Rommel - the most overrated general since Alexander the Great

[Full Monty]

PD, I'm not sure that Rommel is correct in his assumptions.

"With six German divisions, we could have smashed the British so thoroughly in the summer of 1942 that the threat from the south could have beeen eliminated for a long time to come. Sufficient supplies could have been organised to support these formations if the will had been there.

Van Creveld and John Ellis reject this out of hand. The motor transport Rommel had at his disposal in terms of vehicles per head was far greater than the forces deployed in the USSR. Even then they struggled to keep him supplied when he was close to his main supply ports. The only way that Rommel *might* have been kept going would have been to suspend all offensive operations in the USSR and this was not going to happen. Even then it's debatable whether extra divisions could have been sustained in a hypothetical advance into Egypt.

Above all, however, the British had on their side people with greater influence and considerable insight, who did all they could to organise the efficient provision of supplies. My enemies benefited from this:
a) The British considereed the North African theatre to be decisive in the war.
b) North Africa was the key theatre of war for the British Empire.
c) The British had in the Mediterranean a powerful and excellent navy and air forces, while we had to contend with the unreliable Italian naval staffs.
d) The whole British 8th Army was motorised down to the last unit.

Sour grapes here. Basically he's complaining that North Africa was a 'backwater' campaign, something he was well aware of when assigned his task in early 1941.

.......the British Navy and merchantmen were able to maintain supplies to the British forces in the Near East at a rate far superior to ours even over such a great distance. The British could obtain all their petrol from the refineries in the Near East.

I don't think the last sentence is actually true. Iirc most of the supplies came from American refineries.

The inability of the Italians to retreat due to a lack of motorization was a major factor in their destruction at El Alamein.

It was, and it made the ill-advised advance into Egypt an even greater risk.

I like the last sentence in the quote. It really shows Rommels mentality of relentlessly attacking the enemy so they can't catch their breath. Had the odds been a bit more even, the Allies wouldn't have had a chance against Rommel.

The odds were even at Alam Halfa and he got his backside kicked. So much for that theory.

[The Purist]

If I recall correctly, the main British supply for crude oil was the Mosul oilfields and a few further south near Basra. The distance from Alexandria to Mosul is further than the distance from Berlin to Moscow, the distance to Basra is further again. I am nor aware of any major refining complexes in Iraq at the time but I can't say for sure. Rommel's hope of gaining middle eastern oil was a pipe dream, the distances were far beyond anything that could be supplied from Europe by the axis at the time and the troop density laughably low.

a) The British considereed the North African theatre to be decisive in the war.
b) North Africa was the key theatre of war for the British Empire.
c) The British had in the Mediterranean a powerful and excellent navy and air forces, while we had to contend with the unreliable Italian naval staffs.

a) - not really. The Atlantic was far more important to Britain than Egypt but Egypt was the only theatre that the British land forces could hope to engage the axis. Even so, until Alamein the British could not maintain more than 5 or 6 divisions in Libya due to logistics requirements but had almost as many back in the Nile Delta. For example, at Gazala 8th Army had two arm'd divs, two arm's bdes, three inf divs and couple of spare brigades.
b) - again, this is not the case. If the British army was going to fight the Germans and Italians at all it was going to have to be in Africa.
c) - The Italian navy was hamstrung by a lack a fuel,...there simply was not enough fuel to keep the entire German and Italian armies, air forces and navies supplied. U-Boats had priority over Italian battleships, German squadrons in Russia had priority over German/Italian squadrons in Libya and German tanks in the Ukraine had priority over Rommel's German/Italian motor formation in the desert.

Logistics, logistics, logistics.

[IronDuke]

Originally Posted by panther3485

FM has pretty well addressed this question. No, I don't think the British really did get it properly 'sorted out' before the end of the war, at least not on a broad scale. IMHO, It's possible to interpret some later war operations as a slight improvement, but that's about all I'd give them.

I think things started improving in places from Bluecoat onwards. If memory serves, 11th Armoured reorganised into mixed infantry/Tank Brigade groups which greatly facilitated co-operation for the rest of the campaign.

