Did the British Need a British Bomber?

[flash]

Originally Posted by Jon Jordan

Fair point - though like all bombers of that era, it needed a stout handguard to plunge deep - which it didn't have until the advent of the humble drop tank.

Hi Jon.
I assume you're getting at the lack of LR escort fighters.
If so you're quite right.
In 39/40 the RAF found to its cost that unescorted bombers engaged over enemy held territory were very vulnerable and changed their strategy to night bombing.
Apart from the A6M Zero there were no effective long range fighters in existence anywhere at that time and what's more there was absolutely no anticipation of future demands for one.
Remember Douhets theory; The bomber will always get through.

[BELGRAVE]

Originally Posted by flash

Hi Jon.
I assume you're getting at the lack of LR escort fighters.
If so you're quite right.
In 39/40 the RAF found to its cost that unescorted bombers engaged over enemy held territory were very vulnerable and changed their strategy to night bombing.
Apart from the A6M Zero there were no effective long range fighters in existence anywhere at that time and what's more there was absolutely no anticipation of future demands for one.
Remember Douhets theory; The bomber will always get through.

I think that it was Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who said that, although he seemed to do little about it.

BTW I have always thought that the RAF missed a trick in not adapting the naval Blackburn SKUA as an answer to the Ju-87B STUKA, but probably the tactical doctrine was lacking.

[flash]

Originally Posted by BELGRAVE

I think that it was Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who said that, although he seemed to do little about it.

BTW I have always thought that the RAF missed a trick in not adapting the naval Blackburn SKUA as an answer to the Ju-87B STUKA, but probably the tactical doctrine was lacking.

Hi Belgrave.
Stanley Baldwin was just one amongst many leaders in the 20s and 30s who echoed Giulio Douhets revolutionary views on the future of aerial warfare.
In both volumes of his treatise on "The Command of the Air" he advocates bombing an enemies civilian centres into submission using explosives to open up buidings to incendiaries which will then destroy them due to the emergency services being denied access due to the use of poison gas bombs. this would inevitably lead to mass hysteria ,revolution and surrender.
In the first volume he insists (probably correctly at that time) that the bomber would always get through.
In the second,he allows for a long range fighter escort.
His first volume created an almost messianic following amongst all air force top brass.
The theories of the bomber always getting through was probably correct up until the mid 30s when the advent of fast ,well armed single engined monoplane fighters finally closed the speed gap between bombers and fighters. By this time however many of his followers had risen to influential heights (Pun unintended) in their respective air forces and went on to attempt to prove his theories correct.
The Germans even going so far as to produce a long range fighter (Bf 110).
Of course,both of his theories were proven untrue.
The bomber would most definitely not always get through and far from producing mass hysteria and revolution followed by surrender ,bombing actually seemed to bolster civilian morale and a countries will to resist.

[BELGRAVE]

Originally Posted by flash

Hi Belgrave.
Stanley Baldwin was just one amongst many leaders in the 20s and 30s who echoed Giulio Douhets revolutionary views on the future of aerial warfare.
In both volumes of his treatise on "The Command of the Air" he advocates bombing an enemies civilian centres into submission using explosives to open up buidings to incendiaries which will then destroy them due to the emergency services being denied access due to the use of poison gas bombs. this would inevitably lead to mass hysteria ,revolution and surrender.
In the first volume he insists (probably correctly at that time) that the bomber would always get through.
In the second,he allows for a long range fighter escort.
His first volume created an almost messianic following amongst all air force top brass.
The theories of the bomber always getting through was probably correct up until the mid 30s when the advent of fast ,well armed single engined monoplane fighters finally closed the speed gap between bombers and fighters. By this time however many of his followers had risen to influential heights (Pun unintended) in their respective air forces and went on to attempt to prove his theories correct.
The Germans even going so far as to produce a long range fighter (Bf 110).
Of course,both of his theories were proven untrue.
The bomber would most definitely not always get through and far from producing mass hysteria and revolution followed by surrender ,bombing actually seemed to bolster civilian morale and a countries will to resist.

Hi Flash,

Indeed, although to read some of the dire predictions around in the late 1930's the overall impression seems to have been that strategic bombing would have an immediately devastating effect of almost nuclear proportions: ,- London raised to the ground in a fortnight, civilian morale shattered etc.

In the event, as you say, it had the opposite effect occurred.

[flash]

Originally Posted by BELGRAVE

Hi Flash,

Indeed, although to read some of the dire predictions around in the late 1930's the overall impression seems to have been that strategic bombing would have an immediately devastating effect of almost nuclear proportions: ,- London raised to the ground in a fortnight, civilian morale shattered etc.

