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Alternate TimelinesThe great "what if's" of military history.
That's why I would defrost him a couple years before the war, so that he can get acquainted with the mutated conditions
A couple of years? He'd need ten at least, and probably experience of those tactics failing when he uses them.
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The point is that the French didn't fail because they launched suicidal infantry attacks - infact after the 1866 war their tactics focused on fire. They failed because their generals lacked initiative, aggressivity, tempism and morale: just those quality that carachterized 'Le tondu' at his best. And they didn't lack experience either, they were apt to small wars like the campaigns in Algeria, but lacked the preparation and frame of mind for a big european war.
The whole reason that the Prussians take heavy casualties is that almost all the battles- Wissembourg, Froeschwiller, Spichern, Mars La Tour, Gravelotte- feature the French defending, and the Prussians attacking. Bring Napoleon in, and the French go onto the offensive, in which case their casualty rates will undoubtedly spiral. Attacking under fire, even that from needle-guns, is not an easy proposition: look at the two Prussian corps who hold the French at Mars-la-Tour. Furthermore, the failings of the subordinate generals will become even more crucial: attacks are far more easily derailed by mistakes than defences.
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As for the Civil War, American commanders, especially Hunt, became extremely proficient with the use of artillery, and according to R. Luraghi this Civil War heritage was reflected in their proficiency in later wars (in WWII US artillery was probably the best in the world, not so for numbers and quality of guns, but for tactics and use).
They may be proficient with the use of artillery, but it still seems to be the traditional use made of it. I don't see much difference between the use of artillery at Gettysburg and Waterloo. Similar ranges, similar weapons: the only difference is that Hunt is keen on counter-battery fire, while Wellington dislikes it. In fact, considering that after March 1863 the majority of guns are grouped in a Napoleon-style artillery reserve, I'd say that the American Civil War would, for Napoleon, only confirm his thoughts on artillery, rather than force him to drastically alter his position.
A couple of years? He'd need ten at least, and probably experience of those tactics failing when he uses them.
Obviously we disagree here.
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The whole reason that the Prussians take heavy casualties is that almost all the battles- Wissembourg, Froeschwiller, Spichern, Mars La Tour, Gravelotte- feature the French defending, and the Prussians attacking. Bring Napoleon in, and the French go onto the offensive, in which case their casualty rates will undoubtedly spiral. Attacking under fire, even that from needle-guns, is not an easy proposition: look at the two Prussian corps who hold the French at Mars-la-Tour. Furthermore, the failings of the subordinate generals will become even more crucial: attacks are far more easily derailed by mistakes than defences.
As I wrote (quoting some of Nappy's own words), 'At the tactical level the Napoleonic doctrine was a careful and balanced defence followed by a lightning and devastating attack'. That was exactly what the French would have needed in 1870. And don't forget that the very presence of Napoleon would have made miracles on the morale and confidence of soldiers and officers alike.
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They may be proficient with the use of artillery, but it still seems to be the traditional use made of it. I don't see much difference between the use of artillery at Gettysburg and Waterloo. Similar ranges, similar weapons: the only difference is that Hunt is keen on counter-battery fire, while Wellington dislikes it. In fact, considering that after March 1863 the majority of guns are grouped in a Napoleon-style artillery reserve, I'd say that the American Civil War would, for Napoleon, only confirm his thoughts on artillery, rather than force him to drastically alter his position.
But it would not have been necessary 'to drastically alter his position', just to make some modifications. After all, as yourself admit, not even the Prussians made revolutionary changes in their use of the artillery, just evolutionary steps.
As I wrote (quoting some of Nappy's own words), 'At the tactical level the Napoleonic doctrine was a careful and balanced defence followed by a lightning and devastating attack'. That was exactly what the French would have needed in 1870.
I think here we're facing a small amount of Napoleonic revisionism. While I'd certainly describe the battle of Austerlitz as a careful defence followed by attack, the battles he fights immediately after don't bear that judgement out. At Friedland, he attacks: at Eylau, he attacks despite being outnumbered. While what you describe is certainly what the French need, is it what Napoleon would provide?