It wasn't Kampfgruppe so much as American CC but it was a start.

[Aber]

And of course organising the Guards Armoured removes the excuse that the infantry and tanks are from different regiments

[IronDuke]

Originally Posted by Full Monty

It was, and it made the ill-advised advance into Egypt an even greater risk.

One last try then I'm giving you up as beyond hope .

Firstly, the basics. German military tradition taught that the numerically and materially inferior side could win by means of aggressive action. It was their cornerstone since it was generally how they ended up.

Secondly, a cornerstone of miltary principle is the idea you never give a beaten enemy chance to regroup. You pursue and destroy so you don't have to fight the battle again. Eighth Army was in full retreat and Rommel made things worse at Matruh a few days after he attacked.

Thirdly, German operational concerns always trumped logistical ones. The Germans worked out where their forces need to be to win then challenged the logisticians to follow them.

Add all this together and it would have been amazing if Rommel didn't go. He was doctrinally primed for it, his operational situation demanded it, and the one drawback was one of those things the Germans lived with, however inconceivable to our abundantly supplied Allied eyes.

Fourthly, he had just captured a lot of stock in Tobruk. He captured a little more in Matruh. this was the way the desert war was fought, particularly with the AXIS. Captured supplies and water were key operational objectives and having landed what he had at Tobruk, he would have felt emboldened to push on.

Finally, one asks what was the alternative. The German plan without a lunge into Egypt called for a halt on the border along the line Sollum-Halfaya-Sidi Umar. It next called for the capture of Malta. This required much of PanzerArmee's air cover at a time when the DAK was already getting the upper hand and american bombers were beginning to deploy in numbers.

Even assuming Malta was taken, PanzerArmee would have spent weeks perhaps months ill supplied and under constant air attack. Their enemy would have been sitting pretty, reinforcing and regrouping and refitting. Then they would have returned to face an enemy rather like they faced at Alamein. To defend at all requires some types of weaponry like heavy artillery and AP weapons that the PanzerArmee lacked.

To face this, Rommel could expect little in the way of new equipment and troops. Supplies would have been sporadic and under heavy interdiction. If he had one chance, it was to lever the British out of their defensive positions by means of aggressive action whilst he still had the means. It worked at Matruh when without proper recce he got lucky, but ultimately, what he actually got was what Germans often got when they were too aggressive for their own good, an enemy who pulled out surprised at how aggressive the Germans were actually being, an enemy convinced German aggression must have been founded on a good battlefield position and relative force strength that usually wasn't there.

What of Malta. Well, the plans to take it were lightweight and most of the detail not yet worked out between the various Staffs who would take a hand. The air defences of the Island were still intact, the garrison as strong as ever. Hitler had (undestandably) forbade the massed use of airborne troops so a non existant plan in the face of determined defence that partly relied on sufficient POL to coax the Italian fleet out into the open just doesn't strike me as likely to begin never mind succeed.

To Rommel, the British were in disarray, in full retreat. He had adequate supplies to at least get after them and see what could be done. To standfast was to relinquish the initiative, and against a well supplied and numerically superior enemy, that was a recipe for defeat. If he had one chance, it was to go in late June.

One last thing. Churchill's position was at its trickiest after Tobruk (he faced a no confidence vote in the Commons). What emboldened him at the time was the unequivocal American help (one of their finest hours). within 10 days of the fall of Tobruk, fast convoys were leaving the States carrying combat aircraft for Egypt. By the beginning of September, 300 Shermans, 100 105s and hundreds of aircraft had arrived in time for the Halfa and Alamein battles.

In addition to British reinforcements, this material finished the PanzerArmee. Rommel's one chance was to strike before it arrived, to close the ports it would be unloaded in, and remove the British forces in Egypt this equipment was to replenish.

When Rommel first reached the Alamein position, the British dispositions and situation was not that good. Packed into boxes, with big gaps inbetween, and a shortage of Tanks to cover these gaps with left the Army vulnerabble. With better intelligence, infiltrating amongst the boxes to seal them off and reduce them was not beyond the means of even a depleted Panzerarmee.

