Peninsular Campaign?

[allsirgarnet]

A thread with two purposes you might say. It deals with the campaign in three ways.

Grand Strategy...

In terms of the Napoleonic wars as a whole (1805-1815), how crucial to the outcome was the French campaign in the Peninsular. Was it just a sideshow or was it crucial to the ultimate defeat of France?.

Strategy...

How would members have changed (if at all) overall French, British or Spanish strategy during the Campaign, from its inception and right through the subsequent individual campaigns that followed?.

In to battle...

Dealing with specific actions themselves, members thoughts on any and all actions during the campaign as a whole?.


In general, any comments that members feel relative or crucial to the above are most welcome, be they political or military or social in nature. From the mistresses of French Marshals to Cuesta's siesta's to the lowliest Guerillo's cigarillo will do.

Any and all comments on the Peninsular most welcome.

ASG (Gaz)

[Cap. Teancum]

Next year, Maia (a portuguese city, close to Oporto) will have comemorations about the 200 years of the french 2nd invasion in Portugal.
So I'm loocking forward to see if there's any new studies and articles about this subject coming out in other places of the world.

[wwagstyl]

Living in the UK, the peninsular campaign is the part of the Napoleonic wars receiving the most attention. Strategy-wise I would say that though it must have been thoroughly frustrating, Wellington chose the best strategy for his army. Spending the summers in Spain campaigning, but then retreating to Portugal each winter was the best possible way forward. Wellington knew that the army he fielded was the only real field army that possessed, so firstly he needed to preserve it. The retreats to Portugal, even after victories on the battlefield, allowed his army to rest and recuperate in relative safety, with the shortest possible supply lines. On the other hand it forced the French to sit on extended supply lines, with an entire nation of hostile Spaniards in between them and France. Then in Summer, the "central position" of Portugal allowed Wellington to move out in any direction he wanted to take on the next of the marshals.

With regards to how much of an impact the peninsular campaigns had, that it was called the "Spanish ulcer" should give some idea of the effect. The French, iirc, had over a quarter of a million troops in the country to try and control it. Yet this was not the way it had to be, when the French first moved into Spain, there was no real uprising against the French. But the French acted in too heavy a manner, eg the massacres at Madrid in 1808 or the abolishing of the Spanish Inquisition, and so encouraged the Spanish into the guerilla war which tied down so many troops. I think that though the campaigns fought in the Iberian peninsula were of importance, the biggest contribution to the downfall of Napoleon came further East. But the fact that the British funded so much of the action by the other nations and showed in the peninsula that french troops could be beaten, meant that the other powers were willing to try so many times to act against Napoleon, even though they lost fairly consistently for over a decade.

[Swampwolf]

I've been interested in the defenses built by Wellington's army in Portugal, and how it confounded the French. I wonder if such a thing could have been repeated.

[thejester]

Originally Posted by allsirgarnet

Grand Strategy...

In terms of the Napoleonic wars as a whole (1805-1815), how crucial to the outcome was the French campaign in the Peninsular. Was it just a sideshow or was it crucial to the ultimate defeat of France?.

Fairly crucial. It siphoned off a large amount of French men and money; perhaps more importantly, it thwarted Napoleon's campaign to outnumber the RN through acquiring European fleets and provided an example to other European nations that the French could be beaten.

Strategy...

How would members have changed (if at all) overall French, British or Spanish strategy during the Campaign, from its inception and right through the subsequent individual campaigns that followed?.

For the French, the obvious answer (like the Axis in WW2 ) is not to start it. It's hard to see how the French could have won in a country that so thoroughly rejected the ideals of the Revolution/Napoleon and simply couldn't support a military force of any size, either because of a lack of agricultural surpluses or because the nature of the country made logistical supply by land extremely difficult.

[wwagstyl]

Originally Posted by Swampwolf

I've been interested in the defenses built by Wellington's army in Portugal, and how it confounded the French. I wonder if such a thing could have been repeated.

