Hitler Does Not Bother With The BOB.

[Nick the Noodle]

After the fall of France, Hitler does not even pretend to conquer Britain. He simply orders enough aircraft are left to prevent any real impact of the RAF over Europe 1940/41.

Could this have a real effect during Barbarossa? The Luftwaffe would have several thousand more capable aircrews - pilots/navigators etc etc, that they did not have.

If the Germans were to defeat the Soviets, it would had to have to been in 1941.

Would a much stronger Luftwaffe actually enabled the Heer to defeat the Soviets ?

[MarkV]

Originally Posted by Nick the Noodle

After the fall of France, Hitler does not even pretend to conquer Britain. He simply orders enough aircraft are left to prevent any real impact of the RAF over Europe 1940/41.

Could this have a real effect during Barbarossa? The Luftwaffe would have several thousand more capable aircrews - pilots/navigators etc etc, that they did not have.

If the Germans were to defeat the Soviets, it would had to have to been in 1941.

Would a much stronger Luftwaffe actually enabled the Heer to defeat the Soviets ?

Only if Germany had put the resources into a strategic bomber force that could have hit the Soviet industrial base when it pulled back beyond the Urals

[The Exorcist]

What would the RAF have been doing all that time?
Their losses were pretty stiff, when you include their bombers. Are you trying to make it more so by tempting them to go over to the offensive?

Maybe they would simply have sent them to the Med and Africa.
Plenty of mischief the could have wrought down there, including hastening the end for Italian East Africa, and freeing up the Army down there well before mid 1941.

[sebfrench76]

I guess I'd be typing this in German?
Or in Russian .

[Rojik]

Runways, mechanics, airfields, supply chains, airframes... Wars not always won or lost at the pointy end. So much more goes into it than that, and the Nazi Soviet war is a pretty good example of that.

A slight difference, maybe, but I wonder if the pilots lost wasn't in a large way compensated buy the experience gained, and that experience wasnt a big factor in the losses the Red Air Force suffered in the first 18 months.

[T. A. Gardner]

A real, and very dangerous for Britain, alternative was the Luftwaffe goes after shipping instead. I'm not talking a Kanal Krieg, but hunting for shipping away from Britain at sea. Sweeping the Bay of Biscay to Gibraltar, going out into the Atlantic, etc.

Less than a dozen Fw 200 became "The Scourge of the Atlantic" in 1940. Imagine several hundred Ju 88, He 111, etc., doing the same mission. The Spitfire and Hurricane would now be useless. Britain would be forced to improvise some sort of merchant carrier on the fly, and have to start scrounging up AA guns for merchant ships in a big hurry.
This still does nothing for the U-boat war however for Britain, while for Germany, the Luftwaffe reporting ship's positions makes the U-boats even more effective.

[jeffdoorgunnr]

Originally Posted by The Exorcist

What would the RAF have been doing all that time?
Their losses were pretty stiff, when you include their bombers. Are you trying to make it more so by tempting them to go over to the offensive?

Maybe they would simply have sent them to the Med and Africa.
Plenty of mischief the could have wrought down there, including hastening the end for Italian East Africa, and freeing up the Army down there well before mid 1941.

Even without the BOB..... they would have had to keep large fighter forces at the ready to prevent the Germans from suddenly attacking Britain/

[MarkV]

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

A real, and very dangerous for Britain, alternative was the Luftwaffe goes after shipping instead. I'm not talking a Kanal Krieg, but hunting for shipping away from Britain at sea. Sweeping the Bay of Biscay to Gibraltar, going out into the Atlantic, etc.

Less than a dozen Fw 200 became "The Scourge of the Atlantic" in 1940. Imagine several hundred Ju 88, He 111, etc., doing the same mission. The Spitfire and Hurricane would now be useless. Britain would be forced to improvise some sort of merchant carrier on the fly, and have to start scrounging up AA guns for merchant ships in a big hurry.
This still does nothing for the U-boat war however for Britain, while for Germany, the Luftwaffe reporting ship's positions makes the U-boats even more effective.

The reason why there was only a few FW200s is that the other types didn't have the range. navigation aids and the all weather capability. OK over the Baltic and on the Arctic v convoy route but not out over the Atlantic.

[T. A. Gardner]

Originally Posted by MarkV

The reason why there was only a few FW200s is that the other types didn't have the range. navigation aids and the all weather capability. OK over the Baltic and on the Arctic v convoy route but not out over the Atlantic.

The reason there were so few FW 200 was that the Luftwaffe considered the type a transport aircraft and were pegging their long-range bomber needs on the He 177. Thus, in September 1939 the Luftwaffe didn't have a long-range maritime bomber in service.
It was only because the Japanese had ordered the FW 200 as a potential maritime bomber (the FW 200 V10) that gave Focke Wulf the ability to quickly plan a conversion for the Luftwaffe as the FW 200C.
It took Focke Wulf about six months to deliver the first the initial ten ordered with about one every two weeks being completed afterwards through the end of 1940.

With hindsight, the easiest method to get lots of maritime bombers quickly would have been to have Junkers convert the Ju 88, as they did later in the war, to the Ju 88H model.



