Evander M. Law

[Zouave]

Originally Posted by mikeck

Hmmm, it's a shame you don't know anything about this issue Semper.

It's like you just waiting for someone to ask this question.

Hey Chase... I did my part... now you do yours. My bank account is...

[Zouave]

Originally Posted by semperpietas

I would rate Law's competency as a good brigade commander, but beyond that Law didn't seem fit for Division command and is an example of the Peter Principle. This is made worse when you look at some of Law's personal actions. When he took command after Hood's wounding at Gettysburg he seemed to lose command and control somewhat. His performance at Chickamauga is even less impressive (and that is with him commanding Hood's Division on the field from the beginning, Hood being elevated to corps command because of Longstreet's temporary absence and then elevation to wing command). His performance at Chickamauga on the 19th is abysmal, and he displays a complete lack of command and control ability at division level. His own brigade first under Colonel Sheffield shifted too far to the right and got mixed up with Stewart's Division and Law soon lost control of it's movement. In Law's own front, Robertson's Texans advanced somewhat unsupported despite Robertson' repeated request to Law. Law finally committed Benning, but that was after Robertson was forced back and the end result was Benning then attacked and was repulsed unsupported in in Brock Field.

His performance on the 20th is even worse. Dave Powell has called Law a complete non-entity in Longstreet's breakthrough. First, Law was supposed to take Hood's Division and move into a gap opening between Stewart's and Johnson's line. Johnson adjusted his division to close the gap, so Law haphazardly formed his troops (again contrary to the formation specified by Longstreet's orders) behind Johnson's. Either Law or Hood failed to report this, so Longstreet operated under the assumption that Hood's Division was on the front-line (having ridden south to see to the disposition of Hindman's and Buckner's troops). Once his troops crossed the Lafayette Road in Longstreet's main assault on the Union right, his division again lost cohesion. Benning's Brigade, having suffered heavily in the fighting before had to halt and reform, while both Law's (under Perry) and Robertson's brigades were thrown by a counterattack of Harker's brigade. This pretty much put Hood's Division out of the fight for the rest of the battle, with no man from Hood's Division taking part in the fighting on Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge.

As for Longstreet holding a grudge, there are complicated details behind it. Evander Law and Micah Jenkins had a intense rivalry, one that had existed since both were classmates at the Citadel. They simply hated each other. Flash forward, and Jenkins and Law are both commissioned Brigadiers in the Confederate Army. Jenkins was promoted in July of 1862 after displaying great ability in temporary command of Richard Anderson's Brigade at Seven Pines which he takes command of. Law is promoted Brigadier in October of the same year after commanding Whiting's Brigade at the Seven Days, Second Manassas. and Antietam. At first this isn't problematic, as Law was in Hood's Division and Jenkins was in Pickett's Division. After Gettysburg, when it was decided the First Corps would reinforce Bragg, Longstreet requested Jenkins' Brigade (which missed the Gettysburg campaign) to strengthen Hood's Division (which was losing a brigade temporarily to Charleston's defenses).

Hood had not yet recovered from his Gettysburg wound, so as senior Brigadier Jenkins assumed command of the division. Hood however rejoined the division despite the wound which postponed the problem. After Chickamauga when Hood was wounded yet again, Jenkins took command when he arrived on the field at Chattanooga. Law wasn't exactly a happy camper and would have preferred to retain permanent command of the division for himself. And the men in Hood's Division didn't exactly like Jenkins (they view him as an outsider). The men of Law's Brigade especially took it hard.

This caused a problem, which affected the command and control of the division. Law actually left his brigade stationed on picket duty at Brown's Ferry under false pretenses to gain Hood's endorsement for command of the Division. That irked Longstreet. After the fiasco at's Brown's Ferry and Wautachie, in which Jenkins and Law blamed each other for, Longstreet tried to alleviate the problem. He personally asked Davis to either promote Law to Major General or to affirm Jenkins as commander. Davis refused on both counts, believing that Hood would heal and return to duty (this was before Hood is promoted to Lieutenant General and permanently assigned to the Army of Tennessee). Personally, Longstreet preferred Jenkins for the command (and so did Lee for that matter).

When Longstreet's Corps was sent to Knoxville, the feud between Jenkins and Law got even worse, with Jerome Robertson and the Alabama Brigade colonels openly siding with Law. It got the point where it may have actually cost Longstreet the campaign. At the Battle of Campbell's Station, Longstreet caught up with Burnside's main body. He decided to pin Burnside with McLaws' Division, while using Jenkins' Division to flank. Either in an act of incompetence or purposely for pure spite for Jenkins and Longstreet (and many contemporary accounts, including E.P. Alexander say it was the latter) Law bungled the flanking attack by making his turning movement too soon and thus revealing the flanking assault and allowing Burnside to adjust his line.

