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American Age of Discovery, Colonization, Revolution, & ExpansionMilitary history of North America. Sponsored by Wild West magazine.
Casimir Pulaski - the "father of the American cavalry" according to Longfellow. Quite an interesting career in the AR.
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Go Canes in 2010
Best regards,
The Ibis
“Here’s a horse that had a guy with a flaming spear on his back, who parades in front of 60,000 screaming fans with the band playing, and a guy in a duck costume is going to scare him?” John Routh
I hope that you're enjoying our forum. I would say that my opinions are similar to Elijah's summary, but I think that you both are under rating Greene. If all of your opponent's victories are phyrric in nature, who needs a victory? If your army is intact, and you drawing your enemy further from his source of supply, who needs a victory?
Well quite, and of course it should be noted that Greene's side won, but nevertheless it is quite difficult to get excited about Greene given the talent that was present in the war at the time. After all, Pyrrhic victories may undermine your opponent, but as historians debating tactical prowess they are not exactly a ringing endorsement. Generals throughout history have achieved outright victories with resources similar to what Greene had, and against similar adversarial might!
Thanks also for the welcome.
@Legate: Cornwallis and Howe are both highly respected here in Blighty, especially Howe. It's difficult to positively say that Howe ever really made a mistake, the man was brilliant. (Especially given that neither he, nor many of his compatriots really agreed with the war they were asked to fight!) I would call Howe the best general in the war with no question, since unlike other usual suspects like Washington and Cornwallis, he was brilliant at both strategic and tactical levels.
Last edited by James Hacker MP; 12 May 10 at 14:37..
Well quite, and of course it should be noted that Greene's side won, but nevertheless it is quite difficult to get excited about Greene given the talent that was present in the war at the time. After all, Pyrrhic victories may undermine your opponent, but as historians debating tactical prowess they are not exactly a ringing endorsement. Generals throughout history have achieved outright victories with resources similar to what Greene had, and against similar adversarial might!
Thanks also for the welcome.
@Legate: Cornwallis and Howe are both highly respected here in Blighty, especially Howe. It's difficult to positively say that Howe ever really made a mistake, the man was brilliant. (Especially given that neither he, nor many of his compatriots really agreed with the war they were asked to fight!) I would call Howe the best general in the war with no question, since unlike other usual suspects like Washington and Cornwallis, he was brilliant at both strategic and tactical levels.
It good to hear that these two are still respected as I feel that they are two of the finest generals to wear the red coat in the era between Marlborough and Wellington.
As much as I admire and revere Washington,I've always felt that Howe and Cornwallis were certainly better generals than him.
__________________ If the art of war were nothing but the art of avoiding risks,glory would become the prey of mediocre minds. Napoleon
I've heard many times that Cornwallis was a fine general. And I don't doubt it. Yet noone ever seems to provide any examples of this decision making ability. I'm wondering what we might discuss as examples of his generalship?
While he had his occaisional moments, Washington was certainly not a brilliant operational commander. His reputation stands on two other things:
1. He maintained a revolution in being through many times when it should have fallen apart. More than any other person it is Washington who kept the things going, not by ideology, but by keeping a force in the field that had to be dealt with.
2. Despite some modern historic debunkers, he had more personal intergrity than anyone else in our political history. Manifested from his direct support of the troops out of his own pocket to his handling of scandals and stopping the officers coup in its tracks.
While he had his occaisional moments, Washington was certainly not a brilliant operational commander. His reputation stands on two other things:
1. He maintained a revolution in being through many times when it should have fallen apart. More than any other person it is Washington who kept the things going, not by ideology, but by keeping a force in the field that had to be dealt with.
2. Despite some modern historic debunkers, he had more personal intergrity than anyone else in our political history. Manifested from his direct support of the troops out of his own pocket to his handling of scandals and stopping the officers coup in its tracks.
Oh, I agree. As I think I said earlier, Washington was largely a mediocre general, competant rather than brilliant, but his contribution to history, America, and personal integrity cannot be doubted.
I would also contend that his logistical skill was up there with the best, however.
I've heard many times that Cornwallis was a fine general. And I don't doubt it. Yet noone ever seems to provide any examples of this decision making ability. I'm wondering what we might discuss as examples of his generalship?
Cornwallis didn't get much opportunity to exercise independent command in the AWI. His southern campaign was a mixed bag with the two losses (Kings Mountain and Cowpens) cannot be laid at his door.
While he does deserve a bit of the share of the blame for Yorktown,it should be noted that he was following Clintons orders.
I feel that Cornwallis more than redeemed himself in India where he was commander in chief and Governor General and conducted a successfull campaign in the Third Anglo-Mysore War.
Perhaps I did rate him a little highly and probably is not as good as Howe but I do think he should be counted in the top ten British generals of all time.