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And don't forget that the very presence of Napoleon would have made miracles on the morale and confidence of soldiers and officers alike.
Granted, morale is a factor. But the presence of Napoleon also puts pressure on the subordinate generals: they'd be even more conscious of the need to succeed, under the watchful eye of the man most of them idolise. Some might well crack under this pressure.
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But it would not have been necessary 'to drastically alter his position', just to make some modifications. After all, as yourself admit, not even the Prussians made revolutionary changes in their use of the artillery, just evolutionary steps.
When you're armed with weapons both more accurate and quicker-firing than those of your opponent, you don't need to make revolutionary changes: if you're using similar unreformed doctrines, you'll still out-shoot your opponent. The pressure here is on the French to use their guns to the absolute fullest, and I personally think that Napoleon isn't capable of that: he's too set in his ways.
In part, much of my argument is based on nit-picking. Had you said the Napoleon of 1797, or even the Napoleon of 1805, I'd have been much more confident of his chances. However, by 1807, Napoleon seems to be well on the route that leads to Wagram and Borodino: massed artillery blowing a hole in the line, followed by a bloody infantry assault.
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Originally Posted by grognard
Patton said the artillery won the war. And the American certainly applied and modified artillery tactics used in the Civil War in subsequent wars.
This quote bemuses me. Are you implying that some countries didn't modify their tactics between 1860 and 1917? Or are you saying that American tactics gently evolved, while other countries had a revolution in doctrine? If so, when precisely did this happen? I appreciate that we're straying a little off-topic, but it may turn out to be somehow relevant to Napoleon's hypothetical performance in 1870.
I think here we're facing a small amount of Napoleonic revisionism. While I'd certainly describe the battle of Austerlitz as a careful defence followed by attack, the battles he fights immediately after don't bear that judgement out. At Friedland, he attacks: at Eylau, he attacks despite being outnumbered. While what you describe is certainly what the French need, is it what Napoleon would provide?
Granted, morale is a factor. But the presence of Napoleon also puts pressure on the subordinate generals: they'd be even more conscious of the need to succeed, under the watchful eye of the man most of them idolise. Some might well crack under this pressure.
When you're armed with weapons both more accurate and quicker-firing than those of your opponent, you don't need to make revolutionary changes: if you're using similar unreformed doctrines, you'll still out-shoot your opponent. The pressure here is on the French to use their guns to the absolute fullest, and I personally think that Napoleon isn't capable of that: he's too set in his ways.
In part, much of my argument is based on nit-picking. Had you said the Napoleon of 1797, or even the Napoleon of 1805, I'd have been much more confident of his chances. However, by 1807, Napoleon seems to be well on the route that leads to Wagram and Borodino: massed artillery blowing a hole in the line, followed by a bloody infantry assault.
Napoleon was a flexible and opportunistic general, which by itself are carachteristics of great generalship. Austerlitz reprehesents the 'ideal' Napoleonic battle, but no battle or campaign takes place under identical conditions. At Ulm he managed to win without fighting a battle at all, at Friedland the Russians first attcaked Lannes and then went to the defensive. When Napoleon arrived with the main force he attacked, which was the right thing to do. At Eylau he was overconfident, but that's rather understandable after the incredible string of successes in 1805-6.
Why should they have cracked? Napoleon didn't have did effect on his subordinate generals in his real career.
I don't undertstand why Napoleon would have been unable to realize the full potential of the new guns. He was an expert artillerist and he was flexible. He was 'set in his ways' because those ways, at his times, were the best ones. Of course you can't accuse him of sticking to muzzle-loaded smooth bores in 1805-15 no more that you could accuse Hannibal of sticking to elephants instead of using tanks... But give him a couple years to get acquainted with the new technologies of the late 60s and with the experiences of the 1859/66 wars and the ACW: how can you assume he would have rejected all the innovations, when they were already accepted by the not so brilliánt military of the epoch (the French didn't go to breech loaders only because of budgetary reasons)? It would be to assume that not only he wasn't a genius, but actually intellectually inferior to the average!
