What's important to know?

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by NoPref

Very interesting bit of information. The kind you can only get from someone who was there. In my day (late 70s, peacetime) we were drilled on tank ID and could tell a T-55 from a T-62. Easier to learn such details when nobody is shooting at you.

It certainly fits in with my own experience. During my Army service (1974-83), most of my mates could easily pick a 'commie' tank such as a T-55 or T-62, from a Western tank such as an M60, a Leopard or a Chieftain. In other words, the tanks that they would most likely have to go up against vs the tanks that would most likely be used by their own or allied countries, in any war that might be likely to come up. But ask them for details about how one Soviet tank type might differ from the next and you'd just get blank looks.

[broderickwells]

Originally Posted by ElefantPanzer

I read my first WWII book when I was 9 and I've been seriously studying the war since I was 14. Today at 31 I'm still learning new things. Cramming it all into a semester would be impossible. In my opinion covering the political aspects of the war would be one of the most important. Then I would break the war down into years, spending 2 weeks on a year. Hopefully this would spark an interest in a few students to study the war on their own.

I guess it boils down to short answer or long answer. Short answer is angry men believed their own bullshyte. Long answer is a whole lot of reading on ALL aspects of the war: causes, consequences, alliances, neutrality, home fronts, the various war fronts, atrocities, war crimes, POWs, racism, propaganda, partisans, economics, espionage, popular images, myths, peace movements. I realise that is not an exhaustive list, but it should stimulate a little more than the usual trite discussions.

[AdrianE]

Originally Posted by Roadkiller

So, potential teaching points that might apply to courses taught anywhere:

1. The rise of fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan.
2. The 'age of appeasement' and the coming of war.
3. Axis on the rise - Poland, France, the Battle of Britain, the invasion of the USSR and Pearl Harbor.
4. Nazism and occupied Europe including the Holocaust and the atrocities in the Soviet Union.
5. Japan and the war in the far east, including CBA and human rights violations.
6. Allies ascendant, including Moscow, Stalingrad, Midway and Normandy.
7. Allies victorious, the A-bomb and the coming of the Cold War.

(Most of these points would need to be discussed from their overall effects on the war and their political implications, not drawing NATO standard unit designations on maps for an hour.)

8. Your nation's contribution and how it was changed forever.

I'd add some basic economics and logistics as these are really the keys to understanding why things turned out as they did. Quite simply WWII was a war of the factories and the allies had more and better factories.

Mostly I'd add emphasis to the fact the Allied victory was an enormous team effort from tens if not hundreds of millions of people all across the globe.

[Desiree Clary]

Originally Posted by AdrianE

I'd add some basic economics and logistics as these are really the keys to understanding why things turned out as they did. Quite simply WWII was a war of the factories and the allies had more and better factories.

Mostly I'd add emphasis to the fact the Allied victory was an enormous team effort from tens if not hundreds of millions of people all across the globe.

I read somewhere that no lesser economy ever beat a more poerful economy in a prolonged conflict. I read through a book called Brute Force by John Ellis that makes this point over and over again.

[broderickwells]

Originally Posted by Desiree Clary

I read somewhere that no lesser economy ever beat a more poerful economy in a prolonged conflict. I read through a book called Brute Force by John Ellis that makes this point over and over again.

Then the French losing in Indochina needs some serious explanation, as does the War of Dutch Independence. It is more about determination and willingness to accept costs.

[Desiree Clary]

Originally Posted by broderickwells

Then the French losing in Indochina needs some serious explanation, as does the War of Dutch Independence. It is more about determination and willingness to accept costs.

I don't agree with everything Ellis said, either. You might have added the U.S. Involvement in Viet Nam.

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by Desiree Clary

I don't agree with everything Ellis said, either. You might have added the U.S. Involvement in Viet Nam.

Ellis was probably referring to 'conventional' war situations.

[Desiree Clary]

Originally Posted by panther3485

Ellis was probably referring to 'conventional' war situations.

