The 'Great War' did more for Air Power than Air Power did for the 'Great War'

[halloween jack]

This is an essay I recently completed for university and thought i would pop it up here to see what people thought. Do you agree or disagree with the premise? Thoughts ?

The ‘Great War’ is synonymous with idea of aerial paladins jousting above the mud filled battlefields of France and Flanders, yet this was far from the truth. The impact of air power on the ‘Great War’ has been shrouded in the above myth which has clouded speculation and debate on the topic for some time. However, what is clear is that the ‘Great War’ certainly had an impact on the future of air power as will be highlighted in this essay. The invention of the aircraft and lighter than air dirigibles added a third dimension for military commanders to consider in the course of conflict. War has always heralded technological invention and innovation and in this the ‘Great War’ is no different. Air power was still in its infancy and as such was relegated to the peripheral in planning, within four short years however air power had become an essential consideration to the planning and implementation of military strategy (Powers 19:1976). To assess the impact of air power on the ‘Great War’, and the ‘Great Wars’ impact on air power, this essay will look at four points. The early formative years of air power in the ‘Great War’ will highlight the differences in National strategies and show how air power developed through the opening phase of the conflict. The evolution of air to air combat and the attempts at battlefield interdiction and close air support (CAS) will be analysed, including the effectiveness of this use of aircraft. Strategic bombing is largely considered a WWII phenomenon, however the use of bombers to strike the home State reared its head in the ‘Great War’. The German and British use of bombers and zeppelin’s to strike civilians, industrial and port facilities will be addressed and the effects it had on the overall war effort. Lastly, this essay will assess the impact of the ‘Great War’ on the thinking of the inter war theorists and highlight how this impacted on WWII and future conflicts.

At the outset of conflict in 1914, the air forces of the belligerent States were “small and technically immature” and aircraft were also characteristically fragile, under powered and dangerous to fly(Overy in Townsend 263:2000). This of course was a far cry from the scenes portrayed in HG Wells’ 1908 novel ‘The War in the Air’ that portrayed air power far differently to the reality of technology at the time. The primary use of air power in the early stages of the war rested on battlefield reconnaissance and artillery observation. This use of air power was particularly useful to battlefield commanders, however aerial reconnaissance did not excel until cameras were placed aboard aircraft. The process from spotting enemy movements or positions to analysis and interpretation was often slow and as such it is critical that its early contribution to the war is not overstated. John Buckley suggests that aerial reconnaissance actually contributed to the stalemate on the Western Front as it restricted the chance of surprise (Buckley in Trew & Sheffield 89:2000). Whilst the effectiveness of reconnaissance aircraft in the ‘Great War’ is somewhat debatable, the contribution aircraft made to artillery observation can not be avoided. Powers suggests that “…artillery cooperation was an important element in the British series of victories which rolled back the Germans to the armistice” (Powers 18:1976). The overall effectiveness of reconnaissance and observation aircraft meant that to avoid detection, ground forces would have to move up under cover of darkness (Powers18:1976).

Air power was a microcosm for the strategies of each Nation participating in the ‘Great War’ and their doctrine for fighting the conflict. Germany and France relied on reconnaissance to support their armies in the field where as Britain favoured maritime air power to support the Royal Navy (Buckley 44:1999). The failure of the Schlieffen plan also put Germany firmly on the defensive and as such its employment of air power mirrored this (Buckley 44:1999). Due to the very nature of Air Power, it is costly to develop, manufacture and deploy, this of course is significant when considering the impact air power had on the ‘Great War’. Not all States could financially suffer the burden of creating such unproven weapons, consequently, Germany was the only Central Power that was capable of utilising the third dimension. Financially it was also expensive to train pilots, however trainees were often expected to supply most if not all of the costs for their training due to a lack of State funding (Budiansky 75:2004). Casualty rates amongst aircrew were also particularly high, especially in aircraft assigned to CAS.

The appearance of reconnaissance aircraft and balloons over the battlefield gave each side an advantage in spotting enemy offensives. To counter this threat each belligerent pushed fighters onto the battlefield in an attempt to restrict the capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft. Initially fighters were limited by technological problems, however by 1915 purpose built aircraft appeared in significant numbers (Overy in Townsend 263:2000).This was a significant shift for Army commanders as many believed aircraft should be used solely for reconnaissance and artillery observation (Overy in Townsend 263:2000). The reality of air to air combat was far different to the ‘knights of sky’ portrayed in the popular culture of the ‘Great War’. John Buckley suggests that whilst the some pilots were successful this was more attributable to the technological advantage their aircraft had over the opposition (Buckley 43:1999). Examples cited by Dr Buckley include Richtofen, who preyed on slow reconnaissance aircraft and William Bishop who may have fabricated the event that gained him the VC (Buckley 43:1999). The fact that air crew losses were disproportionately high in comparison with other arms highlights the problems associated with the third dimension. The men were poorly trained, unprepared and unequipped for the task in front of them.