Napoleon was a flexible and opportunistic general, which by itself are carachteristics of great generalship. Austerlitz reprehesents the 'ideal' Napoleonic battle, but no battle or campaign takes place under identical conditions. At Ulm he managed to win without fighting a battle at all, at Friedland the Russians first attcaked Lannes and then went to the defensive. When Napoleon arrived with the main force he attacked, which was the right thing to do. At Eylau he was overconfident, but that's rather understandable after the incredible string of successes in 1805-6.
If no battle takes place under identical conditions, then you can't really predict what Napoleon's going to do based on his own writings: local conditions appear to override his principles. I think defrosting Napoleon at a time when the Napoleonic myth is probably at its peak will only serve to add to his overconfidence- he might well attempt to repeat his previous successes by charging bull-at-a-gate at the armies around Strasbourg.
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Why should they have cracked? Napoleon didn't have did effect on his subordinate generals in his real career.
Napoleon's generals know him, however: they've been there to experience his rise. For the generals of 1870, he's a semi-legendary figure, almost a demigod. It's like the return of King Arthur or Barbarossa: I wouldn't blame people for feeling more pressured under those circumstances.
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I don't undertstand why Napoleon would have been unable to realize the full potential of the new guns. He was an expert artillerist and he was flexible. He was 'set in his ways' because those ways, at his times, were the best ones. Of course you can't accuse him of sticking to muzzle-loaded smooth bores in 1805-15 no more that you could accuse Hannibal of sticking to elephants instead of using tanks...
Were they the best ones? Wellington wins his battles using artillery for infantry support, rather than offensively, and he does it at much less cost. Furthermore, while there were no real alternatives to the artillery pieces of his period, the fact that he doesn't even experiment with arming his skirmishers with rifles suggest that he's not entirely flexible.
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But give him a couple years to get acquainted with the new technologies of the late 60s and with the experiences of the 1859/66 wars and the ACW: how can you assume he would have rejected all the innovations, when they were already accepted by the not so brilliánt military of the epoch
I'm not seeing him as rejecting the innovations. Grand batteries, etc, are still in use: for example, the Confederate artillery at Pickett's charge. The 1859 war in Italy sees rifled artillery used at short ranges. What I'm saying is that these events would have confirmed Napoleon's trend of thought- to use massed artillery offensively- and this would have been disasterous in 1870 against the superior Prussian artillery. Give me the Napoleon of any point before 1807, and I think he's still open enough to recognise the shift.
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(the French didn't go to breech loaders only because of budgetary reasons)?
It's not just budgetary reasons: the failure of the British Armstrong breech-loaders suggest that they're mechanically imperfect as well. When the British revert to RML, it seems like a validation of the French choice.
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It would be to assume that not only he wasn't a genius, but actually intellectually inferior to the average!
Not really. There's nothing wrong with being transported forward 60 years and having trouble adjusting to the epoch: neither is there anything wrong with having a general mentality towards tactics. Why would he change what was for him a winning formula- especially when the conditions seem to be right for it to work again?
Napoleon's methods were the best ones for the conditions in which he fought at his times. Wellington won with different methods applied to relatively small armies of well trained, steady British soldiers. Napoleon had to use mass armies of French conscripts, and his tactics were tailored just for such armies and soldiers. And don't forget that when the two commanders met, even if Napoleon was not at his best, he would have certainly won if Blucher hadn't arrived in the nick of time, even if the numerical strength of Napoleon's and Wellington's armies was about the same. Even so Waterloo was a very close thing.
