French tactical & operational doctrine

[The Purist]

Originally Posted by Nickuru

The key was that the Germans had learned from the Spanish Civil War that armoured columns should be used as such while infantry columns should back them up....

Actually, Spain gave instruction to the Germans on what not to do. German and Italian kit generally failed in actual combat during the Spanish civil war because they could not stand up to even the smallest of AT weapons and were armed only with machine guns. They were not used in larger than battalion sized formations and in support of infantry assaults requiring artillery to silence the AT weapons of the opposition. The results of the war tended to confirm French doctrine, not German. This was because the numbers and organisation was not there in Franco's army.

Originally Posted by Nickuru

...The French error was to distribute their armour piecemeal. By this I do not mean a few tanks in every infantry division. But using armoured groups dispersed, compared to the concentration of armour into entire armies.

Nope. Sorry,... bit of old wive's tale there.

The majority of the independent tank brigades were used to support the 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies defending the Maginot Line (reserves). There were comparitively few assigned to the manoeuvre forces and they too were in reserve. This allowed the French to concentrate all 19 motor/mech divisions in support of the manoeuvre armies that were to fight in Belgium. These were either the cavalry forces (3 DLM and 5 DLC) assigned the role of reconnaissance and screening ahead of the army, the 4 DCR (R standing for Reserve) held in army and army group reserve (1st DCR with 1st Army, 2nd, 3rd and the new 4th with GHQ Reserves), or the 7 motorised divisions that were assigned to either enhance the the field armies mobility of the infantry or retained as part of the GHQ Reserve.

[T. A. Gardner]

Originally Posted by The Purist

Nope. Sorry,... bit of old wive's tale there.

The majority of the independent tank brigades were used to support the 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies defending the Maginot Line (reserves). There were comparitively few assigned to the manoeuvre forces and they too were in reserve. This allowed the French to concentrate all 19 motor/mech divisions in support of the manoeuvre armies that were to fight in Belgium. These were either the cavalry forces (3 DLM and 5 DLC) assigned the role of reconnaissance and screening ahead of the army, the 4 DCR (R standing for Reserve) held in army and army group reserve (1st DCR with 1st Army, 2nd, 3rd and the new 4th with GHQ Reserves), or the 7 motorised divisions that were assigned to either enhance the the field armies mobility of the infantry or retained as part of the GHQ Reserve.

I tend to agree. The French problem was more one of lack of combined arms than lack of mass in armor. Their armored units had very small infantry components and while the artillery was adequite there was a lack of means to really bring it down on targets in any sort of real time.

So, while the DLM's gave the Germans a bloody nose in Belgium they couldn't hold the ground and ended up losing as a result. The DCR is the same way. Tank on tank it was vicious. Against antitank guns, infantry, artillery, and coordinated defenses it got stomped on.

I'll add, somewhat gratitutiously, that the British took some time to lean that lesson too.

[Destroyer25]

Originally Posted by The Purist

Nope. Sorry,... bit of old wive's tale there.

The majority of the independent tank brigades were used to support the 3rd, 4th and 5th Armies defending the Maginot Line (reserves). There were comparitively few assigned to the manoeuvre forces and they too were in reserve. This allowed the French to concentrate all 19 motor/mech divisions in support of the manoeuvre armies that were to fight in Belgium. These were either the cavalry forces (3 DLM and 5 DLC) assigned the role of reconnaissance and screening ahead of the army, the 4 DCR (R standing for Reserve) held in army and army group reserve (1st DCR with 1st Army, 2nd, 3rd and the new 4th with GHQ Reserves), or the 7 motorised divisions that were assigned to either enhance the the field armies mobility of the infantry or retained as part of the GHQ Reserve.

How did most of France's armored, mechanized and motorized units end up being employed? IIRC they were never massed for a serious counterattack, which was one of the German's biggest fears.

[Admiral]

Knock off the insults, trolling, whinging & other general off topic BS!

If one does it, report it.

If two start flingin poo, both will suffer the same fate.

If 3 do it, then all 3 will.

Quoting such crap & continuing it will only see you sent along your way with em!

Stick To The Topic!

ACG Staff

[The Purist]

Originally Posted by Destroyer25

How did most of France's armored, mechanized and motorized units end up being employed? IIRC they were never massed for a serious counterattack, which was one of the German's biggest fears.

Well, they did counterattack just not in the manner French doctrine intended. The problem came from not being able to handle the tempo of operations. The Germans reacted faster to the changing tactical situations and the French suffered from their top down system, which often meant orders were out of date when they arrived.

