And away we go again...spinning off on a tangent about weapons systems and such.
The "problems" with "German forces" (i.e. the composition of the Wehrmacht's actual force structure) are very much as I described in my first post to this thread.
ADHD much, people?
Anyone care to actually carry on a coherent discussion about this topic?
No...it's much more "fun" to talk about the Me 262's and the Tiger tanks...
The problems were inherent in the path taken during the early period of German rearmament from 1932-1939. Once Hitler gained power, the existing army plans were expanded upon by a significant degree but the focus remained as per the initial objectives: create a "conventional army" of sufficient strength so as to be able to hold the borders in the event that France wanted to get hostile about that whole "Versailles thing" and coerced the Poles into joining in. This mandate was the initial plan followed during the early years of the Third Reich and it was the ARMY'S plan, NOT Hitler's.
As I already said (upthread), this put Germany into a position of considerable strength (continentally) but one of significant weakness when we blow it up to the global level.
Hitler was truly "gobsmacked" when the "English

" declared war on him in September 1939. This wasn't in the plan at all and hence the shift of Naval focus (production wise) to assets suitable for "blockade" warfare against the British Isles...i.e.: "Blue water "U-boats" and commerce raiders. The KM would have to get by with what it had in service/working up/fitting out vis-a-vis surface combat with the RN.
This was a huge "problem with German Forces".
Then there's the Luftwaffe.
This element was the one that was the "outlier" in the traditional military sense. Yes, air combat had been explored during the "Great War" and theorists had been busy throughout the intervening years predicting all sorts of nihilistic outcomes with respect to the role of airpower in any subsequent conflict. The "lessons" learned in Spain seemed to support these theories (if the sensationalism surrounding Guernica is to be accorded any credence) and at the onset of war, the Germans were in possession of the best trained/equipped airforce that had
ever existed...to this point.
Evolution is a total b*tch though; things don't happen in a vacuum.
The "problem" with Germany's airforce only manifested itself during the Campaign in the West during the Spring/Summer of 1940.
Replacement levels were inadequate to deal with the attrition brought about during a campaign of such scale. This hit hard on the extant system of aircraft production and even harder on the pipeline feeding trained crewmen into the frontline units...and this is BEFORE the "Kanalkampf/Angriff auf England" period of ops.
So with perfect hindsight, what do you do?
I would support for more induction/training units and an earlier investment in the DB plant at Genshagen, which would provide the manpower and the aeroengines required to overcome this "problem".
The "problem" is? Things don't happen in a vacuum...take from one, give to another. 5000 machinists don't grow on trees. Neither do the Corps Staff/instructors/airframes/infrastructure for the additional pilot schools.
This is what I'd like to discuss in such a topic.
The Army? They were fine. The historical record kind of points in that direction...Right?
All for now, Ron