In December, Law decided to resign, and asked Longstreet to go to Richmond to do so. This was granted. However, he once got to Richmond, he talked to Hood and changed his mind. When he returned however, the Alabama Brigade colonels had filed a petition to transfer to Alabama to recruit and to get out from under Jenkins. Longstreet was already aware of Law's earlier false use of leave, and accused Law of obtaining leave under false pretenses to arrange this transfer and arrested him. He also reassigned the Alabama Brigade to Buckner's Division (before the War Department overruled this and returned the brigade to Hood's Division). Longstreet also requested a permanent replacement for Hood, specifically asking for Major General W.H.C. Whiting or Simon Buckner to take command. Instead, Charles Field was sent, who had not seen action since his wounding at Second Manassas.

To surmise, Longstreet originally thought very highly of Law. When it came to Hood's Division, Longstreet preferred that Jenkins take command. After Knoxville, Longstreet understandably harbored ill feelings towards Law, because let's be frank, Law had acted less than professionally. He allowed his feelings towards Jenkins not only to affect his own performance, but to affect the combat effectiveness of a veteran Division. Jenkins does deserve some blame here too. He made no major attempt to smooth things over with Law and would not hesitate to blame Law when things went wrong. And Longstreet should have realized the problems Jenkins and Law had and intervened more forcefully (even though he tried with President Davis). But in the end, Law does more to hurt his own case than anyone.

Many thanks, Chase! I couldn't have asked for a better explanation.

The men in the Alabama brigade were very loyal to Law, huh? He must have been a very good brigade commander indeed.

Law should have been shot after his bungled attack at Campbell's Station (if indeed he did it for pure spite).

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by Zouave

Many thanks, Chase! I couldn't have asked for a better explanation.

The men in the Alabama brigade were very loyal to Law, huh? He must have been a very good brigade commander indeed.

Law should have been shot after his bungled attack at Campbell's Station (if indeed he did it for pure spite).

Evander Law had a charismatic personality and was familiar to Law's Brigade and Hood's Division, while Jenkins was viewed as a somewhat ambitious outsider (the division seemed unaware that of the reason that Jenkins' Brigade had been transferred to Hood's Division).

As for Campbell's Station, Hess surmises the bungled flanking action in his new book on the Knoxville Campaign says the following (The Knoxville Campaign, Pge. 67-68):

By 3 p.m. Jenkins had grown tired of waiting for McLaws to act, and
Longstreet authorized him to turn the Union left flank by moving along
some hills to the south. Jenkins considered the late hour and devised a movement to accomplish the goal quickly by moving Law by the right flank, along some irregular high ground south of the road, hoping tree cover would shield the movement. Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson’s brigade followed Law. Jenkins instructed both commanders to move south until the second regiment from Anderson’s left flank was opposite the apparent flank of the Federal formation across the valley. In this way, when the two brigades advanced, Law could move obliquely so as to bypass the Federal line, and Anderson could overwhelm the enemy’s left flank. Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning’s small brigade would support Law by screening his right flank against a Union counterstrike. These three brigades moved by the right flank, the men turning in place to the right, in effect transforming their two-rank battle line into a narrow column that could negotiate rugged terrain.

Law marched his men south of Kingston Road as Alexander redoubled
the efforts of his seventeen gun crews. As Jenkins described it, the
high ground was covered with a “close undergrowth of scraggy oaks,”
causing delay. Longstreet anxiously rode near the moving column “to see
that there could be no mismove or misconception of orders,” but he also
rode to other parts of Jenkins’s line before Law was ready to stop and advance toward the enemy.

When Law reported that his brigade was in position, Jenkins told
Anderson to reface his command forward and start advancing. Jenkins
then rode to the far right, where he was surprised to see that, in his
opinion, Law had not gone far enough. Law seemed to be placed so as to
squarely hit the Union flank instead of gaining the rear area of the Union
position. Jenkins then sent word to cancel Anderson’s advance and told
Law to go in alone, maneuvering on the way to attack the flank as best he
could.

Law’s brigade, however, made a jumble of its advance. The regiment that was to serve as the battalion of direction for the entire brigade mistakenly closed the interval between Law and Anderson instead of advancing directly ahead. This took the entire brigade off to the left at an oblique. Law and Anderson approach the Union position. The Confederate attempt to cross the wide valley of Turkey Creek fell apart as a result of miscues and mistakes.

