ACW: France and England to the rescue!

[Selous]

Originally Posted by Ex

In the case of Holland, I was thinking of $ terms only.

Dutch companies, as British ones did, may back a certain side, but it’d be politically too risky for the Dutch as a people, in terms of the actions of their government, to oppose both Europe’s greatest land power and the world’s greatest Seapower so directly. Not that it would likely come to such a daggers-drawn situation, the political capital just isn’t there for the Dutch strategic decisionmakers for interference.

You see, once the RN has the Union blockaded in the East (so easy I give the Union zero chance to avoid that fate, and a much lower than the 1 in 2 chance of running this blockade than the Confederates had with the real one) the value of smuggling goods into the US grows exponentially. The Union has Gold, and Iron, and many other things, so they are more liable to attract a better class of smugglers.

then you give the RN more credit to get this done than I do – I’m not so sure a blockade of the Union would be as complete as the Union blockade of the South. But if this blockade is so complete, then it becomes more difficult to smuggle. Neither is a blockade brought about without political manoeuvring, Dutch authorities could be leaned on to prevent their own merchantmen from activity. Is it a close or distant blockade?

Enter the Dutch.
Savvy mariners, they have their colony in the Indies that can supply tin, rubber, and a host of other things, and blockading the west coast of the US would be immensely harder for the RN, even if they took the logical step of occupying Hawaii.

I don’t see that as being so logical, it could be a case of frustrating the enemy’s useful actions (prevent Union shipping activity on the East Coast) and yet encourage their useless activity (allow hundreds tons of rubber and tin to land in San Francisco or elsewhere on the coast. The Union will then have to transport it to immense cost, time and effort over land. Or just have the RN Pacific squadron threaten a few Dutch flagged vessels off the coast. As they’re owned by private corporations and well meaning individuals they’ll soon find the game not worth the candle as their resources are inferior to that a state, particularly GB, could yield.

And here's the kicker;
The Union was always able to produce a surplus of food.
That is the real killer with this whole idea of European nations coming to the Confederacy's rescue.
There were crop failures all over the place in the 1860s, except in the Americas. And in addition to that, yields in the US went up even as men were being called to the War because of the introduction of McCormick and other farming machinery.

The issue, particularly of corn and wheat, I believe, was a major bargaining chip for the Union. And perhaps why there was no involvement after all. I agree entirely and, perhaps this nips the whole scenario in the bud. But nevertheless the OP gives us the cards we’ve been dealt.

War with the Union would be terribly risky for anyone at this stage, AND terribly profitable for anyone with a lot of good ships that was a bunch of genuine wheeler-dealers.
How could they loose?

With a complete close blockade I don’t see the smugglers getting an easy time of it on the East coast, or after a few months of assertive action, on the West. Any materiel is going to have to be transferred overland thousands of miles to or from the West Coast, that’s fine, I’d allow that. It’s consuming in time and money. I don’t know about the agricultural capacity of the unoccupied South at this time, or whether any food could be procured from them in exchange for political assistance from an Anglo-French alliance. My gut says no, given the condition of their soldiery, but as continued conflict with the Union would be unlikely to meet the year of ’64, what with the presence of a blockade and all these professional French infantry, cavalry and artillery, it may be of questionable relevance over time. Depending how the Union escalated the conflict and what operations were carried out, it may even be judicious to seize San Francisco.
I’ve given up on Canada as it’d be likely targeted by Union agents, including the vast potential of Alberta, though I don’t think it’d be impossible to garner some foodstuffs from them. Worse comes to worse a paltry few more Mancunian peasants starve. In a couple of weeks I shall be returning to my house where I have Paul Kennedy’s books. These books usually include such dull minutiai (but highly relevant to our chat here) as grain and iron outputs in given decades. If you’d be willing to place some of these subjects on hold, and then remind me then, we may have (unless we can find elsewhere) some of the stats on French and British Empire production of foodstuffs, and how much could be sourced elsewhere if it were necessary.

I've said it before, this is my favourite 'what if' as it fits incredibly well with my interests, but sadly it seems like only you and I are keeping this up (which I sincerely and heartily thank you for, as it is much fun to ponder.)