The use of aircraft to attack enemy positions directly (ground attack) and to disrupt troop movement or supply lines (interdiction) was perhaps the most successful use of offensive air power during the ‘Great War’. This premise is supported by Richard Overy who claims “the most effective contribution made by air power in the ‘Great War’ was in tactical support” (Overy in Townsend 264:2000). Yet, this type of action was also the most dangerous that aircrew could perform. The development of anti-aircraft weapons and the nature of tactical support would mean that considerable losses would occur, making it highly unpopular with the aircrews. The accuracy of such attacks was also questionable as bomb loads were light and were also dropped by hand. Initially there was also a lack of coordination in the way CAS aircraft were used, however by 1918 army field commanders were coordinating with air assets to attack enemy positions (Overy in Townsend 264:2000). 1918 also heralded the beginnings of combined arms offensive as German aircraft attacked strategic weak points in support of heavily armed infantry (Overy in Townsend 264:2000). However, there is little in the way of evidence to support how these methods actually impacted on the conduct of the war.

A German, Major Wilhelm Sieghart has been credited with formulating the idea of strategic bombing and indeed it was Germany that first conducted these types of raid (Pimlott in McInnes & Sheffield 114:1988). The first attacks on Britain in 1915 were carried out by Zeppelin dirigibles which had an almost unlimited range. However, due to weather constraints and lack of navigational equipment, these assets were of limited effectiveness (Pimlott in McInnes & Sheffield 114:1988). Zeppelins carried large bomb loads (in comparison to aircraft of the time) however because the ordinance was dropped from 12,000 feet, accuracy was poor (Pimlott in McInnes & Sheffield 114:1988). On May 15th 1915 Zeppelins dropped bombs on London, destroying urban housing in the Docklands. This was the first of 51 raids that hit Britain, however the actual damage caused was insignificant, however the implications of this event went much deeper (Pimlott in McInnes & Sheffield 115:1988). The reaction of the civilian population to the bombings is much debated. Pimlott claims in response to the bombings rioting broke out and absenteeism from factories rose significantly. Tami Biddle-Davis however does not quite agree, she states that “…although this was a rude shock for the British public that had been insulated by the English Channel and a tradition of Naval strength… it would perhaps overstate the case to argue that the Zeppelin raids had provoked panic” (Biddle Davis 23:2004). She also goes on to suggest that it is important to separate out ‘panic’ from ‘anger’. The British public were clearly moved that their Government had seen inept in the face of an attack on their homes with seemingly no measure of defence. The Smutts committee was formed to address this imbalance in the defence of Britain. The first recommendation of the Smutts committee involved creating a London Area Defence Association (LADA), which involved banks of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter patrols to intercept incoming attacks. In the second report, Smutts suggested a complete force reorganisation which included the creation of a separate air force. Smutts realised that there were two ways to defend the country, passively and aggressively. LADA was passive defence and through the creation of the RAF Smutts envisaged offensive operations against the enemy, which would be aggressive defence. This suggests that the Smutts committee is clearly laying the foundations for a strategic bomber offensive against Germany. Initially this received little support from Parliament, however that changed after the ‘Raid of the Harvest Moon’. The Air Ministry finally opened on Jan 2nd 1918 with the RAF coming into creation on April 1st of that year. The RAF’s impact on the ‘Great War’ was relatively insignificant and it failed to become an effective force in the remaining months of the war (Pimlott in McInnes & Sheffield 117:1988). However several innovations were made, such as the 1 tonne bomb and the potential for incendiary attacks. Pimlott suggests there are three lessons to be learned from the strategic bombings of WWI. Firstly, civilians realised that bombers were lethal, indiscriminate and impossible to stop. The Government accepted that but also believed that civilians could not sustain aerial bombardment. The strategists took note of that but also pursued defence through offensive and counter bombardment to deter or blunt the enemies attacking potential (Pimlott in McInnes & Sheffield 118:1988). There are implications for the future of warfare on these assumptions. Clearly WWII highlights how these lessons were implemented through the Battle of Britain and the strategic bomber offensives conducted by the RAF. However, technology seems not to have kept pace with the theory until the Gulf War of 1990-91.

