Luftwaffe destroy British and Soviet aircraft industries

[Michele]

Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner

One option the Germans might have gotten to was spreading the raid vectors out far more than they did. The Luftwaffe in the BoB opted for almost all raids to take pretty much the direct approach route from France to England. If they had longer legged bombers and fighters they could have sent raids out that turned in out of radar range of Southern England and approached from the South, raids sent from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, or raids that approached from other directions. The US and Britain did this against Germany in their bomber campaign.
This would spread the defenders out far more diluting the defense. At least raids would have been met with less initial opposition and depending on the depth of penetration might have made their targets with less defending interceptions overall.

I agree on most everything else but I have to nitpick about this. Your reasoning is sound but what less informed dabblers might forget to consider is that when we talk about a maximum effort by Fighter Command, say on September 15, we are talking about a maximum effort by #11 Group and the Southernmost Squadrons of #12 Group. That is by no means all of Fighter Command - even at a time when the Germans were throwing nearly anything serviceable in the battle and were musing about those "last 50 Spitfires".

Attacks from Norway would have no fighter escort. In any case they would be faced by #13 Group. Yes, that was the rest and refit area, and by the late stage of the campaign there were several C-classed Squadrons there. But engaging unescorted bombers would be just the right exercise for these.

Attacks over the North Sea could have a semblance of fighter escort, and they would be engaged by the central part of #12 Group, Wittering for instance had 3 Squadrons on September 1.

Attacks to the West would be met by #10 Group, which on the same date had no less than 8 single-seater fighter Squadrons.

All of the units mentioned above had little or nothing to do with the main battle, so even if these sideshows were launched by the Germans at the same time with raids in the historical area, they would be engaged.

Leaving tactics aside and only considering the math, it's a very bad option for the Germans, because they use the same assets they can use in the main battle area, while giving the British the chance of using more assets, the ones they always kept out of the main battle area.

The US opted for the former and just saturated the defense with bombers and fighters that were in large enough numbers they shot down the defending interceptors.

This seems the brute-force option, but actually is the one providing more fringe benefits. The USAAF challenged the Luftwaffe in its own playground and thrashed it.
Tech spoofing seesaws over the war, as measures are met with countermeasures and so on. One day Bomber Command easily gets through, the next one they are clobbered. But a downed FW remains downed and a killed German pilot remains in the grave. The Germans could build more and train more, but they'd do that under unrelenting pressure.
Additionally, every German fighter and pilot that have to be kept over the Reich - and that are downed there - aren't interfering over the front lines, thus the Western Allies have unchallenged air support and the Germans have no friends up there.

[Frtigern]

What if the Luftwaffe''s priority was taking out Britain's early radar system?

[Roddoss72]

Originally Posted by Frtigern

What if the Luftwaffe''s priority was taking out Britain's early radar system?

Ok say the Luftwaffe's Abteilung V had guessed correctly that the Radar systems that the RAF had wasn't rigit and inflexible and did not "Tie" RAF fighter to their home fields but was essential early warning system for the whole RAF Fighter Command.

So the Commander of Abteilung V Oberstleutnant "Bebbo" Schmid report on the 16th July 1940 stipulated that RAF Fighter Command heavily relied on the Advance Early Warning System for the conduct of RAF Fighter Command Operation and that it is vital that the Luftwaffe must destroy this vital defensive asset rendering the RAF "Blind".

So from the get go the Luftwaffe targets the Radar Huts and the Towers, so day after day the Luftwaffe destroys/damages each Radar station and is prepared to cop losses to effect the blinding of the RAF then so be it.

Assume for the momment that this is achieved, this does play havoc with the RAF at the time was running things, the RAF then has to basically turn to the Forward Observer Corps, this is vital but not as good as Radar, for the Radar can detect Luftwaffe formations as far as the Pas de Calais and further, also the CHL can detect low flying formations at sea level, visual detection by Foward Observer Corps can't, nor can they plot the direction of raids once they cross the coast, Radar can. Radar allows the RAF time to scramble their fighter squadrons and get to operational height, by the time visual detection is confirmed, that cuts the time to deploy RAF fighters dramatically, essentially the Bombers will most likely be hitting their targets as the RAF are still taking off or still climbing to engage the enemy.

