Ignoring johnbryan's unprovoked personal insult (seriously, did I miss something?), why was the B-24 produced in such large numbers? Former posters said that the B-17 was cheaper to produce, it had been in flying long before the B-24, was considerably sturdier and the Liberator's only advantage was being modable for long range maritime reconnaissance, for which considerable smaller numbers would have sufficed. So, why was the B-24 produced by the thousands to carry a large part of the bomber offensive in Germany? Political pressure by the manufacturers? Incompetent army aviation procurement?
I guess the best answer would be that the manufacturers and the AAC procurers didn't have any idea how many the AAC would need to defeat Germany so they just produced as many as they could and bought as many as they could. Why not, the US could afford it. And as usual the USA preferred as many as the USAAC could get to overwhelm the German defences.
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Ignoring johnbryan's unprovoked personal insult (seriously, did I miss something?), why was the B-24 produced in such large numbers? Former posters said that the B-17 was cheaper to produce, it had been in flying long before the B-24, was considerably sturdier and the Liberator's only advantage was being modable for long range maritime reconnaissance, for which considerable smaller numbers would have sufficed. So, why was the B-24 produced by the thousands to carry a large part of the bomber offensive in Germany? Political pressure by the manufacturers? Incompetent army aviation procurement?
because the American Automakers were enlisted to produce the 24 in large quantities, using their production methods instead of the production methods of Boeing which produced the 17.
So the B-24 could be quicker produced despite being more expensive?
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The B-24 could fly further and faster with the same bomb load as the B-17. The Army Air Force pulled the B-17 out of the Pacific and replaced it with B-24's. The B-17 could fly higher, but could one hit something accurately from this height?
Pruitt
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Pruitt, you are truly an expert! Kelt06
Have you been struck by the jawbone of an ASS lately?
So the B-24 could be quicker produced despite being more expensive?
If I might assume to speak for Kick, I think he's saying it's War, follow the money and the congressional power. I think the B-24 did excellent service in the Pacific, but Michigan had a great deal of influence.
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If I might assume to speak for Kick, I think he's saying it's War, follow the money and the congressional power. I think the B-24 did excellent service in the Pacific, but Michigan had a great deal of influence.
Probably, but remember that domestic car production was pretty much outlawed ... they were entitled to keep those factories going!
Britain did the same with tanks and aircraft coming out of car factories, Germany did not, despite the mass-production model being a no-brainer for industrialized warfare.
As Richard Overy points out, the 1938 Volkswagen factory had the largest metal press in the world, capable of punching out 200,000 whole car bodies annually. Yet " only one-fifth of its capacity was ever utilised, for a hotch-potch of equipment from one and a half million camp stoves to army issue footwarmers ..."
just saying in the time frame of WW2, much of the manufacturing expertise of large American Industry had its attention turned into pumping out military product. the B24 is a good example.. so is the Liberty Ship.
These American manufacturers didn't design the war machine, they designed
and operated the production machine that enabled large numbers to be produced.
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Chapter 4
B-17 or B-24?—Which was the Better Plane?
Efforts to increase the ability of the B-24 to protect itself against enemy
fighters through an increase in its defensive fire power have seriously
reduced the performance of this aircraft. This has now reached a point
where a basically new tactical employment must be considered or, if the
airplane is to be used conventionally in this theater, immediate remedial
action must be taken through extensive local modifications and substantial
changes in design must be accomplished now even though this may
necessitate a reduction in production.
—Maj Gen James Doolittle,
letter to Lt Gen Spaatz, dated 14 Feb 44
2
:
1. Statistical data compiled on the utilization of both planes showed that the B-17
was easier to maintain and therefore more available for combat.
2. Statistical data on time from aircraft acceptance to delivery in theater showed that
the B-17’s spend only half as much time in modification centers thus are available
at the theaters in a shorter time.
3. Use of B-17 combat sorties, versus B-24, resulted in a 40% savings in personnel
and material.
