tasks by reading of Popel’s memoirs and by looking what he did as a commissar.
I read that it was right before the beginning of the war when a few thousands ordinary school teachers were drafted in Red Army as company scale commissars. You can imagine yourself how those former school teachers operated as commissars.
So in many units the commissars were very popular.
And your phrase about distrusting to commissars is completely incorrect if to speak the Russians. Can you apply that phrase to the commissars who were school teachers a few months ago?
Especially your phrase is incorrect if to speak about the Soviet youth of the 30th-40th years and the commissars of the Civil War. In the 30th-40th the Civil War’s commissars were like legendary heroes.
Zhukov did it not because he was a large friend of Konev or because he liked Konev. Zhukov did it in 1941 because he thought about the interests of the defense of Moscow.
You again suppose that Konev advanced to Berlin from south for his personal purposes only and not for the interests of the war.
Agree, Zhukov did not do it out of freindship. He thought the personalizing of battlefield defeats was detrimental to aggressive senior leadership.
You suppose wrongly. Konev was assigned to attack south of Berlin, and Stalin purposely left the boundary between Konev and Zhukov open to promote a competition ("socialist competition"?) between the two to reach Berlin faster. Konev did not encounter the same opposition as Zhukov in crossing the Oder and had a good jump on Berlin despite being a little farther to the south. Again, Konev had a lot to gain personally if successful in the eyes of Stalin, nationally, and for posterity. And I previously gave one indicator of his personal drive.
__________________
Leadership is the ability to rise above conventional wisdom.
You suppose wrongly. Konev was assigned to attack south of Berlin, and Stalin purposely left the boundary between Konev and Zhukov open to promote a competition ("socialist competition"?) between the two to reach Berlin faster. Konev did not encounter the same opposition as Zhukov in crossing the Oder and had a good jump on Berlin despite being a little farther to the south. Again, Konev had a lot to gain personally if successful in the eyes of Stalin, nationally, and for posterity. And I previously gave one indicator of his personal drive.
I want to explain the situation with Konev.
You have said that:
1. He was an ex-commissar and it is bad.
2. Zhukov saved him in 1941 but Konev turned out to be ungrateful and tried to steal Zhukov’s glory of the capturer of Berlin and Reichstag.
I showed you that:
1. To be an ex-commissar was not so bad like you suppose.
2. It is not clearly that Konev’s advance to Berlin from south was made for his personal self-conceit.
From the military point of view Konev’s rash to Berlin was very useful.
If Stalin didn’t draw the final separation line between Zhukov and Konev’s troops right in the beginning of the final battle for Berlin it could be because no one could know what success each Front would achieve a few days later.
I don’t see any reason for Konev to stop his troops before which there was little resistance because Zhukov saved him in 1941.
Konev did everything correctly and his troops captured a half of Berlin. I doubt Rokossovskii operated by other way if he commanded Konev's troops.
Before the Lvov-Sandomir operation, he argued with Stalin for two breakthrough sectors on his front. He was asked to leave the room and reconsider. He held his ground. Stalin finally relented, but told him the success of the operation was on his (Konev's)shoulders.