150th Anniversary of the formation of the Army of Tennessee

[Jack Torrance]

Originally Posted by PGT Beauregard

Army of the Tennessee Monument in Metairie Cemetery LA

Good God! That expressway and the power lines just ruin the memorial aspects of the monument. Makes it look like a badly decorated air raid shelter.

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by Jack Torrance

Good posting Longstreet had the opportunity to be it's commander after the corp commanders revolt but refused. Too bad for him and for the AofT. I wonder how much better the Aoft would have performed under Longstreet. For all the bad things said about Bragg one person who only saw him through rose colored glasses was Eliza Brooks Ellis, his wife. And maybe Jeff Davis.

Longstreet did express some interest in the job in the spring of 1863. However, this was when Joe Johnston was in Departmental command of the West. Thus taking Bragg's job would make him second to Johnston. At Chattanooga, Johnston was no longer functioning in department command, having taken over the "Army of Relief", a temporary field command that was supposed to have relieved Vicksburg. Johnston and Hardee were also busy processing parolees from Vicksburg. Thus when Davis asked him about replacing Bragg, Longstreet recommended Johnston. This earned Longstreet a reprimand from Davis.

We cannot be certain how Longstreet would have performed in army command. We do know that Longstreet proposed that the Army of Tennessee flank Rosecrans out of Chattanooga and then make a movement towards Knoxville or Nashville. Bragg decided against this in favor of a siege of Chattanooga, citing that the Army's pontoon bridge had not yet returned from Cartersville, Georgia and that his wagons were insufficient to keep up supply for the divisions. LTC Harold Knudsen talks about the proposal in his latest edition of his small book on Longstreet.

We can extrapolate based on his only independent "active" (Suffolk was a logistical campaign) at Knoxville. Longstreet conducted what Hess has described as a "highly fluid and mobile campaign" in the beginning. He fought several small skirmishes with Burnside at Lenoir's Station and Campbell's Station. Longstreet's tactical handling was superb, but his main flanking attack at Campbell's Station was bungled by Evander Law. Aside from a aborted attack at Fort Sanders, every other battle where Longstreet commanded was a tactical victory, even if the overall campaign was a failure (which given the strategic situation would have probably required a lot of luck and Burnside making a serious mistake, neither of which happened). Once Burnside withdrew inside Knoxville's Fortifications, there was nothing else left but to attempt a siege, and even that was forced to be lifted when Bragg was routed at Chattanooga.

[Nickuru]

Originally Posted by Jack Torrance

Good posting Longstreet had the opportunity to be it's commander after the corp commanders revolt but refused. Too bad for him and for the AofT. I wonder how much better the Aoft would have performed under Longstreet. For all the bad things said about Bragg one person who only saw him through rose colored glasses was Eliza Brooks Ellis, his wife. And maybe Jeff Davis.

That is an astute observation, Bragg had a pile of problems which in the CSA was almost unique. Other nations had mobilizations, but the Confederates were almost a volunteer army. Too many citations to put here. But Bragg's strategy was defective. Why invade Kentucky?

Yours truely is of the opinion that invading Kentucky was the strategic mistake which decided the USA Civil War.

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by Nickuru

That is an astute observation, Bragg had a pile of problems which in the CSA was almost unique. Other nations had mobilizations, but the Confederates were almost a volunteer army. Too many citations to put here. But Bragg's strategy was defective. Why invade Kentucky?

Yours truely is of the opinion that invading Kentucky was the strategic mistake which decided the USA Civil War.

Bragg invaded Kentucky primarily to gain recruits (operating under false intelligence that Kentuckians would flock to the colors), and to maintain strategic initiative gained by shifting his base to Chattanooga. He also had to draw Buell's Army away from Chattanooga, which he did splendidly.

I think you are operating under a misconception here (and please correct me if I am mistaken). There were two were separate invasions of Kentucky, the first under Polk in 1861 that seized Columbus and Hinkman, the second being Bragg's 1862 invasion that culminated at Perryville. It was Polk's invasion that violated the nuetrality of the state and drove it into the Union camp.

[cici]

Originally Posted by semperpietas

Longstreet did express some interest in the job in the spring of 1863. However, this was when Joe Johnston was in Departmental command of the West. Thus taking Bragg's job would make him second to Johnston. At Chattanooga, Johnston was no longer functioning in department command, having taken over the "Army of Relief", a temporary field command that was supposed to have relieved Vicksburg. Johnston and Hardee were also busy processing parolees from Vicksburg. Thus when Davis asked him about replacing Bragg, Longstreet recommended Johnston. This earned Longstreet a reprimand from Davis.