4. The average man-hours expended in producing and modifying one B-24 were
greater than for a B-17.
5. Statistical comparisons done on loss rate per sortie showed that the B-17 had a
35% longer combat life than the B-24
Another study was conducted in the fall of 1944 by the AAF Unit Training Division.
This study analyzed the Third Quarters accidents of both planes. In the final report,
Colonel Walker, Chief of the Unit Training Division, states the following
The extensive use of the B-24 is inconsistent with the blunt fact that it is
the most extravagant killer of any airplane in the AAF. Since Pearl Harbor
through September 1944, B-24 accidents in the U.S. have resulted in 2,188
fatalities. In the first 9 months of 1944, B-24’s did only 6% of total flying
in the U.S. but accounted for 26% of all fatalities. They flew 5% less than
B-17’s but had 105% more fatalities and 85% more wrecks.
Had the B-24 had as good accident rate as the B-17 during the period 7
December 1941 through September 1944, there would have been a saving
of 230 aircraft wrecked, 904 lives, and approximately $60,000,000.
24
Chapter 5
Summary and Conclusions
Briefly, the situation is this: The B-17 is a fine, heavy bomber which has
been lavishly built up by the Press with the result, we believe, that not only
the public but the personnel in the Army Air Forces think of it as an
airplane far superior to any other heavy bomber. At the same time, our
industry is just beginning to put out large numbers of B-24’s. Even in its
condition today, without the (lower) turret, which may be available in
quantity by the first of the year, the B-24 has shown up in proving ground
tests as a very fine heavy bomber with a greater range that the B-17.
Brereton has used this same B-24 with German and Italian opposition and
has had a remarkable degree of success in air combat. Likewise, Butler’s
small B-24 unit has been highly successful against the Japs in the
Aleutians. It is unfortunate at this time that neither of those theaters has
had the publicity enjoyed by the B-17 in the United Kingdom. The net
result is a false public impression that the B-17 is a fighting airplane far
superior to any other heavy bomber in the world, because of the briefness
of B-24 combat experiences and lack of publicity for its successes in
battle.
We find ourselves faced with what may be a real and acute problem in
psychology and in leadership.
—Gen H. H. Arnold
Probably, but remember that domestic car production was pretty much outlawed ... they were entitled to keep those factories going!
As Richard Overy points out, the 1938 Volkswagen factory had the largest metal press in the world, capable of punching out 200,000 whole car bodies annually. Yet " only one-fifth of its capacity was ever utilised, for a hotch-potch of equipment from one and a half million camp stoves to army issue footwarmers ..."
Interesting, but ity could be a red herring. First thing to do when looking at systems is searching for bottlenecks in the processes. At time certain plants had spare capacity for specific products at specific locations. For want of government orders/decisions things were put on halt/delayed. Sometimes it is as simple as that. Then there is the prioritising of allocation of raw materials. We now know that there were problems in the field of supply of steels and fuel and transport in general. Maybe this is stuff for another one of those alternative scenarios: "Could Germany have won the conflict had it rationalised production for it's war needs?" Knowing fore well, that if done seriously a positive answer might/will still be elusive.
Yes, Dutched, one such bottleneck was that that generation of business owners and industrialists, with relatively small firms (especially in the vehicle and aircraft industries) was not up to what was required.
They and their own battles with each other (look at the Heinkel/Messerschmidt thing) and currying favour with the Nazi Party for contracts were a constraint on Germany.
The traditional workbench of craftsmanship was also a poor model of how to wage war versus the assembly line.
Yes, Dutched, one such bottleneck was that that generation of business owners and industrialists, with relatively small firms (especially in the vehicle and aircraft industries) was not up to what was required.
They and their own battles with each other (look at the Heinkel/Messerschmidt thing) and currying favour with the Nazi Party for contracts were a constraint on Germany.
The traditional workbench of craftsmanship was also a poor model of how to wage war versus the assembly line.