Mapping the London Blitz

[ShAA]

Originally Posted by Michele

Sorry, but these facts are well known. Nothing in what you quote, or, indeed, in the history of the questionable British approach to these negotiations, contradicts the fact that the German-Soviet agreement could well be considered "unpleasant" for the British government, and, to a certain extent, a surprise too.

I would object to the statement on the "wide publicity" of these facts. You know how this story is normally presented - Britain and France did their best to forge an alliance, but evil Stalin preferred Hitler cause he was evil and had more to gain from this. However, this is not the discussion topic now - do you know what it is, by chance?

I meant that when you do something reluctantly, half-heartedly and without a plan, why are you surprised that you fail and something unpleasant comes from it? I wasn't questioning the fact it was unpleasant, I'm just surprised by the "surprise" part

[Michele]

Originally Posted by ShAA

I meant that when you do something reluctantly, half-heartedly and without a plan, why are you surprised that you fail and something unpleasant comes from it? I wasn't questioning the fact it was unpleasant, I'm just surprised by the "surprise" part

I'd say because you thought you were the only game in town that the john could consider.

[ShAA]

Originally Posted by Michele

I'd say because you thought you were the only game in town that the john could consider.

It should be noted that an year before they dealt with that very "other" game in town and somehow they forgot others could take the same option.

Well, I'm just saying

[Jack Torrance]

Originally Posted by Michele

Now, of course the Soviet Union's surprise came in late August, and if you want to claim that the British had already decided for war against Germany before that, and that thus your remark about their thinking that Germany was diplomatically isolated refers to before that surprise, you are welcome to support that. As for myself, when talking about why the "British declared war", I tend to consider what they knew on September 1st, 1939.

Yes, that is my claim. Britain had decided on war by the time of joint British-Franco staff talks when it was decided a BEF would be sent to France and the Military Training Act (a limited form of conscription) was passed in Britain on May, of that year.

IMO, by claiming that Britain had decided on war when Poland was invaded than it would ignore all the military preparations and diplomatic initiatives prior to that date.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Jack Torrance

Yes, that is my claim. Britain had decided on war by the time of joint British-Franco staff talks when it was decided a BEF would be sent to France and the Military Training Act (a limited form of conscription) was passed in Britain on May, of that year.

IMO, by claiming that Britain had decided on war when Poland was invaded than it would ignore all the military preparations and diplomatic initiatives prior to that date.

Conversely, claiming that war was decided for in May, no matter what could have happened later, means war between Germany and Poland was an automatic knee-jerk reaction, and any later assessment of the evolving situation was a loss of time.

In particular, your claim also mean that the British ultimatum was just a show. Had the Germans backed off into Germany on September 2, the British would continue to wage war, because that is what had been decided in May.

Evidently, the truth is somewhere more reasonable in between. Chamberlain had decided that Germany had to be stopped, that's true. It is also true that he would have much preferred to stop it by the mere threat of waging war alongside Poland. It is also true that he thought that war would be, nevertheless, a likelihood, so he rightly began serious preparations.
It is untrue that he tied his own hands preemptively by taking a decision for the future that could not take into account things that would happen in the future.

[Jack Torrance]

Originally Posted by Michele

Conversely, claiming that war was decided for in May, no matter what could have happened later, means war between Germany and Poland was an automatic knee-jerk reaction, and any later assessment of the evolving situation was a loss of time.

In particular, your claim also mean that the British ultimatum was just a show. Had the Germans backed off into Germany on September 2, the British would continue to wage war, because that is what had been decided in May.

Evidently, the truth is somewhere more reasonable in between. Chamberlain had decided that Germany had to be stopped, that's true. It is also true that he would have much preferred to stop it by the mere threat of waging war alongside Poland. It is also true that he thought that war would be, nevertheless, a likelihood, so he rightly began serious preparations.
It is untrue that he tied his own hands preemptively by taking a decision for the future that could not take into account things that would happen in the future.