We cannot be certain how Longstreet would have performed in army command. We do know that Longstreet proposed that the Army of Tennessee flank Rosecrans out of Chattanooga and then make a movement towards Knoxville or Nashville. Bragg decided against this in favor of a siege of Chattanooga, citing that the Army's pontoon bridge had not yet returned from Cartersville, Georgia and that his wagons were insufficient to keep up supply for the divisions. LTC Harold Knudsen talks about the proposal in his latest edition of his small book on Longstreet.

We can extrapolate based on his only independent "active" (Suffolk was a logistical campaign) at Knoxville. Longstreet conducted what Hess has described as a "highly fluid and mobile campaign" in the beginning. He fought several small skirmishes with Burnside at Lenoir's Station and Campbell's Station. Longstreet's tactical handling was superb, but his main flanking attack at Campbell's Station was bungled by Evander Law. Aside from a aborted attack at Fort Sanders, every other battle where Longstreet commanded was a tactical victory, even if the overall campaign was a failure (which given the strategic situation would have probably required a lot of luck and Burnside making a serious mistake, neither of which happened). Once Burnside withdrew inside Knoxville's Fortifications, there was nothing else left but to attempt a siege, and even that was forced to be lifted when Bragg was routed at Chattanooga.

Chase,

It sounds like you picked up the Hess book on the Knoxville campaign. If so, how does it compare to Mendoza and his evaluation of Longstreet out west?

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by cici

Chase,

It sounds like you picked up the Hess book on the Knoxville campaign. If so, how does it compare to Mendoza and his evaluation of Longstreet out west?

Overall a good book, and more extensive than Mendoza because it covers the campaign from both the perspective of Longstreet and Burnside. Hess rates Longstreet very highly as a tactician. Hess in summation states the failure of the campaign was more due to a bad strategic situation and bad luck than anything Longstreet did or didn't do. Although Longstreet and Burnside had about equal numbers, Longstreet was delayed in his start by awaiting logistics. this delay really cost Longstreet his only chance to catch Burnside's command in the open. When Longstreet did catch up with Burnside at Campbell's Station, Law bungled the flanking attack and Burnside withdrew to a new position (something that Hess takes Law to task for) That said, he is critical of Longstreet's poor recon work (and Alexander and McLaws) in the assault of Fort Sanders and for his indecisiveness in the siege.

[Nickuru]

Considering that Bragg, Polk, Pillow among others were in charge of the western region of the Confederacy, it was doomed.

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by Nickuru

Considering that Bragg, Polk, Pillow among others were in charge of the western region of the Confederacy, it was doomed.

That the poor departmental system implemented by Davis. Davis probably did more by what Grant determined his "superior military genius" to hurt the Confederacy in the west than Polk, Pillow, and Bragg combined.

[cici]

Originally Posted by semperpietas

Overall a good book, and more extensive than Mendoza because it covers the campaign from both the perspective of Longstreet and Burnside. Hess rates Longstreet very highly as a tactician. Hess in summation states the failure of the campaign was more due to a bad strategic situation and bad luck than anything Longstreet did or didn't do. Although Longstreet and Burnside had about equal numbers, Longstreet was delayed in his start by awaiting logistics. this delay really cost Longstreet his only chance to catch Burnside's command in the open. When Longstreet did catch up with Burnside at Campbell's Station, Law bungled the flanking attack and Burnside withdrew to a new position (something that Hess takes Law to task for) That said, he is critical of Longstreet's poor recon work (and Alexander and McLaws) in the assault of Fort Sanders and for his indecisiveness in the siege.

Chase,

Thanks for the info. I will have to pick the book up. It seems between Hess's and Mendoza's books, the Knoxville campaign finally has the scholarly coverage it has deserved.

Also, just making out what you write about the Hess book and knowing Mendoza's well received book, it appears that the long held conclusion by many that Longstreet would not have succeeded in independent command is a little more open to debate. Also, the original view that the Knoxville campaign showed Longstreet to be incompetent in that capacity does not ring true either. In the end, the campaign was not to his credit, but it is not the debit that many have made it out to be, especially when you weigh all the factors facing Longstreet.

[RebinHawaii]

Originally Posted by Savez

I'm very partial to the Army of Tennessee. To hold together in the face of so much adversity was amazing.

I forget which Yankee General said of the Army of Tennessee: "I've never seen an Army that needed so much convincing that they were beaten".....