There are some who will say, Why not have CAP? Well CAP is great but when your pilots are flying up to 5 sorties a day they become very exhausted very quickly, reducing their effectiveness, nor does it give the ground and maintenance crews to fully service aircraft, essentially you have exhausted pilots getting shot out of the sky faster than they can be replaced, and aircraft with that are not up to the job.

Worst case scenario, the RAF is defeated but it is easier said than done.

[T. A. Gardner]

Originally Posted by Frtigern

What if the Luftwaffe''s priority was taking out Britain's early radar system?

The British already had alternatives: Mobile units that could cover gaps, moving ships in to do the same with Type 79 or 279. Also Home Chain, because of its unique operation made it possible for one station to use the transmissions of another to obtain detection.

To take out a station you had to either hit and destroy the (usually hardened) building with the transmission and detection equipment and / or take down 3 of 4 receiving towers and / or 2 of three transmission towers.

As the Allies found in the lead up to Normandy taking out radar stations was a bit tricky. They don't make good targets and often don't stand out in the terrain. Also, some damage doesn't always preclude operation and in many cases what damage is done is quickly repaired. It took a number of months of concerted effort to lay waste to the German radar system using hundreds of fighter bombers with homing equipment aboard. The Germans in 1940 have neither.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Frtigern

What if the Luftwaffe''s priority was taking out Britain's early radar system?

Some of the difficulties have already been mentioned.

The first question is, with what.
What the Luftwaffe has in great numbers is level bombers. Small huts and radar towers are pinpoint targets. They have to be hit with accuracy. Close-by explosions just make the towers sway in the overpressure, then return to their original position; they were built to withstand the Channel's winds, after all.
That said, large raids could be mounted and some bombs would hit, over time. Naturally, the British can react. We do know that the Germans, in the real fight, were losing more aircraft than the British. Reserve squadrons would be moved forward. AA batteries would be deployed. The Germans would soon be paying a high price, for little result.

Stukas are a good platform - in the absence of defenses. They can deliver a sizable bomb with pinpoint accuracy. The only problem is that they died in droves in the Battle of Britain, so much so that the Germans decided to withdraw them. Additionally, while the Germans have many level bombers, they have less Stukas.

Bf 109s as fighter bombers also could in theory deploy bombs with accuracy, and they wouldn't be as totally vulnerable as the Stukas, nor as vulnerable as level bombers. Unfortunately their payload is too small, the Germans have too few bombing-trained Bf 109 pilots, and too few units for that purpose, and too few bomb racks for them.

Bf 110s would be the ideal platform. That's why I mentioned upthread that the Germans could have acknowledged they had to use them differently. They carry a reasonable bomb, are less vulnerable than bombers (though still being easier targets than Bf 109s), and can strafe auxiliary, non-hardened buildings with reasonable firepower. Unfortunately, the Germans didn't want to use them in this way, had too few Bf 110 pilots trained for ground attack, and too few Bf 110s altogether.

Note that any form of low-level attack (Stukas, Bf 109s, Bf 110s) is vulnerable to all sorts of AA and to the simple but effective countermeasure of balloons.

All that said, if the Germans keep this kind of attack up, casualties be damned, the British EW system will be degraded - provided that the British only react by defending the radar stations with fighters, AA and balloons, as mentioned above.
In particular, level-bombers carrying out saturation attacks will occasionally cut the power lines, which in actual history was nearly the only way in which they managed, by mere chance and often without understanding it, to put a station off line.
But the British can deploy mobile radar stations. They can send generators and repair crews. All things that they historically did, though taking their own sweet time; they can be criticized for this, but one should remember that the Germans were not consistently carrying out a concerted effort against the radar stations. Should the Germans do that, you can bet the British efforts to keep them in service would be redoubled.

Also remember that the radar system was redundant and resilient. If one station is out, the two stations on its sides take up the slack. If one CH station is out, the British still have CHL, and so on.

Also remember that the British still have the Observer Corps.

