Why Was the US Army So Slow to Adapt?

[Rojik]

Originally Posted by johnbryan

They never had enough fuel to propel a motorized transport army. They were always in danger of running out of fuel for the entire war

Nope. It was industrial power. Even with fuel the German army in peace time was struggling to make up normal losses. It was only the invasions of the Czechs and the French that gave them some sort hope of ever having a semi motorised army.

[johnbryan]

Originally Posted by Rojik

Nope. It was industrial power. Even with fuel the German army in peace time was struggling to make up normal losses. It was only the invasions of the Czechs and the French that gave them some sort hope of ever having a semi motorised army.

The Germans were always on the verge of running out of fuel throughout the war. Even the acquisition of the Ploesti oil fields in Romania couldn't supply all of the Wehrmacht's everyday needs. Their other problem was simply not expanding their truck factories to meet the increased wartime need for motorized transport. BMW, Ford, GM and a number of other local and foreign car companies had factories within the Reich. The Germans simply did not expand and make optimum use of them throughout the war.

[Carl Schwamberg]

Originally Posted by Chukka

I'd say that the US army was well ahead of the rest of the world in adopting motor transport. While European armies remained tied to train timetables and horse transport the Americans were getting ahead with truck based transport.

This went unevenly. During and imeaditly after the Great War there was a smell of petrol across the army camps and all sort of experiments and tests were ventured. Then the US Army budget for 1922-23 was cut drastically. In a issue of the Field Artillery journal of that era I found a item describing some of the effects. The motorized artillery was reduced from eight regiments to two. & those two were at less than 75% strength. Artillery officers in service in that era describe visits by tight fisted Congressmen, determined to eliminate waste prowling Ft Sill and questioning the need for 'all those automobiles' when horses were so cheap (circa 1934). Other elderly crocks simply railed against the 'mechanization fad' and declared the army officers fat and lazy obviously making the case for getting them back on horses & rid of the cars. Officers of that era who wished to get ahead spoke quietly about mechanization of the Army. ie: Pattons sly artical of the 1930s condeming the 'Motor Maniacs'.

As late as 1942 dodering cavalrymen & other old soldiers with politcal power were wringing their hands and fretfully tugging at Marshals sleeve over the elimination of the last horsed regiments.

The biographys of officers like Bradley, Collins, Stillwell have a 1920s backstory of the motor vehicals being passed from company to company for training, and officers riding horses while the infantry marched while attempting to simulate 'mechanized' operations during the interwar years. Something in common with the Reichswehr there.

So yes there was a lot of thinking about motor or mechanization, but the ability to actually develop such a motorized army or corps was slim. When the first full strength motorized units were recreated in late 1940 there was a huge gap between Army theory and practical application.

The WWII motorization of the US Army was actually accomplished in the 'shop' or vocational classes in the US high schools, in the garages along the highways and the factories, and in the engineering colleges. There the eight million plus men who made up the Army of WWII learned how to operate and manage a vast fleet of motor vehicals. The Regular Army officers who were nominally in charge of the eight million reservists & draftees were swept along for the ride, so to speak.

[Chukka]

I was thinking of the pre WW2 period. The US army mechanisations was certainly slow and sporadic but in the pre-ww1 period I would say that they were ahead of the Brits or continentals, even though therewas along way to go.

[101combatvet]

It has always been the lowest bid that wins the arms contract.

[Carl Schwamberg]

Originally Posted by Chukka

I was thinking of the pre WW2 period. The US army mechanisations was certainly slow and sporadic but in the pre-ww1 period I would say that they were ahead of the Brits or continentals, even though therewas along way to go.

Historians make a big deal out of the Britsh completely motorizing the transport service of the BEF before the war. What the truth is there I dont know. Do your sources for the prewar motorization of the US Army have anything about motor traction for the artillery, pre 1917?

thanks

[Jon Jordan]

Originally Posted by Karri

This had to do with industrial resources though.

Also, the vast expanse of the American west. In 1920, the US Army sent a motorized column across the continent to see what its equipment could do. A young captain named Eisenhower was part of this "expedition," and not long afterwards he became an expert in military-industrial matters, especially the Army's partnership with Detroit.

In Europe, the shorter distances probably delayed the need for full motorization -- it meant an army could "get by" for some of its rear-echelon and artillery transport on foot and hoof. As we've heard, this was not universal nor was distance a complete explanation - but maybe a partial one.

Of course, the Great Depression put a damper on all military budgets.

[Cyberknight]

Originally Posted by Karri

This had to do with industrial resources though. I am sure Germans would have loved to have all motro transport army...

Also necessity played a big part in the decisions. Domestically, American forces had larger distances to deal with than did most European armies in peace time.

Edit: Oops, beat to the punch by Jon Jordan.

[The Ibis]

Originally Posted by Carl Schwamberg

This went unevenly. During and imeaditly after the Great War there was a smell of petrol across the army camps and all sort of experiments and tests were ventured. Then the US Army budget for 1922-23 was cut drastically. In a issue of the Field Artillery journal of that era I found a item describing some of the effects. The motorized artillery was reduced from eight regiments to two. & those two were at less than 75% strength. Artillery officers in service in that era describe visits by tight fisted Congressmen, determined to eliminate waste prowling Ft Sill and questioning the need for 'all those automobiles' when horses were so cheap (circa 1934). Other elderly crocks simply railed against the 'mechanization fad' and declared the army officers fat and lazy obviously making the case for getting them back on horses & rid of the cars. Officers of that era who wished to get ahead spoke quietly about mechanization of the Army. ie: Pattons sly artical of the 1930s condeming the 'Motor Maniacs'.

As late as 1942 dodering cavalrymen & other old soldiers with politcal power were wringing their hands and fretfully tugging at Marshals sleeve over the elimination of the last horsed regiments.

The biographys of officers like Bradley, Collins, Stillwell have a 1920s backstory of the motor vehicals being passed from company to company for training, and officers riding horses while the infantry marched while attempting to simulate 'mechanized' operations during the interwar years. Something in common with the Reichswehr there.

So yes there was a lot of thinking about motor or mechanization, but the ability to actually develop such a motorized army or corps was slim. When the first full strength motorized units were recreated in late 1940 there was a huge gap between Army theory and practical application.

The WWII motorization of the US Army was actually accomplished in the 'shop' or vocational classes in the US high schools, in the garages along the highways and the factories, and in the engineering colleges. There the eight million plus men who made up the Army of WWII learned how to operate and manage a vast fleet of motor vehicals. The Regular Army officers who were nominally in charge of the eight million reservists & draftees were swept along for the ride, so to speak.

There is an excellent essay by Daniel R. Beaver in the book Feeding Mars - Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present entitled "Deuce and a Half: Selecting U.S. Army Trucks, 1920-45 that discusses the actions, doctrine and policies of the the Quartermaster Technical Committee in the 1930s. Its a quick read if you can get a hold of it.

[T. A. Gardner]

The other thing the US adopted well ahead of European armies in the WW 2 period was mechanization of their engineers. The US provided masses of construction machinery to their engineers. Engineer battalions were equipped for the most part with 2 1/2 dump trucks rather than regular ones.
This mechanization meant that a single US construction battalion of engineers could accomplish what it was taking the Germans five to ten times the labor with hand tools to do. That single US engineer battalion had more heavy machinery at its disposal than an entire Germany field army had in it.
It meant that operating in remote or primative conditions could be managed more easily as US engineers could quickly build trails, roads, bridges and, other infrastructure as necessary in a very short period of time.
In many ways this made the impossible possible.