The Kido Butai - Where Did It Go?

[Jon Jordan]

I've read that U.S. Naval Intelligence lost the location of the Japanese carrier force (the one that attacked Pearl Harbor) from about November 26 to December 7. But I've also seen documents indicating that the six carriers of the force were accounted for by USNI in Japan's home waters. Does anyone know what we knew about these carriers shortly before PH, and where we documented this intel?

Many thanks to all!!

Jon

[Pruitt]

It was North of the island of Hakkaido. The weather up there hid them from view. I believe it was technically the Sea of Okhotsk between Sakhalin and the Kuriles.

Pruitt

[RichardS]

Naval Intelligence was also tracking them by the radio operators. So the Japanese kept the regular radio operators in the home islands sending signals so USNI assumed the carriers were still there.

[At ease]

Jon J,

This article:

“CATCHING THE FOX UNAWARE”

Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and
the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Robert J. Hanyok

United States Naval War College Review

2008

http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/2...o-Denial-.aspx

might go some way towards answering your question.

.....
This article will first briefly consider major changes the Japanese navy made
to its strategy and to the operational organization of its carrier forces and how
these changes facilitated the denial and deception plan. Second, it will examine
the technical and operational details of the Japanese plans for radio silence, de-
ception, and monitoring. Finally, the article steps through the chronology of the
Japanese denial and deception, beginning with the Kido Butai rendezvous at
Saeki Bay in the second week of November 1941 and following it to the attack. As
we recount the Japanese actions, we also will consider the American intelligence
estimates of those actions produced in the Pacific and Asiatic Fleet commands,
as well as in Washington, D.C. This parallel examination should illustrate how
the Japanese convinced American intelligence that their carriers, the spear point
of the Imperial Japanese Navy, were still in the home islands on 7 December
1941.
.....

[T. A. Gardner]

One of the deceptions the Japanese used to hide these carriers was to have their radio operators stationed at Sasabo and operating from shore there to make it look like the carriers were in Southern Japan.

[Jon Jordan]

Originally Posted by At ease

Jon J,

This article:

“CATCHING THE FOX UNAWARE”

Japanese Radio Denial and Deception and
the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Robert J. Hanyok

United States Naval War College Review

2008

http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/2...o-Denial-.aspx

might go some way towards answering your question.

Thanks so much! I read this article a while back but completely forgot about it. This is great stuff!!

Edit: Turns out it was a different article on op security and deception that I read, so this is fresh stuff to me. Thanks!!


With gratitude,
Jon

[OpanaPointer]

Kido Butai mustered here: 44°58'15.06" N 147°41'50.84" E

The IJN left the telegraphers with the most recognizable "fists" on ships in the Sagami Wan and shore installations to make the USN think their ships were in home waters. Rochefort's reports noted that they were sending some messages 2-3 times and that old messages were being retransmitted. Assumptions, all wrong, were made based on this information.

[Jon Jordan]

Originally Posted by OpanaPointer

Kido Butai mustered here: 44°58'15.06" N 147°41'50.84" E

The IJN left the telegraphers with the most recognizable "fists" on ships in the Sagami Wan and shore installations to make the USN think their ships were in home waters. Rochefort's reports noted that they were sending some messages 2-3 times and that old messages were being retransmitted. Assumptions, all wrong, were made based on this information.

OP - I figured you'd have some detailed data on this point. Thanks very much for sharing!!

- Jon

[Glenn239]

When Fuchida talked of 'victory disesase' helping cause the Midway disaster, no doubt he was thinking of the excellent security measures taken by the Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor vs. the (comparatively) lax security for the Midway operation.

[Hetzer 15]

Originally Posted by Glenn239

When Fuchida talked of 'victory disesase' helping cause the Midway disaster, no doubt he was thinking of the excellent security measures taken by the Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor vs. the (comparatively) lax security for the Midway operation.

The IJN really went all out befor the midway battle getting all their ships into port facilities for overhaul and repairs so that every thing could be up to date. The repairs really worked overtime so that most of their fleet was ready for action. Armament, engines, paint, etc. was brought up to date. Something like 26 ships in 6 months!!! A huge undertaking!

After the defeat of Midway though the IJN port facilities were building ships and no time was spent for repairs and many ships cruised from place to place and port to port with damages and no real repairs being made. The IJN really went from being on top, to just being able to function. The "victory disease" that Fuchida had talked about had had its desired effect...