Did Japan intend to invade Australia?

[lcm1]

Originally Posted by Jack Torrance

Black Americans got a very raw deal indeed. But I suspect they got better treatment from the Aussies then from their fellow American servicemen. While reading a few articles about the Brisbane Line I ran into the rather ugly incident known as the Brisbane riots in which Aussies and Americans got into a real gang style war. In that article there was mentioned that American servicemen resented Aussie ladies for fraternizing with Black GI's and that the brass actually segregated Black GI's in Brisbane south of the river.

The same thing was done in Exeter in the UK,so much trouble between the white and black Americans that the city was divided in half,blacks in one,whites in the other and because the British forces in the area were often scrapping with the white Americans we were only allowed into the black Americans area and yes you can guess the results,no problems,got on well! lcm1

[Nickuru]

To what extent did the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian islands dilute their invasion forces? Troops that could have been used in more important theatres of war. This does not imply that the battle of Midway might have been won by the Japanese. This was a naval engagement with the Americans knowing the Japanese plans beforehand. Luck was on the Americans' side though. Had the Japanese not placed their fighters on deck and had them blown to pieces, the situation could have been much worse.

This is just from an armchair general looking at the asynchronous strategy of Japan, from a purely military point of view. China had to be kept under control, since USSR would take over whenever allowed a chance. Why waste resources?

[lcm1]

Originally Posted by The Purist

Yep,... they did heavily reinforce the defences of the south east and could have had the required engineer and infantry forces ready for a series of operation throughout the summer,.... except for the little scrap at Midway.

I must admit, seeing all the information flying about regarding the war against Japan, that I know very little about the war in the far east (as it was known by in the UK) Therefore I find the various remarks on the subject very interesting reading and keep my mouth shut, but i will say regarding the original thread,after living in Australia for over 30 years the Japanese would have been extremely foolish to have attempted an invasion of this massive Country with all its devious climates and conditions. lcm1

[Mechashef]

I think that to a certain extent, it was a case of both sides thinking the other was stronger than they actually were.

After their astounding advances through SE Asia, it seemed that the Japanese were almost invincible. The US had been being defeated in the Philippines and received a good thumping at Pearl Harbor. The British had been humbled in Burma and Malaya with the mighty Singapore falling and with our own forces being humiliated in Malaya as well, not to mention the Dutch etc being trounced in the East Indies.

It must have really seemed the Japanese were capable of anything.


On the other hand, the Japanese had seen how a vast country even with plenty of water and food such as China was a nightmare to invade (though of course China also seemed to have an inexhaustible supply of people). Australia may have seemed much worse. They were very aware of the challenges of such a place and the difficulties of maintaining supplies. They knew how hard a motivated defender could make things. In reality Australia was potentially short on many important things such as oil and heavy industry capability.

Unless Australia could be made to surrender quickly, it would could become a China like campaign with the added problem of a very long and very tenuous supply chain.

[Nickuru]

Originally Posted by lcm1

I must admit, seeing all the information flying about regarding the war against Japan, that I know very little about the war in the far east (as it was known by in the UK) Therefore I find the various remarks on the subject very interesting reading and keep my mouth shut, but i will say regarding the original thread,after living in Australia for over 30 years the Japanese would have been extremely foolish to have attempted an invasion of this massive Country with all its devious climates and conditions. lcm1

Spot on. The Japanese would have to face the saltwater crocodiles, the Great White shark and the box jelly fish, as well as wading through rock pools with blue-ringed octopus in them. Once on land they would have to face the friendly snakes of Australia, that's if they get past the sea snakes.

There is the Stephen's viper and the redbellied black snakes. Then we find the black tiger 10 times more poisonous than a cobra. After this we find the common brown, of various subspecies, 'only 20 times more poisonous than a cobra '. Then there is the Death Adder, an ambush predator, with the quickest strike in the world, it's only 30 times more poisonous than a cobra 80% of deaths from snakebite in Australia come from this species. Then there is the taipan, 40 times more poisonous than a cobra, and it bites repeatedly.

Ominous notes: some people have actually survived the bite of a taipan! meaning you get bit you can kiss yourself goodbye if you have no serum. It is as aggresive as a black mamba, whose bite is known in Africa as the 'kiss of death'. Had the Japanese attacked after winning Midway (had they done so) they would have been hung out to dry in a continent which turned into a desert a few million years ago. And we have not even covered the redbacks and the funnelweb spiders.