By the late 60s the French were well aware of the superiority of the breech-loading guns. The problems was that Napoleon III had lost much of his power. He was not able to drive home the re-equipment of his artillery because the parliament, having approved the spending of over 100 million francs for the Chassepots, didn't accept the extra costs for new guns. Anyway, that's not the point: the French didn't lose because they lacked breech loaders or because they massed their artillery (which the Prussians did too as you noticed). They lost because their mobilitation and concentration was a mess and their generals lacked initiative. Quoting from Osprey, Bazaine snatched defeat from the jaws of victory (probably Canrobert would have done better if he had accepted the command). And concerning organisation and concentration of the army, Napoleon was a master in organization and he did succeed amazingly even without a staff like the Prussian one. The concentration and deployment of the Army of the North for the Waterloo campaign was a masterpiece.
As for the rifles, Napoleon discounted their production in around 1808 (I'm not exactly sure of the date) because he didn't consider that these weapons were worth their superior costs. Having to arm mass armies this choice was not irrational, and certainly the lack of rifles was not the cause of Napoleon defeat.
Napoleon's methods were the best ones for the conditions in which he fought at his times. Wellington won with different methods applied to relatively small armies of well trained, steady British soldiers. Napoleon had to use mass armies of French conscripts, and his tactics were tailored just for such armies and soldiers.
For a start, Napoleon doesn't use mass armies of French conscripts. After 1805, he works with an elite force which he deliberately cultivates. If he's unfrozen any time after 1868, he inherits a system of conscripts with five years active, four years in the reserve and a large but untrained garde mobile. Do you really think he'd be able to shake up the system in time to give him the army with which he likes to work- even if he was inclined to do so?
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And don't forget that when the two commanders met, even if Napoleon was not at his best, he would have certainly won if Blucher hadn't arrived in the nick of time, even if the numerical strength of Napoleon's and Wellington's armies was about the same. Even so Waterloo was a very close thing.
I'm not sure about this. Napoleon's got a slight numerical advantage, but all his troops are well-motivated and, more importantly, speak the same language. Wellington's got a severe disadvantage in terms of average quality: not only that, he isn't even allowed to pick his own commanders. Even so, I'm not convinced that Napoleon would have won the battle if Blucher had been delayed further: the most likely result is a draw, with Blucher's arrival the next day forcing him to retreat.
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By the late 60s the French were well aware of the superiority of the breech-loading guns. The problems was that Napoleon III had lost much of his power. He was not able to drive home the re-equipment of his artillery because the parliament, having approved the spending of over 100 million francs for the Chassepots, didn't accept the extra costs for new guns.
To me, this does sound like they underestimate the superiority. Compare the British response to the development of ironclads, or in other naval races: they assess the risk, and decide that they have to keep up no matter what.
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Anyway, that's not the point: the French didn't lose because they lacked breech loaders or because they massed their artillery (which the Prussians did too as you noticed).
The Prussians can mass their artillery, because they have breech-loaders. It's the exact same phenomenon as the British forming square at Ulundi- tactics that would be suicidal in normal warfare are perfectly feasible when your opponent is so inferior. For the French, massing artillery would mean throwing it away.
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They lost because their mobilitation and concentration was a mess and their generals lacked initiative. Quoting from Osprey, Bazaine snatched defeat from the jaws of victory (probably Canrobert would have done better if he had accepted the command).
Initiative is a wonderful thing, but it's not a panacea. If Napoleon has the command, he's most likely going to take the offensive. He's going to mass his artillery, try to blow a hole in the enemy line and then pour infantry through the gap, and the result is going to be slaughter- a slaughter that even he would have trouble recovering from.
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And concerning organisation and concentration of the army, Napoleon was a master in organization and he did succeed amazingly even without a staff like the Prussian one. The concentration and deployment of the Army of the North for the Waterloo campaign was a masterpiece.