The lessons of the ‘Great War’ were interpreted in several ways and provided three distinct lines of development for air power theorists. In the ‘Inter War’ period, strategic bombing, tactical support and Maritime air power were the main focus of doctrinal development (Buckley 71:1999). Air power enthusiasts such as Billy Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard and Giulio Douhet seized on the lessons of the ‘Great War’ and worked to implement their views on the use of aircraft in wartime. Douhet in his book ‘Command of the Air’ suggested that aircraft are capable of attacking any target on earth subject to range and opposition. Douhet also suggests that air power had become an integral and essential element of war. These statements highlight how air power during the ‘Great War’ impacted significantly on this mans thinking on the future use of aircraft in warfare. Douhet was also a proponent of defence through offensive action and counter bombardment, suggesting that one should attack the enemy’s bomber force while it is on the ground before he can use it as an offensive weapon. Douhet also espoused his belief in moral bombing as a way of attacking the enemy state similar to that done to the British in WWI and the Germans in WWII. There are certainly similarities between Douhet’s theories and the lessons that the British subscribed to after WWI. The American Billy Mitchell also pressured his superiors into accepting the realities of air power, however Mitchell had neither an independent air force like Trenchard did, or a political voice such as Douhet. As a result of this, his career suffered and he was eventually discharged. Mitchell’s poignant demonstration of how air power could destroy a naval vessel highlighted how aircraft used in a maritime role would excel in the decades to come. This demonstration heralded the beginning of the end for the battleship and the rise of the aircraft carrier as the dominant vessel in any fleet. John Buckley however claims that neither Mitchell nor Douhet had any significant impact on the development of air power in their countries or on air power theory in general. National strategic requirements were far more influential on the course of air power theory he suggests (Buckley 97:1999). This is highly plausible when considering the strategic requirements on Nations in the ‘Inter War’ years, particularly due to the economic situation in the 1920s.

In conclusion it is clear that the ‘Great War’ did far more for air power than air power did for the ‘Great War’. There are problems when addressing such an impact as air power due to the fact that it was a relatively new concept there had been little chance to innovate on its appropriate uses. The development of air power through the ‘Inter War’ period clearly traces its lineage back to the thinkers in the ‘Great War’ and to some of the earlier predictions of air power theorists. This is partly because those thinkers are now in positions where they can directly impact on doctrine and strategy but also because of the formulation of independent air forces such as the RAF. It would be fair to assess that the aircrafts impact on the ‘Great War’ was modest, however that is not to say that it had no impact at all. There is evidence to suggest that air power was very successful at aerial reconnaissance and artillery observation. However, does that mean without it the war would have been lost? No, clearly it does not and as such it would be hard to claim that air power had a significant effect on the ‘Great War’. The aircraft has enjoyed a similar beginning to that of the tank in WWI and it was not until WW2 that the realties of conceptual ideas came to fruition. However, clearly neither the tank nor the aircraft have reached their full potential and only time will tell how these machines will develop in the future.

Bibliography

Buckley,J.(1999) Air Power in the Age of Total War: UCL Press Limited London
Budiansky,S.(2004) Air Power from Kitty Hawk to Gulf War II: Penguin Books
Cooke,J.J.(2002) Billy Mitchell : Lynne Riener Publishers London
Davis Biddle,T.(2004)Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: Princeton University Press NJ
Gray,P.W.ed(2000) Air Power 21 Challenges for the New Century: HMSO
Holmes,R.ed ( 2003) The Oxford Companion to Military History: Oxford University Press
Mason,T.(1994) Air Power-A Centennial Appraisal: Brassey’s London
McInnes,C. & Sheffield,G.D.eds(1988) Warfare in the 20th Century – Theory & Practice: Unwin Hyman London
Meilinger,P.S. (2003) Airwar Theory and Practice : Frank Cass Publications
Nesbit,R.C.(1998) Eyes of the RAF – A History of Photo Reconnaissance: Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd Stroud
Powers,B.D, (1976) Strategy without Slide-Rule : Croom Helm London
Townsend,C. (eds)(2000) The Oxford History of Modern Warfare : Oxford University Press
Trew,S. & Sheffield,G.eds(2000) 100 Years of Conflict 1900 – 2000: Sutton Publishing Ltd Stroud
AP3003 (2004)A Brief History of the Royal Air Force: HMSO

[Napoleon]

Hello, halloween jack, sorry that I missed this. I generally agree with your thesis. The Great War was responsible for a huge leap in aircraft design and technology. However, airplanes didn't really have a huge affect on combat until after the Great War.