I'm afraid that you're failing to take into account the 1,000 lb gorilla in the room. British policy was a direct result of the very real and, most probably anticipated, threat posed by Hitler. We're not talking about Chamberlain tying his countries hands to a second rate dictator of a third rate power but to a very real threat. Chamberlain had already seen this when Hitler was saber rattling over the Sudenten crisis but had to settle for a policy which was not altogether unfair in that there was a considerable German majority living within Czech borders. This and the fact that militarily speaking it was thought that Britain was not ready for a war that was not supported by the public. For reaching a solution by diplomacy that was felt at the time to have averted war he was later labeled as the arch appeaser.

To get a real measure of how Chamberlain reached the final conclusion that with Hitler one could not negotiate all you have to do is read his speech of March 17, 1939. This speech can be found on the internet in the Avalon Project British War Blue Book Series. I'll copy and paste the part which I think is the most relevant to my thesis and that leads me to the conclusion that, taken together with all the other speeches prior to and later, plus the actions taken in reaching military alliances designed specifically to isolate Germany, Chamberlain was indeed setting up a situation that would force a military showdown with Hitler.

But the events which have taken place this week in complete disregard of the principles laid down by the German Government itself seem to fall into a different category, and they must cause us all to be asking ourselves: "Is this the end of an old adventure, or is it the beginning of a new?"
"Is this the last attack upon a small State, or is it to be followed by others? Is this, in fact, a step in the direction of an attempt to dominate the world by force?"
Those are grave and serious questions. I am not going to answer them to-night. But I am sure they will require the grave and serious consideration not only of Germany's neighbours, but of others, perhaps even beyond the confines of Europe. Already there are indications that the process has begun, and it is obvious that it is likely now to be speeded up.
We ourselves will naturally turn first to our partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations and to France, to whom we are so closely bound, and I have no doubt that others, too, knowing that we are not disinterested in what goes on in South-Eastern Europe, will wish to have our counsel and advice...............

The bold text I place special emphasis on

It is only six weeks ago that I was speaking in this city, and that I alluded to rumours and suspicions which I said ought to be swept away. I pointed out that any demand to dominate the world by force was one which the democracies must resist, and I added that I could not believe that such a challenge was intended, because no Government with the interests of its own people at heart could expose them for such a claim to the horrors of world war.
And, indeed, with the lessons of history for all to read, it seems incredible that we should see such a challenge. I feel bound to repeat that, while I am not prepared to engage this country by new unspecified commitments operating under conditions which cannot now be foreseen, yet no greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, because it believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its fibre that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting such a challenge if it ever were made. For that declaration I am convinced that I have not merely the support, the sympathy, the confidence of my fellow-countrymen and countrywomen, but I shall have also the approval of the whole British Empire and of all other nations who value peace, indeed, but who value freedom even more.

The italiced text demonstrates that given the special conditions Chamberlain did in fact place Britain in a commitment whose conditions could be foreseen. There is not question in my mind that Chamberlain was under no illusion that Hitler would be deterred after absorbing Bohemia and Moravia and, specially after the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. The warning, then the ultimatum issued after Poland was invaded was, I believe, designed more to have a co-ordinated declaration of war along with a French one considering that according to French law the French Chamber could not meet until at least a day after the invasion and, therefore, could not issue a declaration of war. There was also some French footdragging by French foreign minister Georges Bonnet and fellow peacenicks which kept the French from declaring war sooner by tryaing to get Mussolini involved in a peace conference of some type.

While all this was going on the British parliament was beginning to worry that there was another Munich in the making and urged (possibly threatened) Chamberlain to get on with the declaration of war. Of course these MP's weren't aware of what was going on with the French FM and that Chamberlain was playing for time so he issued instructions which, in effect, he knew Hitler would not accept anyway. With the British declaration of war the French, or, more precisely, Bonnet's attempts to divorce France from it's commitment to Poland ended and France declared war on Germany some six hours later.

That's the way I see it. It's different from the accepted accounts but I think Chamberlain deserves a better fate than having a historical appeaser label.Iit's not an attempt at trying to find some justification trying to prove a preconceived belief but it's actually looking at the record and reaching a judgement based on what I see as convincing proof.