In the event, as you say, it had the opposite effect occurred.

Yes, it was proven to be a fallacy during WW2, yet the Yanks must have dusted off Douhets tome for between 65 and 68 they bombed North Vietnam , incredibly, with the exception of Hanoi and the Haiphong area.
They must have been the only two targets that theoretically could have fulfilled Douhets prophecy.
They later included these targets during Rolling Thunder 2 and it still didn't have the desired effect.

[Pruitt]

Actually mining Haiphong and a couple of smaller ports did help a great deal. The NVA were in danger of running out of SAM's after a while. They should have carpet bombed the rail line coming in from China, but that could be repaired quickly.

Pruitt

[flash]

Mining is a very effective way to break down an enemies supply system.
It's not strategic bombing though.
I think the USA almost defeated itself through self imposed limitations on bombing,but there were no limitations in Rolling Thunder 2 and that didn't work either. Douhets theory can be considered a busted flush.

[Pruitt]

Actually Rolling Thunder 2 did get them to the peace table.

Pruitt

[MikeMeech]

Hi All

Don't forget prior to WW2 it was thought that any bombing attack would be using HE and Gas bombs. That's why, in Britain for instance, all civilians, including children and babies were issued with gas masks. There was also the arguments over surface and deep air raid shelters, deep shelters may have filled up with the heavier than air gas (as would the London Underground system, hence the initial reluctance to use it as air raid shelters), although they would offer better protection from HE. That is why there was great fear of air attack in the 1930s, hence various books and films of the period.

Also in the 1930s any long-range escort fighter would have to be twin-engined using the technology of the period, therefore would be out classed by any single seat, single engined interceptor fighter. The ME 110 was a 'failure' in the escort role during the Battle of Britain because of this fact. The P-51 was much later technology, the USAAF also falling for the self-defending bomber formation when it arrived in Europe, although its early short range missions were escorted by RAF fighters.

The Stuka also failed during the Battle of Britain, again shot to pieces by fighters when they operated without air-superiority.

Mike

[flash]

Originally Posted by Pruitt

Actually Rolling Thunder 2 did get them to the peace table.

Pruitt

Hmm,was it only RT2 that got them to the peace table?
USA had been trying to get NV there for a while. Seems to me that they thought "Well we've won here,why have our cities destroyed?"
I think that if the ground war had've been in any doubt they would have kept fighting regardless of the bombing campaign. As it was it suited them to end it there.

[redcoat]

Originally Posted by Jon Jordan

Does anyone know if the Bomber Harris & Co. "warmed up" to the Fortress in late 1941? (I'm aware of the pros and cons of the Lanc/Mosquito versus US medium and heavy bombers - just looking for what the British command thought of them and if that changed over time.).

I'm not sure Bomber Command ever did change their mind,
The early B-17's in British service were viewed a failure, and relegated to Coastal Command where their long range was put to good use. The only B-17's after that to serve in Bomber Command were those operated by 100 Group in the electronic warfare role, where their high altitude performance and spacious fuselage (for storing the extra equipment and crew) came in useful

[Toomtabard]

Even the B-24 Liberator was preferred by R.A.F. Coastal Command to the B-17 because the Liberator's long range helped to close the mid-Atlantic gap against the U-Boats.
It is interesting to note that just before the U.S. 8th Air Force mounted the Sotteville raid in 1942 whwn 12 B-17's kicked off the real daylight bombing campaign in a very modest way that the British ''Sunday Times'' newspaper's aviation correrspodent , one Peter Masefield wrote the following in an article
''American heavy bombers -the latest Fortresses and Liberators ae fine flying machines but not suited for bombing in Europe...''
In the same article Masefield opined that the best use of B-17's and Liberators was in anti submarine pattrolling wok -not strategic bombing.
This provoked American air commander Hap Arnold to contact General arl Spaatz in England and ask how best to respond to this .
Cuirchill agreed about the alleged unsuitability of B-17's in a daylight bombing role and tried to convince Roosevelt to adopt the British night bombing strategy.
Ithink this explains why the B-17 never played a key role in the R.A.F'S bombing campaign. Arnold claimed that after he advanced the argument that daylight bombing by B-17 and 24's would mean bombing the Reich around the clock Churchill relented and agrred that Arnold should be allowed to prove his daylight precision bombing theories in practice.
But the main reason-apart from the early B-17's used in 1941 not proving terribly succesful -was -inter alia -that one Lancaster could carry and deliver three times the bomb load of a single B-17.
Nor later in the war could any American heavy bomber have toted the ''Grand Slam'' and 'Tallboy'' bombs used by Lancasters to take out the Beliefield Viaduct or the battle ship ''Tirpitz''.