Duane A. Brinson Wilmington, North Carolina

[guthrieba]

Originally Posted by Jack Torrance

Good posting Longstreet had the opportunity to be it's commander after the corp commanders revolt but refused. Too bad for him and for the AofT. I wonder how much better the Aoft would have performed under Longstreet. For all the bad things said about Bragg one person who only saw him through rose colored glasses was Eliza Brooks Ellis, his wife. And maybe Jeff Davis.

To my mind, Longstreet demonstrated his capacity in independent command at Suffolk in the Spring of 1863 and again at Knoxville in the Autumn of 1863. He was a capable subordinate but showed little ability in independent command.

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by guthrieba

To my mind, Longstreet demonstrated his capacity in independent command at Suffolk in the Spring of 1863 and again at Knoxville in the Autumn of 1863. He was a capable subordinate but showed little ability in independent command.

In fairness, Suffolk was a logistical operation, and in that aspect he succeeded in.

Knoxville is definitely not a Longstreet highlight. That said, He was hampered by poor logistics in an area that was largely unionist in sympathy, he lacked clear infantry superiority (in numbers) and suffered a particularly recalcitrant brigade commander. It would have taken a major stroke of luck for Longstreet to have caught Burnside and taken Knoxville, and given the strategic situation, with Thomas and Grant operating on his flank in Chattanooga, he likely would not have held it.

In the campaign itself, and the subsequent East Tennessee Operations, Longstreet does show that he is tactically capable in an independent situation. He operates what as I have written before, Hess in his excellent work on the campaign, describe "a fluid and very mobile campaign". However, despite winning several skirmishes (forcing Burnside to withdraw), he cannot catch Burnside (one of Burnside's better campaigns in term of troops handling and the heroic effort of William Sanders in delaying Longstreet's advance elements), and his main effort to bag Burnside is spoiled by a bitter Evander Law.

Where Longstreet can be criticized in the siege of Knoxville itself. He wants to avoid frontally attacking the Union works at the city, and instead favored threatening Knoxville from the south side of the Tennessee. However, pressure from Bragg (particularly Bragg's engineer Leadbetter) forced to attack Sanders. However, delays (reluctance on Longstreet's part to make a frontal attack, and looking for other opportunities to crack Knoxville) gave Federals time to strengthen parts of the line. Longstreet wanted to avoid what he told Leadbetter making an "assault on fortifications and have the chance of repulse".

In both of Longstreet's forays into independent command, he faced largely a static (after Burnside retreats to Knoxville in the latter) enemy behind fortifications, both had larger strategic backdrops with more pressing concerns (Bragg at Chattanooga, and Lee at Chancellorsville). And furthermore, Longstreet wants to avoid making frontal assaults on these fortification (he estimated that he would suffer 3,000 casualties in attacking Suffolk and would without Naval Support be able to hold it). He is pressured into making a ill-advised attack at Fort Sanders by Bragg and Leadbetter (E.P. Alexander remarks that Leadbetter "misled Longstreet in some way"). Longstreet is not very thorough in planning the assault, Longstreet, McLaws, Leadbetter, and Alexander make a very poor recon of Fort Sanders and all them underestimate the size of the trench that McLaws' Division will cross to reach the fort. The only with reservations in Micah Jenkins after the recon, and he is not able to meet with Longstreet to raise his concerns. Longstreet decides to cancel the initial barrage but sends out skirmishers anyway, and the attack in repulsed with disproportional casualties.

Shortly therafter, Bragg is routed at Chattanooga, and Longstreet must break the siege. He decides that rather than joining Bragg and marching over the mountains, but remain and threaten Knoxville. Even some of Longstreet's harshest critics like Steven Woodworth praise Longstreet for this, because it prevents Grant from immediately focusing on pursuing and destroying Bragg's army and instead relieving Burnside.

If you don't have it, I would recommend Earl J. Hess' new book on Knoxville. Pretty good read.

[B7B Southern]

Originally Posted by guthrieba

To my mind, Longstreet demonstrated his capacity in independent command at Suffolk in the Spring of 1863 and again at Knoxville in the Autumn of 1863. He was a capable subordinate but showed little ability in independent command.

I couldn't have said it better. And don't forget 7 Pines.

[semperpietas]

Originally Posted by B7B Southern

I couldn't have said it better. And don't forget 7 Pines.

One of Longstreet's bad days. Misunderstood orders (which were oral and complicated), added to Johnston's mistakes. To top it all off he and Johnston did blame Huger for the mishaps.

But contrary to popular suggestion, this didn't adversely impact Huger's career like has been suggested. Huger remained in Division command until after his abysmal performance during the Seven Days got him transferred to the Trans-Mississippi Theater with Anderson taking over Huger's command.