Counterattacks by 1ere and 2e DCR were solo affairs that did not go well for the French and these two divisions were battered to extinction within a day or two of going into action. 3e DCR and 3e DIM were the divisions that gave the Germans fits at Stonne for three days running. 4e DCR did little more than harrass the corridor for the first few days but once it was linked to an infantry division it almost panicked a German infantry division holding a Somme bridgehead (tank fright was not an allied affliction alone). Only artillery and AA guns in the AT role saved the Germans from an embarrassment.

The 2e and 3e DLM fought as a corps in the meeting engagement at Hannut for almost four days and took on the 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions. They were recalled after their mission of screening the deployment of 1st Army was complete. Unfortunately these two divisions were not able to effect the course of events much afterwards and were lost in the retreat to Lille and Dunkirk. 1ere DLM was with 7th Army in the Breda advance and was lost in the retreat and defence of Dunkirk.

I disagree with TAG on the DLM's infantry complement. There is a difference between the motorised RDP of the DLM and motorised BDP of the DLC. The RDP (motor dragoon regiment) had 3 battalions, each of:

1 reconnaissance squadron (light tank coy)
1 motorcycle squadron (typical light inf coy)
2 fusilier squadrons (rifle coy)
1 hvy weapons squadron (weapons coy)

The BDP (Dragoon battalion) of the DLC had (iirc):

1 light tank sqdn
1 fusilier sqdn
1 hvy weapons squadron

The DLCs used mounted dragoons for their main infantry components in the RDP (dragoon regiment).

As for the the 5 DLC they were deployed into the Ardennes to screen and scout the 9th Army (two DLC), 2nd Army (2 DLC) and 3rd Army (1 DLC). All five divisions fought delaying actions against the panzers and all five were withdrawn behind the front after taking losses and fought in the second phase of the campaign. The 1ere DLC became part of 4e DLM, 4e DLC was used to form the core of 7e DLM, neither new DLM reached full strength and both were expended in the Jun battles.

Finally, the seven motorised infantry divisions. These were not assigned roles to cooperate with tank formations but were simply truck mounted infantry. The French did use the 3e DIM in concert with 3e DCR at Stonne but these troops could have easily been from a leg division. Tactically it would make no difference.

The French were not going to "mass" armour for a German style counterattack. It simply was not part of their doctrine. The French were planning on dealing with any penetration by first masking it with fire (artillery, AT, machine gun), then sealing it with infantry supported by the light tanks battalions attached to the armies. Then the reserve infantry and armoured formations would be brought up and a full scale attack prepared. This all took time and the Germans had other ideas. At Sedan, for example, the French began their masking operation immediately the morning of the 14th by committing two reserve infantry regiments and their supporting tank battalions, all supported by artillery. The Germans responded with the first of their own tanks and quickly outmanoeuvering the French attacks, widening the breach and the bridghead to the west. To the south the heavier French reserves first sealed the breach and then counterattacked (Stonne) badly damaging the Gr D Regiment and parts of 10th Panzer.

Both were examples of French doctrine, one more successful than the other.

Ideally the DCR would have been grafted onto an infantry division with each demi-brigade of armour (2 per division) possessing a battalion of Char B1 bis and another of H-35. An attack would have two infantry regiments up supported by the tanks and the artillery of both divisions as well as corps and army assets. The third regiment of the infantry division was the reserve and the DCR infantry battalion (well provided with AT guns) would move forward to the objective and dig in to deal with counterattacks.

This worked, at least to some extent with 3e and 4e DCR as noted above 1ere and 2e had to fight meeting engagement style battles in isolation, something they were never intended to do.

That's French "doctrine" in nutshell.

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by Admiral

Knock off the insults, trolling, whinging & other general off topic BS!

If one does it, report it.

If two start flingin poo, both will suffer the same fate.

If 3 do it, then all 3 will.

Quoting such crap & continuing it will only see you sent along your way with em!

Stick To The Topic!

ACG Staff

Thanks Wes.

Hopefully, the thread can now be used for intelligent, informative and worthwhile discussion of the topic; rather than being a platform for disruption by mischief makers.

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by The Purist

Well, they did counterattack just not in the manner French doctrine intended. The problem came from not being able to handle the tempo of operations. The Germans reacted faster to the changing tactical situations and the French suffered from their top down system, which often meant orders were out of date when they arrived.