And the plan itself is so poor that it can be derailed by the unexpected resistance of a single Dutch-Belgian division in a single place. Anyway, you're slightly confusing organisation of the army with organisation of the support structures. The only real changes to the Loi Jourdan of 1798 that Napoleon makes is to allow replacements in 1800: there's chaos in the system then, too. For example, the class of 1809 is called up in February 1808, September 1808 and April 1809: the same people are being rejected over and over again. Can you really call living off the land a "masterful organisation?" It seems more like what you do to avoid dealing with logistics to me. While Napoleon might have developed corps et cetera, he isn't going to reorganise the administrative system that fails in 1870.
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As for the rifles, Napoleon discounted their production in around 1808 (I'm not exactly sure of the date) because he didn't consider that these weapons were worth their superior costs. Having to arm mass armies this choice was not irrational, and certainly the lack of rifles was not the cause of Napoleon defeat.
No, but he fails to recognise the advantage of the longer range these weapons give him. He can't see that being able to pick off officers at a range at which the enemy is unable to respond is something which is perhaps worth the expense. Is it not possible that he might not see the advantage offered by new artillery, and use it as he always has done?
For a start, Napoleon doesn't use mass armies of French conscripts. After 1805, he works with an elite force which he deliberately cultivates. If he's unfrozen any time after 1868, he inherits a system of conscripts with five years active, four years in the reserve and a large but untrained garde mobile. Do you really think he'd be able to shake up the system in time to give him the army with which he likes to work- even if he was inclined to do so?
I'm not sure about this. Napoleon's got a slight numerical advantage, but all his troops are well-motivated and, more importantly, speak the same language. Wellington's got a severe disadvantage in terms of average quality: not only that, he isn't even allowed to pick his own commanders. Even so, I'm not convinced that Napoleon would have won the battle if Blucher had been delayed further: the most likely result is a draw, with Blucher's arrival the next day forcing him to retreat.
To me, this does sound like they underestimate the superiority. Compare the British response to the development of ironclads, or in other naval races: they assess the risk, and decide that they have to keep up no matter what.
The Prussians can mass their artillery, because they have breech-loaders. It's the exact same phenomenon as the British forming square at Ulundi- tactics that would be suicidal in normal warfare are perfectly feasible when your opponent is so inferior. For the French, massing artillery would mean throwing it away.
Initiative is a wonderful thing, but it's not a panacea. If Napoleon has the command, he's most likely going to take the offensive. He's going to mass his artillery, try to blow a hole in the enemy line and then pour infantry through the gap, and the result is going to be slaughter- a slaughter that even he would have trouble recovering from.
And the plan itself is so poor that it can be derailed by the unexpected resistance of a single Dutch-Belgian division in a single place. Anyway, you're slightly confusing organisation of the army with organisation of the support structures. The only real changes to the Loi Jourdan of 1798 that Napoleon makes is to allow replacements in 1800: there's chaos in the system then, too. For example, the class of 1809 is called up in February 1808, September 1808 and April 1809: the same people are being rejected over and over again. Can you really call living off the land a "masterful organisation?" It seems more like what you do to avoid dealing with logistics to me. While Napoleon might have developed corps et cetera, he isn't going to reorganise the administrative system that fails in 1870.
No, but he fails to recognise the advantage of the longer range these weapons give him. He can't see that being able to pick off officers at a range at which the enemy is unable to respond is something which is perhaps worth the expense. Is it not possible that he might not see the advantage offered by new artillery, and use it as he always has done?
Not that I want to contradict you, since I appreciate your entries, but Napoleon DID use mass armies of conscripts. Of course, the Grand Armee of 1805 was a very finely tuned and trained instrument, but as time went and losses grew he had to rely more and more with conscripts, not only French but also unreliable German allies. With the declining quality of his infantry, already noticeable in the 1809 campaign, he had to rely more and more on its artillery to punch a hole in the enemy lines. Of course the Guard did conserve a high standard.
You are right that the multinational army of Wellington was a mixed lot, and only the KGL and part of the British contingent were veterans. Anyway there can be no doubt that with the whole of Lobau corps and the Young Guard available, the issue wouldn't have been in doubt. Infact, it's probable that if Ney had adequatedly supported his mass cavalry charges with infantry the French would have won anyway.