[johnbryan]

Originally Posted by Nickuru

Spot on. The Japanese would have to face the saltwater crocodiles, the Great White shark and the box jelly fish, as well as wading through rock pools with blue-ringed octopus in them. Once on land they would have to face the friendly snakes of Australia, that's if they get past the sea snakes.

There is the Stephen's viper and the redbellied black snakes. Then we find the black tiger 10 times more poisonous than a cobra. After this we find the common brown, of various subspecies, 'only 20 times more poisonous than a cobra '. Then there is the Death Adder, an ambush predator, with the quickest strike in the world, it's only 30 times more poisonous than a cobra 80% of deaths from snakebite in Australia come from this species. Then there is the taipan, 40 times more poisonous than a cobra, and it bites repeatedly.

Ominous notes: some people have actually survived the bite of a taipan! meaning you get bit you can kiss yourself goodbye if you have no serum. It is as aggresive as a black mamba, whose bite is known in Africa as the 'kiss of death'. Had the Japanese attacked after winning Midway (had they done so) they would have been hung out to dry in a continent which turned into a desert a few million years ago. And we have not even covered the redbacks and the funnelweb spiders.

Such a nice, storied and genteel land as the mad, bad lands of Australia!. Good on ya' lads and lasses!

[Glenn239]

Originally Posted by Nickuru

To what extent did the Japanese invasion of the Aleutian islands dilute their invasion forces? Troops that could have been used in more important theatres of war.

The invasion forces were trivial, and led to the diversion of much larger Allied forces in later counterattacks. The problem was the removal of carriers from Midway.

[The Purist]

Indeed. Ryujo, Junyo and another 70+ a/c in the CV divisions's with the strike force at Midway may have made a critical difference to the outcome of the naval battle.

[Glenn239]

Maybe. The battle result was the product of so many butterflies flapping its really tough to say what happens. Maybe Nagumo sinks a couple American flat tops and pulls his cripples home. Maybe Fletcher pots all six instead. Who knows?

[Aussie]

From some Japanese sources concerning Australia.........


http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/ajrp/ajrp2.nsf/WebI/JpnOperations/$file/JpnOpsText.pdf?OpenElement


After the aims of the initial Japanese blitzkrieg had been achieved within time & with minimal casualties, the question was 'what next.'

The Navy had noted the smooth progress of various victories to this point, but was extremely anxious about initiating the second stage of the operation. The navy’s operational planning was divided into two broad categories.

The first concerned launching a direct attack against Australia and as much as possible foiling any counter-attack by blockading the supply route between Australia and the United States, all the while aiming to establish a long-term unassailable position. The second involved luring the main strength of the US fleet into destruction in a short-term decisive battle through attacks against places like Midway and Hawaii.

At that time, the idea of establishing a long-term position was favoured within the Navy General Staff. The Combined Fleet, however, was opposed to this view, and strongly pressed for a decisive short-term victory.

The chief of staff of the Combined Fleet, Vice Admiral Ugaki Matome, recorded the following in his diary dated 5 January 1942......

'Stage one of operations must be generally completed by mid-March, in terms of overall offensive operations.

As to where we should then spread our wings, whether to proceed to Australia, whether to set out against Hawaii, or whether to prepare a stand against the Soviet Union and take the opportunity to attack, needs to be planned for in mid-February. Research must be undertaken for the General Staff for this purpose.'

Ugaki’s diary entry clearly indicates the mood of uncertainty prevalent at that time.

Research for stage two operations was undertaken by the army and navy as a basis for their planning. Staff officers from the Army Department and Navy Department carried out concurrent research and discussions, including at the Imperial Headquarters–government liaison conferences. Research continued through late February and early March, further delaying the conclusion of the debate on whether to attack Australia.

Fundamentally, however, the army opposed the invasion of Australia and Hawaii on the grounds that they would extend national strengths beyond their limits. They did not oppose the United States–Australia blockade operation because of their faith in the absolute superiority of the Japanese navy’s capabilities.

The Navy’s argument was that establishing a defensive posture was disadvantageous to the execution of long-term strategies. It was vital to adopt aggressive operational leadership whenever possible, thus forcing the enemy to take the defensive position.

Underlying this basic policy was support for the invasion of Australia,
the main area from which the United States would launch counter-offensives against the Japanese. This was leadership of stage two operations through offensive strategies in the Pacific Ocean area, strategies that it was hoped would hasten the end of the war through naval surface battles in the region.

