Worst British Mistake of the American Revolution

[Massena]

Who would control them? Was there a cavalry commander among the senior British generals who could command such a force?

Again, with two cavalry regiments available (the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons) nothing noteworthy was done with them during the campaign. And since the Americans at that point had no cavalry, they would have been unopposed.

Sincerely,
M

[johnbryan]

A good article on 18th century cavalry operations during the Revolutionary War:

http://www.revolutionarywararchives.org/cavalry.html

[Joefoo45]

Without a doubt the worst decision was Howe moving towards philly and not moving north to help Burgoyne. Howe's move toward philielaphia didn't accomplish anything besides the capture of the city. Had he moved north he would've been able to pin Gates army between himself and Burgoyne. And if he acted aggressively he may been able to defeat Gates and, united with Burgoyne, turn on Washington. To keep Washington occupied while headed north he could keep Clinton with the small force that he actually did keep in New York. Doing this would have divided the American colonies and probably keep France out of the war.

[Zhang Xun]

At saratoga

[Twitter3]

Originally Posted by Joefoo45

Without a doubt the worst decision was Howe moving towards philly and not moving north to help Burgoyne. Howe's move toward philielaphia didn't accomplish anything besides the capture of the city. Had he moved north he would've been able to pin Gates army between himself and Burgoyne. And if he acted aggressively he may been able to defeat Gates and, united with Burgoyne, turn on Washington. To keep Washington occupied while headed north he could keep Clinton with the small force that he actually did keep in New York. Doing this would have divided the American colonies and probably keep France out of the war.

While what you are saying are good points, don't forget that Burgoyne was burning through supplies rather quickly and was bogged down. At the potential link up, Burgoyne might not have been much of a help - he would have used up more supplies and slowed down the movement of the 'larger/united' force.

[Duke Maynard]

Originally Posted by Joefoo45

Without a doubt the worst decision was Howe moving towards philly and not moving north to help Burgoyne. Howe's move toward philielaphia didn't accomplish anything besides the capture of the city.

Taking a enemy's heart is not so terrible a military strategy- but the foes Howe faced had more than one! The Germans forwent Paris in 1914 to attempt to roll up the french armies from the flank, and in doing so the gave the Frenchman the miracle of the Marne. When the lines were drawn and trenches dug, the Germans were faced with victorious french armies and no Paris in their hands, which certainly would have been a draining factor on the french that perhaps would have led to a German victory even if stalemate still came.

Hindsight is 20/20.

[slick_miester]

I've said it before and I'll say it again: Britain lost that war the moment Howe decided not to assault Fort Greene. Were his troops tired from the night's march and the day's fight? Yes. Was the Fort Greene position fairly well-prepared? Yes. Would the British have suffered significant casualties, in excess of 10% of the assault force? Probably.

All that being said, however, two salient facts should be recognized:

1) in the late summer of 1776 American public support of the Revolution was rather soft, perhaps no more than a third of Americans supported the Revolution at that time, with another third being Loyalists and the last third awaiting . . . . the wind to declare its direction. Had Washington's command been decisively reduced at Fort Greene, there would have been no more Revolution to support;

2) Great Britain, as a "democracy" waging a war an ocean away, had an enemy far more dangerous that George Washington, or even the French -- and that was time. Whether they knew it or not, British commanders in the Colonies had but a finite amount of time in which to roll up the Revolution before public opinion in Britain would turn against the effort. Once that happened, parliament could, conceivably at least, have reduced funding for the expedition, thus condemning it to ultimate defeat.

Brooklyn was the key. Howe had the Rebels' main force cornered, at a time when their political support was still rather thin, but let them escape. Never would such an opportunity present itself to British forces again.

[Cyan67]

Originally Posted by Joefoo45

Without a doubt the worst decision was Howe moving towards philly and not moving north to help Burgoyne. Had he moved north he would've been able to pin Gates army between himself and Burgoyne. And if he acted aggressively he may been able to defeat Gates and, united with Burgoyne, turn on Washington. To keep Washington occupied while headed north he could keep Clinton with the small force that he actually did keep in New York. Doing this would have divided the American colonies and probably keep France out of the war.

1. Why would any good strategy have an army slaving its movements and objectives for an army half its size? What would that have accomplished?

2. Clinton had a maneuver force of 3,000 men (the other 5,000 were on static defense). How was he going to keep Washington's 11,000 Continentals and thousands of more militia "occupied?"

3. Long before Howe could "pin Gates" (and for the June/July/early August period it would would have been Schuyler) against Burgoyne, he would have had to deal with Putnam in the Highlands. Unlike in October, Putnam had more than 5,000 men at his disposal to man the Highland fortifications (Forts Clinton, Montgomery, and Independence, and opposite West Point, Fort Constitution). Your presumption is that Washington would have just stood still in New Jersey. That was not the case. After Howe withdrew his forces from Brunswick and Amboy New Jersey, Washington marched north to New York. By the time Howe decided to get underway, two of Washington's five divisions (Stirling's and Sullivan's) had crossed the Hudson and were east of the river. Thus, Washington was between Howe and Schuyler with 16 to 17,000 men (many in well fortified positions), and this does not include large numbers of militia that would swarm from everywhere. Howe could have only managed 17,000 at most, but if he could take the Highlands, there was nothing to stop Washington from maneuvering on his flanks and cutting his lines of communications, or even threatening NYC while still maintaining large forces between the two British armies. Even if Howe could have somehow linked up with Burgoyne, he would not have been able to control the river, and would have had to withdraw the forces all the way to New York City. What would that have accomplished?

Howe's move toward Philadelphia didn't accomplish anything besides the capture of the city.

I do believe there was this man named George who with the assistance of a few thousand of his friends who may have had some say in the matter. The expedition to Philadelphia was a failure of execution, not one of strategy. Howe's objective was Washington's Army, the only actual strategy that made any sense given the conditions British Arms were operating under in 1777. Much grandiose but misleading verbiage has been written ever since on Burgoyne's mission, but in the end his orders literally boiled down to "go to Albany and place your self under General Howe's command." No other direction was given to either Burgoyne nor Howe. It was merely seen as a more expedient way of transferring Burgoyne from Carleton's command to Howe's, and it was just plain dumb.

Regards,

Michael