Rocket Artillery vs. Artillery

[Michele]

Originally Posted by String

Also remember that the rocket artillery ROF is very high, therefore a lot of rounds can be placed on ground in a very short time. As we all know, the first rounds are much more effective due to the troops being out in the open and not yet having had the time to take cover. Because of that, 30 guns firing 3 round each is 5-10 times more effective than 3 guns firing 30 rounds each.

More effective for some missions. If the artillery is intended to kill all by itself. Or if the intention is to suppress the position - even without killing the PBI, making them ineffective in their duty - for that short while, say, while the friendly infantry is moving up. Or viceversa for a barrage against enemy infantry moving up in the open.

OTOH many artillery missions were interdiction, disruption, area denial etc. For all of those a sustained - and sustainable - albeit slower, ROF is OK.

[Michate]

Mid-war, the situation was as you say.

Later in the war, the situation was, give me whatever can deliver any fire-for-effect on the enemy.

Of course, what was available was used, and late in the war often even things that were considered vital, were not available nevertheless. For example, on the Oder front in spring 1945 many German units had little, or no, genuine artillery, but had flak guns that were than used as artillery. But that does not mean that anyone had decided that artillery was no longer needed because flak guns were a good substitute. Another analogy, in 1943-45, many Panzer divisions used hundreds, in some cases even thousands, of horses. But that does not mean that anyone had decided that horses were superior to lorries as transportation means for mechanized forces.

And soon the Werfers were a replacement. If you look at the order of battle for Barbarossa, you see that there's a rich number of non-divisional heavy artillery battalions. By 1943, the Germans were creating Werfer battalions - and even regiments and brigades. Creating not just non-divisional battalions but entire brigades is a clear indicator.

Well, the Nebelwerfers were a newly created weapon (or branch), which was still in its infancy at the beginning of WW2, so it is unsurprising, that it grew during the war. My point is that it was never considered a substitute for artillery during the war, at least not by the decision makers, as there are always a few dissidents in any army who favour unconventional ideas. In fact I have documentation that some eggheads in the war economy actually made the proposal, based on simple economic cost comparisons, to replace artillery with Werfers. This however triggered a sharp reply and contradiction from the artillery branch, which pointed out that, for tactical reasons, Werfers are a good supplement to, but a bad substitute for, artillery.

In the same vein, note how the Germans created non-divisional 120mm mortar battalions, and used those mortars in place of infantry guns in the regimental IG companies of some types of late-war divisions.

Well, as you seem to imply yourself, the 12 cm mortars were used as a substitute of infantry "guns" (or howitzers), not as a substitute for genuine artillery. (Infantry guns were not considered artillery proper, their role was seen as different, they were to be used mainly to combat point targets, like an enemy bunker or machine gun position.)

[Karri]

I imagine they would be quiet good for quick fire support to stop an enemy attack.

[Soothesayer]

Originally Posted by String

Also remember that the rocket artillery ROF is very high, therefore a lot of rounds can be placed on ground in a very short time. As we all know, the first rounds are much more effective due to the troops being out in the open and not yet having had the time to take cover. Because of that, 30 guns firing 3 round each is 5-10 times more effective than 3 guns firing 30 rounds each.

Ahem, not entirely true. It depends on the objective of the fire mission. It is true if the purpose is to cause casualties, it is untrue if the purpose is to destroy structures which aren't going anywhere or to suppress the target for a period of time.

[Soothesayer]

Originally Posted by Karri

I imagine they would be quiet good for quick fire support to stop an enemy attack.

Not if the attack was close to its objective which is your own troops. Rkt dispersion is a significant hazard. At what happens if you miss? Adjusting rkt fire is not one of the more practical activities.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Soothesayer

Not if the attack was close to its objective which is your own troops. Rkt dispersion is a significant hazard. At what happens if you miss? Adjusting rkt fire is not one of the more practical activities.

Additionally, there is the range issue. The longest-ranged rockets could hit at 6 kms; the biggest-bored ones at maybe 2-2.5 kms.