This direction would have taken Law’s Alabamans toward the front of
the Federal formation instead of its rear. Jenkins was angry, for he had
told Law “distinctly and emphatically” that he was to advance independently,without coordinating his movement with Anderson, and apparently the brigade leader forgot to relay this information to the regimental commander. This mistake “spoiled the attack, for it was now quite late,” Jenkins reported. Initially Law admitted the embarrassing mix-up, telling Asbury Coward that “My leading regiment changed direction too soon
and brought my line in a dangerous position.” Many years later, however,
Law refused to accept any blame for the miscue.

Nearly everyone else fixed the blame on Law. Longstreet referred to
“a want of conduct” that allowed his brigade to miss “its point of direction.”
Jenkins’s friends criticized Law and ascribed motives of jealousy
because Longstreet favored Jenkins as the commander of Hood’s division.
They claimed the brigade commander, in Alexander’s words, “deliberately
led his brigade . . . where the enemy could & did discover the movement”
in order to sabotage Jenkins’s plan. Alexander recalled that some company
commanders in Law’s brigade wrote letters supporting this view.

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by cici

Chase,

Good Luck. I think you would do well.

Certainly, as to the subjects you listed, the Trans-Mississippi theatre has always been neglected and could always use another good history. The Army of Tennessee story is in need of an update. Connelly's book is a necessary starting point. However, it is, as you stated, dated. That army's history is in need of revision to the one Connelly presented. There have been a number of good books that have covered various aspects of the AoT that have challenged or revised some of Connelly's themes. A synthesis of that research along with your own original research and ideas would bring a necessary revision to the AoT.

Then there is Longstreet. I know you stated it was dated, but I believe that Wert's book holds up well. I believe where it could use some revision is his coverage of the Knoxville and Suffolk campaigns. As you state, his focus is almost entirely on the Civil War career of Pete. Certainly a more balanced coverage of his entire life is needed. In regards to that, Sanger and Hays bio is more balanced in that respect.

Piston's book is very good in studying how Longstreet became a pariah and the historiography concerning Pete. However, and Piston has said and wrote about this, the written history concerning how Longstreet is viewed has turned in a much more favorable direction. An update to that story would be necessary.

Obviously, I believe Sharra's book, The Killer Angels and the movie Gettysburg did much to move general public opinion in a very favorable direction presenting Longstreet as a sympathetic figure who was a capable, modern general who understood that technology had changed the way war's were to be fought. In the scholarly world, Piston and Wert certainly moved the needle in a more positive direction.

But, respected historians such as Archer Jones, Herman Hattaway, Russell Weigley, Thomas Connelly, and other historians that emerged in the 60s and 70s were already pushing the needle in a favorable direction for Pete. Although not the heavyweight as other historians (in terms of scholarship), Glenn Tucker's books were quite important. A couple of chapters in his Lee and Longtreet at Gettysburg still holds up well. And finally, as many threads have shown, you would sell many more books on Longstreet than on the other subjects.

Lastly, Stonewall Jackson could use a balanced bio. Robertson's is well researched and certainly an in depth account. But, there is no doubt he is in love with his subject. A balanced bio as well as something that Piston did with Longstreet and Connelly did with Lee, how Jackson's image was made would be an important contribution.

Thank you for the kind words.

Another thing I would hope to tackle is something that arises from the Killer Angel's, which is the image of Longstreet being a defensive only by pointing out some of his hard hitting attacks.

[guthrieba]

Originally Posted by semperpietas

ILongstreet also requested a permanent replacement for Hood, specifically asking for Major General W.H.C. Whiting or Simon Buckner to take command. Instead, Charles Field was sent, who had not seen action since his wounding at Second Manassas.

Buckner in the Army of Northern Virginia - might have been an interesting assignment. Without much knowledge of Field or Buckner, I suspect that Simon Bolivar Buckner would have been a better commander (or perhaps that's the Kentucky partisan in me coming out).

Yes, I know that Field was born in Kentucky, but he is more associated with Virginia than the Bluegrass State.

[Zouave]

Originally Posted by semperpietas

Thank for the words of encouragement.

I have a couple of ideas floating around, including a multiple volume study on the Army of Tennessee, a biography of Longstreet, or a history of the Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi Theater, just to name a few.

Or a study of the Texas Brigade (Hood's Texas Brigade).

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by Zouave

Or a study of the Texas Brigade (Hood's Texas Brigade).

That's another one. Granbury's Texas Brigade had a book recently by Lundberg.