That poor recce ability and lack of air cover meant the Germans were dragged into an attritional struggle they couldn't win didn't help. Yes, Rommel might have foreseen some of this but the British knew exactly what he was planning through Ultra, so arguably poor recce merely exacerbated a situation
that was already against him.

However, Rommel knew nothing of Ultra, so it isn't a reason for staying the other side of the border.

Even the second battle was fought before extensive American material really made itself felt. Clearly by this stage the odds were working against him, and what is more Rommel knew it, but this stage had only been reached after the first battle which in itself was less of a gamble. He had little option but to stay at Alamein after July, but that in itself does not invalidate the effort he made up to July to defeat the British in Egypt before they became undefeatable with the resouces he was likely to have under command.

Therefore, to sum up. Rommel either went into Egypt with what he had, or sat tight and waited for the end. I don't see the problem with the decision he took given German tradition, German doctrine, the operational situation, the strategic situation (which got worse with every passing day as american ships got nearer) and the likely alternative, which was eventual defeat.

Moving into Egypt cost Rommel the campaign only in so much as it dictated the precise circumstances in which he would be defeated, it didn't cost him the campaign from a wider perspective, because in the long run had he stood still, he would have been overwhelmed at somewhere not called Alamein anyway.

Moving into Egypt, however, gave him his one shot of winning it, and that is why he was right to go.

Regards,
IronDuke

[Full Monty]

Originally Posted by IronDuke

One last try then I'm giving you up as beyond hope

Everybody else has. Anyway, the noose is waiting.

[thejester]

Originally Posted by Aber

And of course organising the Guards Armoured removes the excuse that the infantry and tanks are from different regiments

Not really. 5th Brigade had battalions from three different regiments (Irish, Grenadier, Coldstream) and the the 32nd three (Irish, Coldstream, Welsh).

[Aber]

I understood that in NW Europe the Guards Armoured operated in 4 battle groups Hot, Cold, Irish & Welsh, each with infantry and tanks from the same regiment

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by IronDuke

"I think things started improving in places from Bluecoat onwards. If memory serves, 11th Armoured reorganised into mixed infantry/Tank Brigade groups which greatly facilitated co-operation for the rest of the campaign. It wasn't Kampfgruppe so much as American CC but it was a start."

Originally Posted by Aber

"I understood that in NW Europe the Guards Armoured operated in 4 battle groups Hot, Cold, Irish & Welsh, each with infantry and tanks from the same regiment"

OK. On account of the 'different' (one might even say unique) make-up of their units, of all the British armoured divisions, Guards Armoured were arguably best suited to development of improvements in tank/infantry co-operation.

After the problems of 'Goodwood', where the rigid separation of infantry and armour had proved most unsatisfactory, Guards Armoured had been rapidly re-grouped for 'Operation Bluecoat' by the beginning of August, producing four mixed battlegroups which, though rather 'ad-hoc' in nature (at least to begin with), were nevertheless considerably more effective.

Similar steps were taken by 11th Armoured, IIRC.

Losses were still heavy - a testament to the ferocity of the fighting - but at least the British were now starting to 'find their feet' in this regard. Nine months before the end of the war!

[Gooner]

Originally Posted by thejester

Not really. 5th Brigade had battalions from three different regiments (Irish, Grenadier, Coldstream) and the the 32nd three (Irish, Coldstream, Welsh).

5th Brigade also included 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards as Motor Battalion (infantry) while the Division also had 2nd Bn. Welsh Guards as Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment in Cromwell tanks.

[GreenTiger]

11th Armoured kicked off with four: 23 Hussars/3 Monmouths, 2 Fife & Forfars/4 KSLI, 3 RTR/1 Herefords, and 2 Northants Yeo./8 RB. These groups were beefed up when necessary with anti-tank guns of 75 Regt.
The initial line-up was flexible and units were switched around as the battle developed. Obviously a common "Guards" background was not necessary to create a successful blend. Indeed if 11th Armoured complaints about the slow progress of Guards Armoured during the operation were justified, it would seem that they had some problems with the new arrangements.