As I said before, it wasn't artillery inferiority and misuse that was the decisive factor of French defeat in 1870. You probably aren't going to admit it, but there is no reason to think that Napoleon wouldn't have managed his artillery at least as well as the French generals did in 1870. To think that he would have done even worse than them, given a couple years to get acquainted with the current reality, means to have a very low opinion of him. What he would almost certainly have done is to keep the initiative, especially at the strategic and operational level, and attack when favourable conditions were present. Bazaine missed some very favourable occasion to attack and catch the Prussians at disavantage. At Mers-La-Tour he had the occasion of investing part of the Prussian forces and destroy them separatedly, but he didn't. He was likely victim of war fatigue and many other generals would have probably done better. Do you think a general like Nappy would have missed such an occasion? Well, you probably are going to mantain that he would have done wrong anyway, and ultimately, being an hypothetical situation, there is no way to give a definite answer.
Talking about Napoleon's organizative skills, I was referring specifically to the ability of mobilizing and deploying an army for a campaign. In this the French blundered in 1870. Napoleon on the contrary was masterful, and also in 1815 the concentration and deployment went so smoothful and so unnoticed by the Allies that they were caught dispersed. The plan for the waterloo campaign is generally considered masterful I can't see why you consider it a bad plan. Of course it was risky, but it was probably the best plan given the situation, with the french outnumbered almsot 2 to 1 by two Allies armies. Then, of course, in war everything is risky, and even plans safer 'on the paper' can go awry.
All in all, it seems to me that Nappy had exactly those qualities that the French would have needed to win in 1870.
Napoleon would not have gotten armies blocked in Sedan, and if somehow the Prussians did move it in force, Nappie would have broken out when he had the chance. Observer Phil Sheridan said the breakout was possible, granted he said he could have done it with the (U.S.) Civil War VI corps.
If an observer can see the possibilities, Napoleon certainly can.
Napoleon would not have gotten armies blocked in Sedan, and if somehow the Prussians did move it in force, Nappie would have broken out when he had the chance. Observer Phil Sheridan said the breakout was possible, granted he said he could have done it with the (U.S.) Civil War VI corps.
If an observer can see the possibilities, Napoleon certainly can.
To be fair with macMahon, he wouldn't probably have got himself blocked in Sedan either, if he hadn't been subjected to strong political pressures from Paris. He was aware that he was going to stick his head in the snare, but he had to proceed anyway because the politicians in Paris required an attempt to relieve Bazaine in Metz, and Napoleon III was already losing his political control and the capacity to influence events (he was old and sick).
I think Nappy would not have put himself in such a situation in the first place, because he would have directly commanded the main French force (Bazaine's in real history) and he would not have been trapped in Metz. Besides, one of the reasons of the slowness of Bazaine's army, which allowed the Prussians to wheel around him, was that the French adopted the marching orders from the wars in Algeria: the units bunched together for the bivaucs with the cavalry close to the other units. This was apt for small armies fighting against mobile rebels, but not for a big army in the European theatre. The consequence was unnecessary delays, confusion, clogging of the roads and inadequate reconaissance.
Not that I want to contradict you, since I appreciate your entries, but Napoleon DID use mass armies of conscripts. Of course, the Grand Armee of 1805 was a very finely tuned and trained instrument, but as time went and losses grew he had to rely more and more with conscripts, not only French but also unreliable German allies. With the declining quality of his infantry, already noticeable in the 1809 campaign, he had to rely more and more on its artillery to punch a hole in the enemy lines. Of course the Guard did conserve a high standard.
However, if Napoleon's unfrozen after 1868, then the army he inherits has just been reformed to make it, in effect, a half-arsed compromise between the seven-year semi-regular army it had been previously and the Prussian-style Landwehr army. The result is a lower quality army than that Napoleon would be used to, and, as you suggest, Napoleon historically takes a specific path when he doubts the quality of his infantry.