Nevertheless, the Germans might continue with such a concerted effort, ignoring their own losses at it, and throwing each and every of their assets at the problem. If they do, eventually two results are possible:

a) the Germans do not succeed at consistently keeping the EW system out of service, in which case all their efforts are in vain, or

b) the Germans do succeed at consistently keeping the EW system out of service, in which case all their efforts are in vain.

a) is easily explained. It's the same outcome as in actual history, only with the German defeats in the air taking place over the radar stations.

b) depends from the following factors.

First, we know that the Germans won the air Battle of France. Yet that mostly happened by the Heer overrunning French air bases. At the end of the Battle, the vast majority of the French fighters were still operational. The fact is that Goering was right when he thought that if the point was defeating the British fighter force in the air, he needed the enemy fighters to show up. If the radar network is out of order, the British fighters will simply often fail to intercept.
Now, that would mean German success in bombing, say, the Supermarine factory hub. Fine, that disrupts the British replacement of fighters. And this happens when? After the Germans have successfully carried out their long, sustained, costly anti-radar campaign. I.e., by the time when the seas alone will prevent Sealion, and the weather alone will provide the British with many, many days of bad-weather respite.

Second, let's suppose the Germans on the contrary manage to win the anti-radar campaign in a short time, so that Sealion is still possible. That means more losses on their part.
Now, losing more than 50% of the relatively small Stuka force dooms Sealion.
The landing German units have no artillery. Their artillery is flying, it's the Stuka.
The German barge armada has no battleships. Their naval gunnery is flying, it's the Stuka.
So if they are down to 50% Stukas, the Royal Navy will very easily sink the barges, and the Royal Artillery will kill the landing force from safe distance, while even a badly set RC pillbox with a Home-Guard-manned WWI-vintage MG will be a formidable obstacle for an artillery-less infantry.

End of the dream.

[Reggie Mental]

Originally Posted by Frtigern

Couldn't the Luftwaffe simply adapted tactics that made use of the Me 110's strengths, since it could escort the bombers to the ranges that were needed? I'm talking about having them escort from above then dive upon RAF fighters and using their higher speed to keep running while the Hurricanes and Spitfires wasted fuel trying to catch them. Or you could fly feints of them, to make it look like they were bombers (since they were so big) so the fighters would go after them instead of the bombers.

4 Reasons the freijagd sorties were ignored:
1. The CHH/L ID'd them as fighters. Even the 110s
2. ROC spotters confirmed it.
3. The fighters carry no/insignificant bombload. At the height of the battle it was the bombing of airfields that was the RAFs greatest concern.
4. Putting up precious fighters and ever more precious pilots against a non-threat is something Dowding and Park were far too clever for.

Leigh-Mallory though...

[Carl Schwamberg]

Originally Posted by At ease

Quote:
Originally Posted by T. A. Gardner
Focke Wulf's Marienburg plant was flattened the day before it was scheduled to open for production in early 1944 by just shy of 100 B-17 in perfect weather. They totally demolished the plant. That is one clear case where the Allies succeeded in bombing a German aircraft factory. It never produced a single plane.
Quote:
REPRESENTATIVE MISSIONS: MARIENBURG

Similarly, in our attack on the Focke-Wulf Assembly Plant at Marienburg in East Prussia (October 9, 1943), only 2 out of 100 B-17's were lost. The concentration of bomb bursts on this target was so great that there is sound reason to evaluate this as one of the finest examples of precision bombing to date. The attack was made in daylight from altitudes between 11,000 and 13,500 feet. Several hundred 500 lb. general purpose bombs and 1300 x 100 lb. incendiaries were dropped. Study of reconnaissance photographs has convinced photo interpreters in the United Kingdom that every factory building and all the hangars had been damaged. And this plant had been turning out about one-half (110 per month) of all of Germany's FW-190 fighters.

This report was prepared by the Army Air Forces and is dated Jan. 4, 1944.
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/fac...et.asp?id=1713

The attack altitude caught my eye. This is significantly lower than the usual altitude given for the attacks by the heavy bombers - 20,000+ feet. 10,000 - 13,000 feet is more typical of the medium bombers of the US 9th AF, which were attacking smaller targets, like bridges or V1 storage sites in 1944.

Anyone here seen or rrember any literature that has specifics on the relationship between altitude and accuracy?