The reasons for the army’s opposition to this policy were that the invasion of Australia was expected to require 12 army divisions, in addition to transport shipping requirements of approximately 1,500,000 tons. [overkill?]

The pressing issue of strengthening policies was discussed at the Imperial Headquarters–government liaison conference on 10 January 1942. It was decided to blockade the supply from Britain and the United States in India, and to deny British cooperation. With regards to Australia (including New Zealand), the following was
determined.............

Proceed with the southern operations, [FS] all the while blockading supply from Britain and the United States and strengthening the pressure on Australia, ultimately with the aim to force Australia to be freed from the shackles of Britain and the United States.


On 30 January the head of the 2nd (Operations) Section of the Army Department, Colonel Hattori Takushir
, explained the operation proposals discussed up to that time with the navy to the army minister, Tojo Hideki.
The army minister indicated his assent concerning the FS Operation, as follows.....

'There is no consensus on the Australia operation even between high command and the ministers. Agreement has been reached concerning the plans to invade Fiji and Samoa. I think there is reason for caution concerning the method of execution of the New Caledonia invasion, though I cannot say there is no agreement.'

Army chief of staff Sugiyama expressed his convictions to his navy counterpart, Admiral Nagano Osami, on 16 February as follows......

'Discussions have previously been conducted concerning leadership in operations after the completion of stage one in the southern region. We have now achieved our goal of favourably advancing the operation, even in Java.

It is now essential that subsequent strategies be formulated as soon as possible, and that decisions are taken on research on various related issues at the upcoming liaison conference.

An essential part of this research concerns strategies against Australia. Great deliberation must be given to this consideration.

It is thought that Australia will be the main base for mounting the US and British counter-attack against Japan, so strategies to crush this counter-offensive are essential. However, these strategies, which will not aim to deal with the entire continent, will probably develop from operations in one part of Australia into a war of attrition spread over many areas. There are grave fears that the operation will gradually expand uncontrollably and slide into a total multi-front war. Consequently, because measures to control all of Australia should not be adopted, it is felt necessary to refrain from invasion operations in any part of Australia.

However, it is essential to blockade the transport of troops and matériel to Australia in order to smash the enemy counter-offensive. To this end, the operations to occupy Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia in the Pacific are felt to be of great importance'.......


Fortunately the Navy General Staff lost the argument to invade Australia immediately, but if things went favorably for Japan the newly acquired Territories were to be colonized.

By 1950 according to the projections of the Tokyo health and welfare Dept, 14% of the national population would be living abroad as settlers. 2.7 million in Korea, 400,000 in Formosa, 3.1 million in Manchuria, 1.5 million in China, 2.38 million in other Asian satellites, AND 2 million in Australia and NZ.


The scary thing is if the Japanese had played their cards differently & not attacked Pearl or any American possession, they 'may' have gotten away with it, for a time at least.

[killemall]

It Was Entirely Possible But Never Happened As With The Planned Submarine Entry Into New Zealand Harbours Rivers And Estuaries

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by Nickuru

" ... Then there is the taipan, 40 times more poisonous than a cobra, and it bites repeatedly.

Ominous notes: some people have actually survived the bite of a taipan! meaning you get bit you can kiss yourself goodbye if you have no serum. It is as aggresive as a black mamba, whose bite is known in Africa as the 'kiss of death'. Had the Japanese attacked after winning Midway (had they done so) they would have been hung out to dry in a continent which turned into a desert a few million years ago. And we have not even covered the redbacks and the funnelweb spiders.

http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/quee...109-291ud.html

This and other friendly natives are waiting to welcome any potential invaders.

Back in the 70's, I was helping to handle a taipan that had just been 'milked' to extract its venom and it bit me on the 'web' of the hand (between forefinger and thumb). I quickly pulled it away and it hadn't invenomated me but I did feel some anxiety and I was given precautionary treatment just in case (but not the antivenom, which is only administered if envenomation is evident). Being a rather cavalier young man in my early 20's, I laughed it off at the time but later came to fully ponder the potential seriousness of that.

[lcm1]

Originally Posted by killemall

It Was Entirely Possible But Never Happened As With The Planned Submarine Entry Into New Zealand Harbours Rivers And Estuaries

Possible yes,feasible, no. A world of differance. lcm1