[mahross]

Nice essay. Though I must disagree with your conclusion. It is somewhat more complicated than most previous historians have assumed and we have seen this develop in the historiography of the war. Air Power had a significant effect both on the nature of the war and to its growth in terms of its effect upon the civilian population. I wrote a similar essay for my university studies, whcih has been extended to a journal essay looking at the historiography of WW1 in the air. I will provide you with my conclusion from my essay.

'In the end it can be seen that air power did have an effect on the nature of warfare during the Great War, most notable the introduction of CAS/BAI operations and other new technologies led to the evolution of all-arms battle doctrines in most armies, and provided a RMA that would be felt for years after the armistice and the end of the war. Though it must be considered that the opinion of the generals, such as that shown earlier by Field Marshal The Earl Haig, must be considered much more fully, as while their interpretation is polemic, their opinion does have some truth in it. This lies more in the implementation of air power than in its actual effect. Air power in the Great War suffered from a technological failure, there existed during the war what can only be described as a technology Vs theory gap. That is that there was lots of theory of how implement aircraft into the battlefield but unfortunately the aircraft to do it with did not exist. This can be seen in various aspects of the air war. For example, the strategic bombing campaigns, while attempting to bring the enemy to its knees, did not see significant success because the airframes being used were both slow and cumbersome as well as carrying a negligible bomb load. When compared to the bombers that existed twenty years later this show up the gap between technology and theory and as such as one historian has observed ‘…the embryonic nature of aerial operations in 1914-18 ensured that they were only partly effective at best, and in no case had a decisive impact on the outcome of the war.’(32) Though to this interpretation can be added that air power at the outbreak of the war was only in its second decade and that once the technology existed, as it did in the Second World War, its decisiveness would be increased as its technological capability had grown to come in line with the theory that existed.'

Air Power had a significant effect on ground operations. Many of the lessons learnt by the RFC/RAF were lost in the inter - war period and had to be re - learnt in the Western Desert. For example, both Paddy Griffith and David Jordan have pointed to these developments in their works. So in effect air power in the Great War is a ddouble edge sword. In some areas it was effective, however, in others this was dubious.

As to your point on the conceptual problems of the Aircraft these were not solve realy until the First Gulf War with the advent of the Stealth aircraft and its ability to hit targets with immunity. US Air Force Genral Dugan commented that with the advent of this aircraft theory and technology had finally converged. So realy this problem of conception has only recently been solved.

Ross

[Tom Phoenix]

I tend to agree that aircraft had more of a propaganda effect then an actual effect in the Great War. While propaganda tended to celebrate the "air knights" and thus these pilots were famed by the masses, their actual effect on war events was small.

In WW1, there wasn`t yet such a great need of controlling airspace as it was in WW2. Thus fighters had more of a propaganda role then anything else. However, this changed through the course of the war as the number of active planes increased and the development of AA guns. But it wouldn`t become as pressing of an issue as it did in the Spanish Civil War and WW2.

Aerial reconnaissance had already become an important concept even before WW1, most notably in the Italian-Turkish War and the First Balkan War. In both cases, aerial reconnaissance revealed army dispositions and enemy forces in the rear. This is of course important information and thus reconnaissance was already important in the beggining of the Great War. However, while photography reconnaissance already appeared in the Italian-Turkish War, it would not be developed until the Great War.

CAS had little effect on the war, but not beacuse it wasn`t useful but primarily beacuse it was introduced so late in the war. It still however showed its potential and its worth would be proven 20 years later with the German Blitzkrieg.

As for strategic bombing....it was still in its heydays, thus its actual effect was negligeble. If anything, it effected the morale of the civilian populace. However in WW1, where this was something new, it had a much greater effect as it would have later in WW2 with the "terror bombing". However, the concept of Strategic Bombing would long stay unproperly developed as proven by the lessons learned in WW2 and the Second Indochina War (a.k.a the Vietnam War).

Mahross, I agree with you....except with your last paragraph. While Stealth aircraft did rule supreme for a short time, this ended with the NATO campaign in 1999. While the shooting down of the F-117A did have a negligeble effect on the campaign (a bit similar like air powers effect on the Great War), it has however broken the myth that Stealth aircraft is immune to AA defence. It has also supported the claim of experts that Stealth aircraft is vunerable against heat-seaking missiles. With the help of the remains of the shot down F-117A, the Russians have already been able to develop an AA system capable of countering Stealth aircraft (can`t find reference to it yet). Thus, the problem has already been reopened.