__________________ If the art of war were nothing but the art of avoiding risks,glory would become the prey of mediocre minds. Napoleon
I've been thinking on this Cornwallis question. I believe his largely independent command comes after Charles Town which is probably creditable to Clinton (or to Lincoln for the more scarcastic among us). So, Cornwallis took over for the purpose of occupation and conquest of the back country.
His battle at Camden is a good one. No doubt he took a smaller force and decisively smashed Gates. Even though we know Gates made mistakes, a good general sees these as opportunities and takes advantage. Which Cornwallis did. But then he followed with his own mistake. Instead of easing up on the population he turned Wemyss, Tarleton, and Ferguson loose on a campaign to punish the Whig population. I think this was opportunity lost. There was a fairly large Tory population in the Backcountry and the Whig's were almost all discouraged. Other than a few diehards like Elijah Clarke, a softer approach may very well have soothed the savage beast.
What about the actions after Cowpens. Should Cornwallis have worn out his army with the race to the Dan? It seems as if this was probably also a mistake. Followed by leaving Greene to head south after Guilford while Cornwallis turned to Virginia. Was Cornwallis leaving Rawdon without hope of success? He obviously didn't have the manpower to hold South Carolina without Cornwallis's main army. Was this also an error?
Like many Americans I tend to worship anything and everything related to George Washington. We find little fault with him as a general, a President, or anywhere else for that matter. I think his greatest accomplishment in the war was simply never allowing the army to be captured and destroyed. By staying in the field, he wore down the British resolve. Tactically, I look to Dorchester Heights and Yorktown as evidence of his ability.
Nathaniel Greene is often thought of as our 2nd greatest. He gets credit for winning the Southern Campaign which we tend to think of as the last British hope of victory. Though Greene won no battles, he is also credited with winning by simply staying in the field without getting destroyed.
Horatio Gates represents our most scorned. Despite being in command at Saratoga, the modern trend over here is to overcredit Benedict Arnold and push any accomplishment of Gates to the side. I disagree with this approach but it is probably commonly held. I tend to think that George Washington carries a lot of responsibility for history's bad image of Gates. Because they were rivals and GW is beloved, people tend to bash Gates. Also GW himself spoke of 'the real hero of Saratoga'. And then of course Gates loss at Camden cements his position as our least liked general of the Revolution.
As a general, Daniel Morgan gets good standing for his work at Saratoga and later at Cowpens. Nothing like defeating the single most hated of the enemy to endear a man to his country.
Benjamin Lincoln was probably better than his reputation. But, then again, his loss at Charlestown showed the exact opposite of GW and Greene. He managed to get his army destroyed in a single battle. The only type of defeat we really couldn't stand. Even at Camden, most of the men survived to fight another day. At Charles Town, they went to the prison ships almost to a man.
We love Henry Knox for bringing the guns to Dorchester. enough to get you going?
I tend to agree with you virtually point for point, except in regards to Gates and Arnold. Gates was a supply weenie that misrepresented being a supply weenie to enhance his own reputation, and I will give the credit for the victory at Saratoga to Arnold. The problem with Benedict Arnold is that he was motivated by ego first and foremost, and it was his own highly inflated sense of self importance that eventually led him to treason.
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Give me a fast ship and the wind at my back for I intend to sail in harms way! (John Paul Jones)
Great tacticians are a lot more fun to like than great strategist. Everybody likes the decisive victory. Especially me. But I have to hand it to Greene.
Greene was a great strategist. He never risked open battle and he won. Didn't Sun Tzu say that the greatest general won without fighting?
Any battle can go any way. Generals, troops, the weather, and the enemy can refuse to cooperate. Greene played the percentages by not, or barely fighting Cornwallis. He knew that it would not be too difficult to out logistic Cornwallis so he did so.
I agree with the position that Washington was decent or miss tactically, good logistically (also strategically), and a great leader.
Dan Morgan in my opinion was the top tactician of the war with his dismantling of Tarleton at Cowpens.
Now for the British.
Howe was great tactician(Long Island, Brandywine) but made a strategic blunder by attacking Philadelphia instead of moving northward along the Hudson. Cornwallis was similar with his choice to move northward into Virginia letting Greene undo everything he had accomplished in the South in a year. Clinton was solid strategically(invasion of the South) but was a poor leader.
It seemed to me that Clinton took to the war in the colonies as a hobby, just another adventure... I have a great respect for Cornwallis and Howe who were very hard core field commanders. But political issues in the British command made matters almost untenable. Dan Morgan gets high praise as Greene, whom Washington leaned on when the going got real tough. Lafayette was the last French commander in North America, with the exception of Napoleon perhaps the best since their time. And his contribution was noted by Washington as a highly capable field commander.