As was I, but I really don't like Ellis' views on the Pacific campaign, which, briefly, he wrote that the whole island-hopping strategy was a waste of time and resources, and the allies should have simply starved Japan out. Personally, I believe that Japan would be holding out yet if a very mere blockade such as he advocates (or seems to me to) was all the Allies did..

[clackers]

Originally Posted by Desiree Clary

Personally, I believe that Japan would be holding out yet if a very mere blockade such as he advocates (or seems to me to) was all the Allies did..

Well, the US Strategic Bombing Survey, established by Secretary of State Stimson, chaired by a civilian, and tasked with working out what claims by Curtis LeMay and other Air Force hawks were spin, actually thought otherwise:

There is little point in attempting precisely to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. The time lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid and decisive determination of national policies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by Desiree Clary

As was I, but I really don't like Ellis' views on the Pacific campaign, which, briefly, he wrote that the whole island-hopping strategy was a waste of time and resources, and the allies should have simply starved Japan out. Personally, I believe that Japan would be holding out yet if a very mere blockade such as he advocates (or seems to me to) was all the Allies did..

I guess I was just responding to a couple of folks who quoted conflicts such as the French in Indochina, the War of Dutch independence and the US involvement in Vietnam; but there have been many such conflicts that we might not regard as 'conventional' wars but where an apparently weaker or lesser power prevailed over a greater one; often at least partly because of determination and resolve but there are other complications in many cases. I'm thinking Ellis had more conventional wars in mind if he made such a statement.

This is not to say that I think Ellis is always right. Far from it. I am inclined to agree with you that simply blockading the Japanese home islands - presumably with the aim of 'starving' them into submission - and letting their China, SE Asia and Pacific Island forces hopefully simply 'wither on the vine' was not in itself a viable alternative. Even the successful prosecution of the bombing campaign, as it historically occurred, required the capture of at least one or two island bases from Japanese hands.

I think the way the Pacific war was fought, was largely as it should have been.

[Desiree Clary]

Originally Posted by clackers

Well, the US Strategic Bombing Survey, established by Secretary of State Stimson, chaired by a civilian, and tasked with working out what claims by Curtis LeMay and other Air Force hawks were spin, actually thought otherwise:

There is little point in attempting precisely to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. The time lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid and decisive determination of national policies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

As Panther3485 points out in the post above, the strategic bombing of Japan was very, very important in the decision to surrender, but without Iwo or Okinawa, that would have been very difficult. The results from bombing Japan from mainland China were not impressive and losses were high. I would point out that I was objecting to Ellis' argument that none of that was necessary, just the blockade, which I continue to regard as fallacious, not referring to the strategic bombing initiative.

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by Desiree Clary

As Panther3485 points out in the post above, the strategic bombing of Japan was very, very important in the decision to surrender, but without Iwo or Okinawa, that would have been very difficult. The results from bombing Japan from mainland China were not impressive and losses were high. I would point out that I was objecting to Ellis' argument that none of that was necessary, just the blockade, which I continue to regard as fallacious, not referring to the strategic bombing initiative.

Agree it's fallacious.

Re bases for the B29s, IIRC Saipan and Tinian were very important too. And for me at least, it's hard to imagine the Americans feeling secure just taking a couple of isolated islands here and there while still leaving the rest of the vast area Japanese hands.

As for that remainder, while it was certainly possible to keep their public at least partly in the dark, for the Japanese high command to see their territorial gains being steadily taken back off them by force of arms must surely have had some psychological effect. It's hard to measure but knowing that they were being inexorably beaten, step by bloody step, must surely have played at least a small part in their perception of defeat and contributed to the final victory? Looking at the converse, wouldn't the mere fact of still possessing the bulk of their gains uncontested tend to act as just one more disincentive to admitting defeat; part of a perception that they had not yet been beaten?

And that's before we even consider the liberation of peoples living under Japanese rule as quickly as was reasonably possible; which IMO was just about as important as liberating large swathes of Europe from Nazi rule.