When I hear "mass army of conscripts," my immediate assumption is the levee en masse. That isn't what Napoleon has: his army is much more professional in ethos, much more akin to the regular army of the ancien regime. Furthermore, it's got a hard core of veterans to maintain at least a fraction of its 1805 mentality.
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You are right that the multinational army of Wellington was a mixed lot, and only the KGL and part of the British contingent were veterans. Anyway there can be no doubt that with the whole of Lobau corps and the Young Guard available, the issue wouldn't have been in doubt. Infact, it's probable that if Ney had adequatedly supported his mass cavalry charges with infantry the French would have won anyway.
For a start, Ney does support the charges with infantry: Bacheleu's division, which is beaten back. There simply isn't room for either infantry or artillery to support the charges, and I for one wouldn't like to advance into that mass of panicked horses. Whether Napoleon breaking Wellington's line with the Guard would have led to victory is questionable as well: it doesn't work at Talavera, for instance.
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As I said before, it wasn't artillery inferiority and misuse that was the decisive factor of French defeat in 1870. You probably aren't going to admit it, but there is no reason to think that Napoleon wouldn't have managed his artillery at least as well as the French generals did in 1870. To think that he would have done even worse than them, given a couple years to get acquainted with the current reality, means to have a very low opinion of him.
I'm not saying that it's artillery misuse that dooms the French in 1870. There are reasons to think that he wouldn't have used it as well: his trend of tactical thinking by 1807 is to mass for effect, rather than disperse. Had Napoleon been leader in 1870, it would have been artillery misuse that, quite probably, would have been the decisive factor.
As for the idea that it's due to my low opinion of him: I don't blame anybody from this period for failing to understand the potential of the new weapons, much less somebody who's had a grand total of two years to come to terms with them. Other men spend their entire lives trying to grasp the potential, and fail.
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What he would almost certainly have done is to keep the initiative, especially at the strategic and operational level, and attack when favourable conditions were present. Bazaine missed some very favourable occasion to attack and catch the Prussians at disavantage. At Mers-La-Tour he had the occasion of investing part of the Prussian forces and destroy them separatedly, but he didn't. He was likely victim of war fatigue and many other generals would have probably done better. Do you think a general like Nappy would have missed such an occasion? Well, you probably are going to mantain that he would have done wrong anyway, and ultimately, being an hypothetical situation, there is no way to give a definite answer.
I don't claim he would have missed the occasion: I'm claiming that the tactics he would have employed would not have been suited to the sort of battle he would have been required to fight. Even if his attacks do succeed, the high cost of advancing under fire in this period might only have drained the French army to the point where it collapses earlier than it does.
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Talking about Napoleon's organizative skills, I was referring specifically to the ability of mobilizing and deploying an army for a campaign. In this the French blundered in 1870. Napoleon on the contrary was masterful, and also in 1815 the concentration and deployment went so smoothful and so unnoticed by the Allies that they were caught dispersed.
The problems in 1870 come through the organisation of the conscript system- the way in which regiments are stationed in one place, have their depot in another and are instructed to mobilise in a third. Napoleon isn't going to go through the rigmarole of sorting this whole thing out, unless of course you grant him with the feat of precognition needed to know it's going to fail. What exactly is his response to the problems of logistics? He ignores them.
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The plan for the waterloo campaign is generally considered masterful I can't see why you consider it a bad plan. Of course it was risky, but it was probably the best plan given the situation, with the french outnumbered almsot 2 to 1 by two Allies armies. Then, of course, in war everything is risky, and even plans safer 'on the paper' can go awry.
It's a good plan on paper, but it's derailed too easily. It relies on Ney seizing the crossroads at Quatre Bras on the night of the 15th and on the Prussians being driven away from the Anglo-Allied army after Ligny. If those two conditions aren't fulfilled, Napoleon's in serious trouble. Jac Weller, in "Wellington at Waterloo," gives a much better critique of the scheme than I ever could.
