Operation Anvil (Dragoon) ?

[Carl Schwamberg]

Originally Posted by Aber

At the end of October the US had 36 divisions in combat in the ETO, of which 9 were supported from southern France ( 3 from Dragoon, 3 transferred, 3 direct arrivals from US in October). This leaves 12th Army Group with 27 {taken from Rupenthal Vol2, p282 if I can count correctly}, which matches your port capacity calculation, so 12th Army Group had no shortfall?

Hate to keep refering to Ruppenthal, but that what I have at hand & not had the time to accquire review other sources. If you plow back through the text there are more than a couple points where the actual supply reaching the combat zone of 12thAG is indicated. Even in late October the US 12th AG divisions on the German frontier were running 35% to 30% short of the requirement for sustained offensive operations. 6thAG had a clear surplus by that time. This was a important part of the reason the 12thAG offensive went in fits & starts in September-November, the necessary reserves of material, particularly artillery ammunition could not be accumulated.

A second point is divisions available and scheduled to disembark in France during September & October were withheld in the US, Britain, or the Med. The schedules I have show between 41 & 48 US and French divisions to be delivered to France NLT the last week of October. A minimum of five & perhaps twelve depending on how they are counted were delayed until the logistics were unsnarled. A similar portion of Corps/Army combat & support units were delayed as well. Conversely the delivery of logistics support was accelerated. The railroads network in Allied hands a D+90 was that expected between D+150 & 180. The rail net in hand at D+130 was close to that expected @ D+240 or 280. Much of the tonnage discharged in September through November was not combat supplies at all but locomotives, rails, ect.. that were 'surged' to Europe far sooner than planned.

Bottom line here remains that without the south port group the Allied armies are far smaller. It is difficult to see the US 3rd Army extending its reach to the Swiss border and/or pinning any significant German forces along that front. Blaskowitzs 240,000 man AG of early August is intact as well and capable of deploying well over 80,000 in mobile units against the 12th AG flank running from the coast eastwards. The ability of 12th AG to deal with that, and support any advance further eastwards in the remainder of 1944 is problematic. The entry of the additional two armies in south France cleared Blaskowitzs command, led to 60,000+ additional prisoners, closed up a strong Allied front extending to Switzerland, and put enough combat power in place to clear the Vosges mountains and advance to the west bank of the Rhine that winter. I have difficulty seeing any of that accomplished by a much smaller force that was undersupplied for nearly four months.

[Easy company]

I think that the allied armies should have attcked from the north and closed in on the nazis.