This aircraft simply introduced additional fuselage sections that held large fuel tanks giving the plane a greatly extended range.

[MarkV]

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

The reason there were so few FW 200 was that the Luftwaffe considered the type a transport aircraft and were pegging their long-range bomber needs on the He 177. Thus, in September 1939 the Luftwaffe didn't have a long-range maritime bomber in service.

Work on a long range maritime aircraft based on the the FW200 started before the war started to meet a Japanese requirement. This was fortunate for the Luftwaffe as they had no conception of the need for a long range maritime recce/bomber. Hence my point the Luftwaffe could not have switched effort to the Atlantic in 1940 because they had nothing with which to do this and it wasn't on their to do list..

[the ace]

I know Hitler was insane, but would he REALLY be stupid enough to leave an enemy intact at his back while he looked at Southern Europe and the Soviet Union ?

Hitler knew he needed a short war, and the decision to try and remove Britain as a threat was a sound one, coupled with the fact he'd already flattened anyone who'd tried to oppose him, meant that attacking Britain made sense.

The fact that he had the wrong kind of aircraft, and couldn't make up his mind on objectives (coupled with a catastrophic intelligence failure) meant he hadn't a snowball's of winning, is beside the point.

[BELGRAVE]

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

A real, and very dangerous for Britain, alternative was the Luftwaffe goes after shipping instead. I'm not talking a Kanal Krieg, but hunting for shipping away from Britain at sea. Sweeping the Bay of Biscay to Gibraltar, going out into the Atlantic, etc.

Less than a dozen Fw 200 became "The Scourge of the Atlantic" in 1940. Imagine several hundred Ju 88, He 111, etc., doing the same mission. The Spitfire and Hurricane would now be useless. Britain would be forced to improvise some sort of merchant carrier on the fly, and have to start scrounging up AA guns for merchant ships in a big hurry.
This still does nothing for the U-boat war however for Britain, while for Germany, the Luftwaffe reporting ship's positions makes the U-boats even more effective.

Agreed.The Battle of the Atlantic was, by far, the most crucial campaign in which Britain was involved.
Had more FW-200s been deployed to support the U-Boats -and surface raiders-then British war-waging abilities would have been fatally compromised.Isolate the British Isles, then no need to threaten invasion or even wage a bombing campaign.
The fact that, in reality,theLuftwaffe,was unable to supply fulsome support was entirely fortuitous.

[T. A. Gardner]

Originally Posted by the ace

I know Hitler was insane, but would he REALLY be stupid enough to leave an enemy intact at his back while he looked at Southern Europe and the Soviet Union ?

Hitler knew he needed a short war, and the decision to try and remove Britain as a threat was a sound one, coupled with the fact he'd already flattened anyone who'd tried to oppose him, meant that attacking Britain made sense.

The fact that he had the wrong kind of aircraft, and couldn't make up his mind on objectives (coupled with a catastrophic intelligence failure) meant he hadn't a snowball's of winning, is beside the point.

Well, he did. The fact the Germans had the wrong aircraft was Göring's fault followed by his minions. If the RLM and top Luftwaffe officials hadn't insisted... let me emphasize that... insisted the He 177 be a dive bomber (insane) and use two engines when four would have worked (stubbornly stupid) it would have been ready by mid 1940. The same can be said for the Bomber B program (Ju 288 / FW 191 and later Hs 130C).

But, because Göring and his minions were myopically stupid they let opportunity go and wrecked any chance of winning the air war after the fall of France.

[MarkV]

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

Well, he did. The fact the Germans had the wrong aircraft was Göring's fault followed by his minions. If the RLM and top Luftwaffe officials hadn't insisted... let me emphasize that... insisted the He 177 be a dive bomber (insane) and use two engines when four would have worked (stubbornly stupid) it would have been ready by mid 1940. The same can be said for the Bomber B program (Ju 288 / FW 191 and later Hs 130C).

But, because Göring and his minions were myopically stupid they let opportunity go and wrecked any chance of winning the air war after the fall of France.

Errm - the He 177 did have four engines - in some ways that was the problem - they were paired to drive a single prop (a very WW1 solution) and in a very confined housing with no fire walls (to save space) was always going to be subject to engine fires. But not Der Grosser Herman's fault any more than the Manchester's problems were the fault of Hariss's. The blame could be fairly laid at the feet of Herr Gimmler. What can be laid at the German sausage's door is the point blank refusal to allow development of the He 277 which could have been archived relatively quickly - its as if Harris had said 'no don't bother with the Lancaster we'll manage with the Manchester thank you'.

At bottom the fault lay with the German Army high command who defined what the Luftwaffe's main function and purpose was to be when it was being created in the early 30s - to wit to tactically support the army.

BTW thew original RLM specification called for medium angle bombing not dive bombing.

[asterix]

The FW-200 was a so-so aircraft, as long as it was lightly loaded. Unlike it's pre-war airliner version, the wartime FW-200 had serious structural problems....it's lengthened fuselage stretched precariously up to it's loading limit. Many of them snapped their backs while taxiing, hard landing or even as the result of the slightest combat damage.