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All in all, it seems to me that Nappy had exactly those qualities that the French would have needed to win in 1870.
I sense we're going round in circles here, so I'll reiterate my views on the subject.
1) If the French had a commander of Napoleon's calibre in 1870, they would have won.
2) If the French had Napoleon taken at any point before 1806, they would have won.
3) If the French had Napoleon from 1807 onwards, they would have done slightly better than they did, but still lost.
That's giving Napoleon a lot of credit, I feel. It says that despite the organisational chaos, despite the inferior numbers, despite the problems with the artillery, despite being in a time of technological change, he'd still be able to win a decisive victory. Before 1807, he's still in the process of formulating his ideal set of tactics: after 1807, he has them, and even the shift to 1870 isn't going to change his mind.
The Napoleon of post 1807 would certainly analyse the current conditions of warfarte and adapt accordingly. He did some great things after 1807, e.g. Eckmuhl, Lingy, and the 1814 "dance" to hold off vastly superior armies.
The Napoleon of post 1807 would certainly analyse the current conditions of warfarte and adapt accordingly. He did some great things after 1807, e.g. Eckmuhl, Lingy, and the 1814 "dance" to hold off vastly superior armies.
He also had Wagram, Aspern-Essling and Borodino: bloody battles, two of which feature precisely the tactics of massed artillery that I argue would cause disaster. As for the campaign of 1814, what does it end with? The battles of Laon and Arcis-sur-Aube, where his run of luck comes to an end.
I must confess, I'm not familiar with the battle of Lingy. If you're talking about Ligny, then the victory is as much due to Prussian weaknesses as Napoleon's strengths- for example placing their reserves in full sight of enemy artillery and over-stretching the right wing. Napoleon doesn't smash the Prussians, and they're able to retreat in relatively good order on Wavre. The fact that you cite it as one of the outstanding victories of the post-1807 period- if indeed it is this battle you're referring to- only goes to demonstrate how far Napoleon sinks.
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He also had Wagram, Aspern-Essling and Borodino: bloody battles, two of which feature precisely the tactics of massed artillery that I argue would cause disaster. As for the campaign of 1814, what does it end with? The battles of Laon and Arcis-sur-Aube, where his run of luck comes to an end.
I must confess, I'm not familiar with the battle of Lingy. If you're talking about Ligny, then the victory is as much due to Prussian weaknesses as Napoleon's strengths- for example placing their reserves in full sight of enemy artillery and over-stretching the right wing. Napoleon doesn't smash the Prussians, and they're able to retreat in relatively good order on Wavre. The fact that you cite it as one of the outstanding victories of the post-1807 period- if indeed it is this battle you're referring to- only goes to demonstrate how far Napoleon sinks.
I think you make too much about 'massing artillery': in reality Austrians, Prussians and French, all massed artillery in several occasions in 1866 and 1870. At Gravelotte-St-Privat the Prussians massed almost 60 guns at 1000 m. from the French lines and the gunners were cut to pieces by Chassepots and mitralleuse fire. It was an error, but it was also just an episode in a big battle.
As I said, after 1807 Napoleon had to resort more and more to massing guns in order to compensate the deficiency of his infantry. But I don't think it would have needed a genial mind to exploit the longer range of rifled guns, at least to avoid exposition to rifle fire.
Anyway, Napoleon did succeed, even with a worse army, both in 1809 and in the first part of the 1813 campaign. And the 1814 campaign is considered by many historians his most brilliant one, facing almost impossible odds. He basically lost because the government in Paris opened the doors to the Allies and deposed him. And at Ligny in 1815, he defeated 83 000 Prussians with less than 70 000 men.
Anyway, Rob, after all your final conclusions don't differ so much from mine, just I don't think the Napoleon of 1807 or 1809 was noticeably worse than the Napoleon of 1805 or 1806. If anything, he was much more experienced. On a different note, I think if you had taken Napoleon from 1896, he would probably have been too immature and inexperienced to lead the French army in 1870.
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