[67th Tigers]

Originally Posted by The Exorcist

And here's the kicker;
The Union was always able to produce a surplus of food.
That is the real killer with this whole idea of European nations coming to the Confederacy's rescue.
There were crop failures all over the place in the 1860s, except in the Americas. And in addition to that, yields in the US went up even as men were being called to the War because of the introduction of McCormick and other farming machinery.
War with the Union would be terribly risky for anyone at this stage, AND terribly profitable for anyone with a lot of good ships that was a bunch of genuine wheeler-dealers.
How could they loose?

Crop failures? The harvest was poor in '62 and '63, and by poor we mean yields in some places were only 90% of normal. The UK wheat production was down 7.5% in those years.

The US had a large surplus (that was previously traded with the southern states) that would rot in the fields, so prices were driven down in the US.

The normal UK consumption (for all purposes, inc. animal feed) was 49 m qrs of which in the best US year for exporting (1863) the US supplied 3.8 m qrs. The effect of the removal of US exports (which in such a scenario might be matched by CS corn exports, the CSA produced corn rather than wheat as its major starch and had a major surplus which was previously exported north). The UK is a major importer, but the US only really managed to sell to the UK in times of crisis.

The effect of no wheat exports would not be starvation but increased wheat prices, but probably not to pre-corn law levels.

[Hesse-Kassel]

Originally Posted by Yankee

I would say by his navy . By the way I just that out there I din't mean to create and argumnet . Okay

There were Russian ships off the coast of the Colonies of NSW and Victoria.

The Australian colonies tried to arm themselves but pretty much everything to do with artillery was sold to the USA and CSA.

[The Exorcist]

Originally Posted by Selous

The issue, particularly of corn and wheat, I believe, was a major bargaining chip for the Union. And perhaps why there was no involvement after all. I agree entirely and, perhaps this nips the whole scenario in the bud. But nevertheless the OP gives us the cards we’ve been dealt.

Thanks for reminding me.
BTW- with the added pressure of the war, could the RR to California not have been completed a few years sooner?
(also- ran a battle years ago between part of the RN Pacific Squadron and the US ships defending San Francisco. RN had the Ironclad Enterprise and the US had the Monitor Comanche. RN opened the battle by flattening the Presidio, but Alcatraz was much tougher, decisive even. The monitor's turret made up for superior maneuvering by the RN squadron. Ended up a costly draw and the RN wound up with not enough ships to blockade with... and it takes a LONG time to get more ships way out there. That's the background on much of my equations here)

Originally Posted by Selous

I've said it before, this is my favourite 'what if' as it fits incredibly well with my interests, but sadly it seems like only you and I are keeping this up (which I sincerely and heartily thank you for, as it is much fun to ponder.)

Oh, I'm having fun too!

As for the rest... its gonna take a while for me to catch up on this Necro-thread, again.
Keeps coming back for more, don't it?

[Selous]

Didn't realise you had posted

Originally Posted by The Exorcist

Thanks for reminding me.
BTW- with the added pressure of the war, could the RR to California not have been completed a few years sooner?

Possibly, my understanding is that the RR was quite the wonder of the industrial world and built at double pace as it is- only compelted in about 1868/9 so I'm unsure if it could be completed in much less time than that - I honestly don't know because I don't know much about the state the railroad was in in, say, 1861. Any increase in construction rate will require more men, food and pay of course, which may, or may not, have negative impact elsewhere for achieving a railroad which, even if 4 years ahead of RL schedule, could miss the end of the war.

(also- ran a battle years ago between part of the RN Pacific Squadron and the US ships defending San Francisco. RN had the Ironclad Enterprise and the US had the Monitor Comanche. RN opened the battle by flattening the Presidio, but Alcatraz was much tougher, decisive even. The monitor's turret made up for superior maneuvering by the RN squadron. Ended up a costly draw and the RN wound up with not enough ships to blockade with... and it takes a LONG time to get more ships way out there. That's the background on much of my equations here)

I think you'd quite like the book Ironclad, by Fuller, if you haven't already read it. It places the monitor and similar vessels at the heart of what Fuller maintains was a more potent naval force than the RN at the time. It's an interesting work and made me do some research a little while ago into monitors and ironclads and I got to have a chat with one of Britain's leading maritime historians professor Eric Grove. There was a supporting article to Fuller's book which made certain small if quite important errors, which I shall see if I can find.