Counterattacks by 1ere and 2e DCR were solo affairs that did not go well for the French and these two divisions were battered to extinction within a day or two of going into action. 3e DCR and 3e DIM were the divisions that gave the Germans fits at Stonne for three days running. 4e DCR did little more than harrass the corridor for the first few days but once it was linked to an infantry division it almost panicked a German infantry division holding a Somme bridgehead (tank fright was not an allied affliction alone). Only artillery and AA guns in the AT role saved the Germans from an embarrassment.

The 2e and 3e DLM fought as a corps in the meeting engagement at Hannut for almost four days and took on the 3rd and 4th Panzer divisions. They were recalled after their mission of screening the deployment of 1st Army was complete. Unfortunately these two divisions were not able to effect the course of events much afterwards and were lost in the retreat to Lille and Dunkirk. 1ere DLM was with 7th Army in the Breda advance and was lost in the retreat and defence of Dunkirk.

I disagree with TAG on the DLM's infantry complement. There is a difference between the motorised RDP of the DLM and motorised BDP of the DLC. The RDP (motor dragoon regiment) had 3 battalions, each of:

1 reconnaissance squadron (light tank coy)
1 motorcycle squadron (typical light inf coy)
2 fusilier squadrons (rifle coy)
1 hvy weapons squadron (weapons coy)

The BDP (Dragoon battalion) of the DLC had (iirc):

1 light tank sqdn
1 fusilier sqdn
1 hvy weapons squadron

The DLCs used mounted dragoons for their main infantry components in the RDP (dragoon regiment).

As for the the 5 DLC they were deployed into the Ardennes to screen and scout the 9th Army (two DLC), 2nd Army (2 DLC) and 3rd Army (1 DLC). All five divisions fought delaying actions against the panzers and all five were withdrawn behind the front after taking losses and fought in the second phase of the campaign. The 1ere DLC became part of 4e DLM, 4e DLC was used to form the core of 7e DLM, neither new DLM reached full strength and both were expended in the Jun battles.

Finally, the seven motorised infantry divisions. These were not assigned roles to cooperate with tank formations but were simply truck mounted infantry. The French did use the 3e DIM in concert with 3e DCR at Stonne but these troops could have easily been from a leg division. Tactically it would make no difference.

The French were not going to "mass" armour for a German style counterattack. It simply was not part of their doctrine. The French were planning on dealing with any penetration by first masking it with fire (artillery, AT, machine gun), then sealing it with infantry supported by the light tanks battalions attached to the armies. Then the reserve infantry and armoured formations would be brought up and a full scale attack prepared. This all took time and the Germans had other ideas. At Sedan, for example, the French began their masking operation immediately the morning of the 14th by committing two reserve infantry regiments and their supporting tank battalions, all supported by artillery. The Germans responded with the first of their own tanks and quickly outmanoeuvering the French attacks, widening the breach and the bridghead to the west. To the south the heavier French reserves first sealed the breach and then counterattacked (Stonne) badly damaging the Gr D Regiment and parts of 10th Panzer.

Both were examples of French doctrine, one more successful than the other.

Ideally the DCR would have been grafted onto an infantry division with each demi-brigade of armour (2 per division) possessing a battalion of Char B1 bis and another of H-35. An attack would have two infantry regiments up supported by the tanks and the artillery of both divisions as well as corps and army assets. The third regiment of the infantry division was the reserve and the DCR infantry battalion (well provided with AT guns) would move forward to the objective and dig in to deal with counterattacks.

This worked, at least to some extent with 3e and 4e DCR as noted above 1ere and 2e had to fight meeting engagement style battles in isolation, something they were never intended to do.

That's French "doctrine" in nutshell.

Excellent and informative post, Gerry.

+1

[lodestar]

Originally Posted by lodestar

Post deleted, as it served only to embellish the trolling and contributed near zip to the discussion. (You were not the primary instigator, lodestar, but your additions - meant in good humour I know -were unfortunately only adding fuel to the trolling)

Thread now under very close scrutiny.

TO VR primarily, but also to anyone who follows him; let this be a warning:
Trolling will cease forthwith and totally.

Thank you for your co-operation.

ACG Staff

Apologies for my outburst.
I have very close family/emotional connections to the Dunkirk 1940 Campaign and was too easily goaded into an inflammatory response.

Regards lodestar

[Von Richter]

Sorry Lodestar, didn't mean to upset you mate...
I've deepest respect for your good self and for what your Mom and Dad endured during the war years.

[lodestar]

Originally Posted by Von Richter

Sorry Lodestar, didn't mean to upset you mate...
I've deepest respect for your good self and for what your Mom and Dad endured during the war years.

Thanks VR. Much appreciated.

Regards lodestar