Now, mortars are short-ranged too, but there's plenty of them and they are attached to infantry companies and battalions, i.e. the guys who need to stop that enemy attack, quickly. So there will be some mortars within range.

On the contrary, with rockets we are mostly talking about non-divisional, corps-level assets. Relatively rare. I do not believe there are high chances that they a) are within useful range of that assault on a given infantry battalion's positions and b) even if they happen to be, that they are on-call for a quick response to that battalion request for fire support. At least I'd doubt that that would be done as an everyday practice.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Michate

Of course, what was available was used, and late in the war often even things that were considered vital, were not available nevertheless.

...

Werfers are a good supplement to, but a bad substitute for, artillery.

Points taken.

Well, as you seem to imply yourself, the 12 cm mortars were used as a substitute of infantry "guns" (or howitzers), not as a substitute for genuine artillery. (Infantry guns were not considered artillery proper, their role was seen as different, they were to be used mainly to combat point targets, like an enemy bunker or machine gun position.)

Thanks, but I'm aware of what these ordnance are. Regardless of their barrel length they get called "infantry guns" in English, and as you'll remember, even the Germans didn't call them "infantry howitzers".
Indeed, IIRC one of the reasons why the 12cm mortars were not an ideal substitute was exactly their inability to fire on flat trajectories which the leIG and sIG could, in a pinch, employ.

That said, the reason why I mentioned the 12cm mortars, even if they replaced infantry guns and not proper artillery, is that the trend is the same, towards easier-to-produce, cheaper tubes - like the rocket tubes in comparison to high-stress-capable, long-barrelled, rifled, big-bored heavy artillery.

[Michate]

Thanks, but I'm aware of what these ordnance are. Regardless of their barrel length they get called "infantry guns" in English, and as you'll remember, even the Germans didn't call them "infantry howitzers".

Fair enough, and let's not argue over semantics.

Indeed, IIRC one of the reasons why the 12cm mortars were not an ideal substitute was exactly their inability to fire on flat trajectories which the leIG and sIG could, in a pinch, employ.

It depends on the target, for example, covered positions, or trenches can be better reached by the more curved trajectories of the mortars.

One important reason for the introduction of these mortars was simply the German experience that when used by their Soviet enemies, they were a simple, effective, and difficult to combat (they could be dug deeply into the earth and/or be placed closely behind cover) weapon.

That said, the reason why I mentioned the 12cm mortars, even if they replaced infantry guns and not proper artillery, is that the trend is the same, towards easier-to-produce, cheaper tubes - like the rocket tubes in comparison to high-stress-capable, long-barrelled, rifled, big-bored heavy artillery.

Good summary as well, and it is not my intention to argue against it.

It should be mentioned in this context that after WW2 most NATO armies, including the American and (I assume) the British armies, introduced MRLS. Which does of course not mean that they suddenly judged their artillery ineffective or regressed to imprecise "grid square erasion" area fires.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Michate

It depends on the target, for example, covered positions, or trenches can be better reached by the more curved trajectories of the mortars.

Well yes, but the IGs could do that too, thus being more flexible. I have read an account of sIGs firing over open bores at enemy tanks, and yet they could engage a target behind an elevation.

[Michate]

That sounds interesting, may I ask you if you could please provide the name of the source? That would be great.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Michate

That sounds interesting, may I ask you if you could please provide the name of the source? That would be great.

Sorry for the delay, the reason for it is that I looked the issue up and I can't locate a quote. It must be a soldier's recollection, but not in a book of memoirs. The reason why I remembered it, I think, is that it was unusual, both for the gun used and for the targeting system used, for anti-tank work. I suppose that if the gun emplacement had not yet been spotted by the enemy and the tanks were advancing slowly, it could have worked, at least that time.
If by any chance I stumble upon the reference in the future, I'll let you know.

[Michate]

No problem, it is just that I am always interested in artillery related accounts. Thanks for your efforts.