Do you mean the Torres Vedras lines? Though they were a strong position (3 lines were built, i think) I personally think that keeping them secret was in many ways a major contributor to their success too. That the French army of Massena came across them so suddenly, it was then unprepared to have to sit it out in front of them, especially as Wellington had employed a scorched earth policy in the regions in front of the lines. It was this lack of supply, at the end of extended supply lines that meant the failure of the lines IMO. Btw, the Russians got the idea for their own scorched earth policy from Wellington. One of the Russians attached to Wellington sent a message to his commanders suggesting that this policy of trading scorched ground for time was a suitable tactic for Russia too, leading to it's usage in the Russian campaign a few years later.

If by repeated do you mean during that campaign, then the answer would have to be no. The amount of capital and labour that went into creating those relatively short lines shows that even Britain's pockets would not have enough to cover building something similar, say on the Portugal-Spain border. Hence why the fortified towns of Badajoz, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida were so important. Also, Wellington did not have anywhere near enough troops for a longer line. A reason as to why the lines succeeded was due to the fact that they only had to cover a short distance. This meant that Wellington could concentrate his resources, and was close to port for constant support from the Royal Navy.

[Cap. Teancum]

There's a decent small article on Wikipedia about the Lines of Torres Vedras, it even has a map to help picture it.

[Boaty]

It was Wellington at his best, and no doubt an ulcer for the French, but little more. I'm guessing that history would have played out as it did with or without this side show.

[wwagstyl]

Originally Posted by Boaty

It was Wellington at his best, and no doubt an ulcer for the French, but little more. I'm guessing that history would have played out as it did with or without this side show.

Though I think I know where you're coming from on this one (the campaign was not the deciding factor in the downfall of the Napoleonic empire) I think you underestimate the effect it had on Britain.
The key thought of mine here is that it was basically the British government who kept putting coalitions back together and funding them. I wonder how much heart the British would have had if they lost their one and only field army. If Wellington had been heavily defeated, killing a large number of his troops or if he had been ousted from Portugal, forcing the army back to England, I wonder as to the effect that it would have had on the feelings of Brits... and others. Under Wellington for the first time an army was to prove the French were not invincible, and could be consistently beaten. The fact that the British army was achieving this helped a long way towards the British government's efforts to continually raise the larger numbers of Prussians/Russians/Austrians against French forces.
Also, the Russian very successful scorched earth policy has been attributed to Wellington's own actions in front of the lines of Torres Vedras.
I also think the morale effect on Britain could have been great if the British army in Portugal got thrown out, just like every other army the Brits tried to land on the continent to face the French, and if it continued to be beaten.
Finally the effect on France. The drain in terms of numbers was not small, over a quarter of a million troops I believe would be employed at any one time to face off against the Brits, Portuguese and Spaniards. Also the morale effect of the little war on French troops must have been pretty depressing.

Sorry to have rambled on a bit, I seem to have just put down thoughts as they came to me. Hope some of the above makes sense.

[Boaty]

Yeah, it does. The morale worth was far more than that of the combat effect, which itself was not tiny. And it was important for the allied effort to see Britain still in the field and not just her treasury in the fight. They were kind of like token or symbolic defiance, which is why Moore took his time heading for Corunna; for appearances sake on the world stage.
But none of this was anywhere near decisive and its weight towards victory is hard to gauge. Kind of like WW2 resistance movements; yes, they certainly helped, but by how much? Its hard to say.

[wwagstyl]

Yes it's weight is hard to gauge, but I believe that if you are trying to compare the effects to that of ww2 resistance movements then you seriously underestimate that weighting. Personally, I would say that it's weight was decisive, not in the same way that the fall of Paris in 1814 was decisive, but in the same way that the failure of the German's to defeat Britain in 1940 could be said to be decisive. I mean that though it was not the event which lead directly to the outcome, it was an almost necessary prerequisite.

[Boaty]

That's an interesting thought. No doubt that its apples to oranges compared to resistance fighting, but it was the best analogy I could think of. I'm guessing that had it never happened, or ended in disaster, Boney's empire still would have crumbled after the Russian mistake. Assuming that the capture of the British army didn't cause a change of heart as to sponsoring the war effort. Which might have prevented Russia from defying the continental system in the first place, etc. Playing 'what if' can get complicated in a hurry.