[RapierFighter]

Originally Posted by Tom Phoenix

I tend to agree that aircraft had more of a propaganda effect then an actual effect in the Great War. While propaganda tended to celebrate the "air knights" and thus these pilots were famed by the masses, their actual effect on war events was small.

In WW1, there wasn`t yet such a great need of controlling airspace as it was in WW2. Thus fighters had more of a propaganda role then anything else. However, this changed through the course of the war as the number of active planes increased and the development of AA guns. But it wouldn`t become as pressing of an issue as it did in the Spanish Civil War and WW2.

Aerial reconnaissance had already become an important concept even before WW1, most notably in the Italian-Turkish War and the First Balkan War. In both cases, aerial reconnaissance revealed army dispositions and enemy forces in the rear. This is of course important information and thus reconnaissance was already important in the beggining of the Great War. However, while photography reconnaissance already appeared in the Italian-Turkish War, it would not be developed until the Great War.

CAS had little effect on the war, but not beacuse it wasn`t useful but primarily beacuse it was introduced so late in the war. It still however showed its potential and its worth would be proven 20 years later with the German Blitzkrieg.

As for strategic bombing....it was still in its heydays, thus its actual effect was negligeble. If anything, it effected the morale of the civilian populace. However in WW1, where this was something new, it had a much greater effect as it would have later in WW2 with the "terror bombing". However, the concept of Strategic Bombing would long stay unproperly developed as proven by the lessons learned in WW2 and the Second Indochina War (a.k.a the Vietnam War).

Mahross, I agree with you....except with your last paragraph. While Stealth aircraft did rule supreme for a short time, this ended with the NATO campaign in 1999. While the shooting down of the F-117A did have a negligeble effect on the campaign (a bit similar like air powers effect on the Great War), it has however broken the myth that Stealth aircraft is immune to AA defence. It has also supported the claim of experts that Stealth aircraft is vunerable against heat-seaking missiles. With the help of the remains of the shot down F-117A, the Russians have already been able to develop an AA system capable of countering Stealth aircraft (can`t find reference to it yet). Thus, the problem has already been reopened.

I was going to make a post until literally everything I wanted to say was mentioned by Phoenix.

I salute you. Well said.

[Mountain Man]

There are currently two concepts in detecting and engaging "stealth" aircraft. The first involves bistatic radars, that is, more than one radar set operating in different locations, sweeping the same sectors on the same frequencies and using a computer to correlate the returns and increase the odds of detection.

The other is the "hole" concept, which says that the one place in the sky where there is absolutely nothing is your target. Your problem then is to hit something undetected.

Heat-seeking missiles can shoot down anything if they get a lock; however, obtaining one on a stealth aircraft is more a matter of sheer luck than anything else.

Nice essay, Mahross.

[Tom Phoenix]

Originally Posted by MountainMan

There are currently two concepts in detecting and engaging "stealth" aircraft. The first involves bistatic radars, that is, more than one radar set operating in different locations, sweeping the same sectors on the same frequencies and using a computer to correlate the returns and increase the odds of detection.

The other is the "hole" concept, which says that the one place in the sky where there is absolutely nothing is your target. Your problem then is to hit something undetected.

Heat-seeking missiles can shoot down anything if they get a lock; however, obtaining one on a stealth aircraft is more a matter of sheer luck than anything else.

Nice essay, Mahross.

While that might be true with Dani Zoltan (the commander of the battery that show down the F-117A), I doubt the new Russian AA system runs on something as unreliable as that.

[zinkyusa]

The F-117A shootdown by a Yugoslav SAM battery was a lucky hit by a ballistically launched SAM. There was never a radar lock. Dani Zoltan is full of caca....

[mahross]

Air power is always going to face the problems of what i called above the technology Vs theory gap. Air power theorists, be they in the inter war period, the Cold War or now, always tend to come up with ideas for the use of aircraft that as yet the developers have not found a solution too. This will always be its problem. Even if we assume the downing of a F-117 was a lucky shot the technology will exist and so the theorists will come up with new and more intriging ideas for the developers to eventually solve.

Ross

[thejester]

Originally Posted by zinkyusa

The F-117A shootdown by a Yugoslav SAM battery was a lucky hit by a ballistically launched SAM. There was never a radar lock. Dani Zoltan is full of caca....

No, it wasn't. The F-117s flew a predictable flight path and the age of the missile batteries radar (longer-waved?) meant it was able to get an echo. In the end the USAF appears to have bought into its own propaganda and paid the price.