[Soothesayer]

Previous posts (pretty much without exception) demonstrate some confusion and misunderstanding of UK arty in WW2.

The first is command arrangements. A commander was just that, he commanded. However, he could only be in one place at a time although his staff acted in his name. As far as combined arms HQs went UK only had arty ‘Commanders’ at Div and Corps level, where they were part of the HQ to ensure effective combined arms action. Until 1942 there was also a Commander, Corps Medium Artillery, who replaced the Commander Heavy Artillery of WW1. The CCMA became the CAGRA, and AGRAs were, as the name implies, commanded by Army HQ and assigned where required, normally to corps.

Commanding officers (of regiments) and battery commanders could deploy where they felt they could best command their units. However, as WW2 progressed Field Regt commanders migrated to Brigade HQ and Field Bty commanders to their supported battalion.

It’s helpful to remember that until about 1948 there were only two relationships that an artillery unit could have with any other unit or HQ. Either ‘Under Command’ (almost never given to a commander below divisional level) or ‘In support’.
Obviously there were arrangements for organising artillery fire to support major (eg brigade/division/corps) operations. The fire for these comprised a set of ‘programme shoots’, a barrage and/or concentrations, usually to a timed programme, but concentrations could ‘on-call’ and could be either Gunfire or for a time period. Depending on the size of the operation a large number of regiments could be involved. Their fire was planned at or between divisional and corps artillery HQs. However, as the war progressed simple bde operations increasingly became a matter for the field regt commander. Similarly at battalion level the field battery commander became the planner.

All this leads to the final point, engagement of opportunity targets. I suggest this page http://nigelef.tripod.com/p_massfire.htm to understand the history and reality. To those labouring under the delusion that UK and US were the same, note the reference to System 1 and System 2, which I believe is accepted by NATO to this day. My understanding is that System 1 is coded into AFATDS software. The fact that some US units in WW2 worked out that requesting fire in all circumstances was not the ideal solution does not alter the fact that requesting fire from an FDC was and is US doctrine. Also note the UK WW2 emphasis on effective procedures and communications discipline, the latter is a tad intangible but was mission critical. As anyone who has listened to different nations’ radio comms will know comms discipline varies!

[kek]

Originally Posted by The Purist

The British had the most advanced artillery system and the US model was a very close almost identical. The main advantage over the US system was the forward observers in the British system were regulary of higher ranks (as high as majors) than the US counterparts (lieutenants) and could not normally be over ruled when calling in guns further up the chain. A British observer could access every gun in the divisions (72 25 pdrs) within about 3 minutes, corps guns in only a few more and even AGRA regiments in a surprisingly short period (in the US system this was also possible with little difficulty).

This permitted incredibly heavy and accurate fire to be brought down on enemy targets in very short periods of time. The German system was not as effecient nor did they have acess to a similar weight of firepower. As for counter battery fire I will leave that to others but German batteries were favourite and accessible targets for the ground attack a/c who tended to concentrate on artillery positions, vehicle parks, field HQs, etc.

Actually in this regard the Finns had the best artillery. Not in the quality of the guns, but the fact that they could adress every gun in the sector and in range from 50mm mortars to heavy howitzers could be fired at the same area. Of course this was mostly because of the relatively static front, because radios were relatively sparse. But the Nenonen tactics were superior in this way because they didn't "respect" any divisional or even corps structures and almost anyone who had an access to a phone line could be a forward observer.

[Nickuru]

I must disagree, speed and accuracy are the prime reasons which make artillery effective. A rocket or even a guided missile loses its guidance due to electromagnetic interference, most notably from the blast to send it into the atmosphere. The speed of repetition of the firing also affects the results.

Look at the Battle of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese war 1905. The Russians had smokeless gunpowder, and could hit the Japanese fleet. The Japanese won, since they were able to fire around five times faster. But in a long running battle the Russian ships would have won, since smokeless powder does not clog the gun muzzles of battleships as does the High Explosive ammunition used by the Japanese. The High Explosive shells were erratic from records. With your permissions.