[panther3485]

Originally Posted by GreenTiger

"11th Armoured kicked off with four: 23 Hussars/3 Monmouths, 2 Fife & Forfars/4 KSLI, 3 RTR/1 Herefords, and 2 Northants Yeo./8 RB. These groups were beefed up when necessary with anti-tank guns of 75 Regt.
The initial line-up was flexible and units were switched around as the battle developed. Obviously a common "Guards" background was not necessary to create a successful blend. Indeed if 11th Armoured complaints about the slow progress of Guards Armoured during the operation were justified, it would seem that they had some problems with the new arrangements."

If the complaints were justified, what is the possible range of factors that may have contributed to the situation?

As for the "common 'Guards' background", I'm not sure that's the main focus of difference.

Although organized and equipped in basically the same way, and faced with generally similar tasks, there were marked differences between the three British armoured divisions which fought in North-West Europe during 1944-45.

The 7th had evolved gradually from pre-war days and had fought continuously since 1940, while Guards and 11th Armoured were formed only in 1941 and spent nearly three years training in the United Kingdom before going into action for the first time in Normandy in mid 1944. The 11th Armoured, like 7th, had a mixture of cavalry, yeomanry and RTR units in its armoured brigade, and had rifle, light infantry and county battalions among its infantry, while Guards Armoured was unique in that virtually all its units, both armoured and infantry, had common origins as foot guards battalions within the Brigade of Guards, before re-training as tank crews and lorried or motor infantry.

Guards Armoured also possibly enjoyed less disruption and greater continuity than the others once it went into action. Unlike 7th Armoured it kept the same divisional and brigade commanders throughout its period of active service, and unlike 11th it retained the same type of tank, the Sherman, until the end of the war. It also drew its reinforcements for its two brigades from the Guards depots, but this proved something of a mixed blessing since the Armoured Division had to compete with the other Guards formations in Italy and elsewhere for the limited available manpower.

All these factors led to each armoured division developing its own distinctive character. Thus Guards Armoured, far from being conservative in outlook as the uninitiated might have expected, went further than either of the other divisions in integrating its armour and infantry into permanent mixed units, and was less influenced by the systems used in previous campaigns for the supply and support of its brigades.

Guards Armoured and 11th Armoured did not start out together on 25th July when 'Operation Bluecoat' (involving VIII and XXX Corps) began; rather, the Guards were initially held back in reserve and only later summoned to take their place alongside 11th to help maintain the momentum of the advance. They then executed a move of 45 miles on 31st July, at the end of which they were hastily regrouped; the Coldstream infantry and Irish tanks were made into one battlegroup in 5th Brigade, and the Grenadier infantry and tanks another, while the Coldstream tanks were split up between the Irish and Welsh infantry in 32nd Brigade to form two more all-arms groups. At this stage the resultant battlegroups were of a very 'ad-hoc' nature, with those units that happened to be parked near each other at the time being paired!

A fortnight of fierce, if disjointed action immediately followed, with initial progress being good but soon slowing down. Included in the miscellaneous mixture of opposing units were 21st Panzer Division (rushed in from South of Caen), elements of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions and the 3rd and 5th Parachute Divisions.

On the 8th of August Guards Armoured took over 11th Armoured's area as well as its own. From here on, no further major attempts to advance were made although fierce local attacks were kept up. By 15th August, serious signs of enemy withdrawal had become apparent, and the division had completed its task (as had 11th Armoured also, of course). During this gruelling period, losses in both tanks and infantry had been heavy. During the whole campaign, for example, the Irish Guards alone were to lose 175 tanks and would end the war with only two of their original outfit, both of which had been hit and repaired.

[Most of the above taken from the following source:

'British Guards Armoured Division 1941-45', John Sandars, Osprey Publishing.

Italics/underlining is my emphasis.]


Best regards.
panther3485