Pursuit after Gettysburg

[Cheetah772]

Originally Posted by TacCovert4

I think Shiloh was the wake up call that made both Grant and Sherman, but Especially Sherman who they were during the latter parts of the war.

When confronted with huge lapses in judgement and a horrible situation, some leaders become basket cases. Others come through the fire and transform into something far more dangerous than they were previously.

Had Grant and Sherman's armies been thoroughly destroyed by Confederates, I think it would have prolonged the Civil War considerably. But the South would have still lost the war somehow, and perhaps spared Georgia & South Carolina the destruction of March to Sea.

Maybe THAT was the turning point of the Civil War.

Dan

[thejester]

Originally Posted by Early1964

Do you think Gen. U.S Grant wanted to talk about Shiloh as a "victory"?

Well, yes:

Originally Posted by Grant, Memoirs, p. 192

...more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. The officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.
The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.

No-one would argue that Grant and those under him had been lax in their defensive dispositions. But when faced with the ultimate challenge Grant responded superbly. By the end of the first day the Union army was in a strong defensive position with it's line of communications still open. The Confederate army was exhausted.

Only the death of Albert Sidney Johnston probably saved Grant from a crushing defeat on the first day.

Quoting Grant again:

Originally Posted by Memoirs, pp. 195-6.

Ifs defeated the Confederates at Shiloh...Commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoraliztaion on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed.

One could equally assemble a list of what ifs for the Union once battle was joined - what if Wallace had not died in the Hornets Nest? What if Wallace had attacked the Confederate rear? And even had Johnston not died - what evidence is there that he was about to pull a proverbial rabbit out of his hat? The frontal attacks against the Hornets Nest had been going for what, five hours when he fell?

To not put out pickets when so (known) close to the enemy was a mistake even a green officer wouldn't have made.

Indeed it was a very, very poor decision and made the basic mistake of assuming what an enemy would do rather than preparing for what he could do.

Gen. Hallack basically stripped Grant of the command of any troops after Shiloh. I don't think Gen. Hallack thought of it as a "victory" by Grant,

Hallack was already scheming against Grant before Shiloh - I don't think he can be taken as a reliable measure.

he was saved from a horrible defeat by the gunboats, darkness and the arrival of massive reenforcements. Sherman was even more inept in his positioning of troops and laxness in putting out pickets. They both came close to spending the rest of the War behind a desk somewhere.

Hardly. By evening Grant had assembled his forces in a strong position and repulsed Confederate attacks on it. The massive reinforcements gave him a clear numerical superiority over his enemy, thus allowing him to mount the offensive the next day - but they hardly saved the army, and Grant could simply have stood on the defensive had they not arrived.

Shiloh was not Grant's finest piece of generalship but it was during the battle that his qualities probably shone most brightly. He was cool under fire, did not panic, and maintained a clear picture of the situation - a fact that allowed him to take the offensive the next day, when you suspect the vast majority of generals on both sides would have withdrawn or sat tight.

[D1J1]

Nice post by the jester, especially highlighting the friction between Grant and Halleck. That was not a new found thing by any stretch of the imagination. It had everything to do with Halleck trying to manipulate his own career rather than shortcomings on Grants part.

[B7B Southern]

I am wondering what these post have to do with the Retreat from Gettysburg.

[D1J1]

Originally Posted by B7B Southern

I am wondering what these post have to do with the Retreat from Gettysburg.

Nothing of course, but as you should be aware a little "drift" isn't unusual on most any forum or thread!

[The Ibis]

Originally Posted by thejester

Well, yes:

No-one would argue that Grant and those under him had been lax in their defensive dispositions. But when faced with the ultimate challenge Grant responded superbly. By the end of the first day the Union army was in a strong defensive position with it's line of communications still open. The Confederate army was exhausted.


Quoting Grant again:

One could equally assemble a list of what ifs for the Union once battle was joined - what if Wallace had not died in the Hornets Nest? What if Wallace had attacked the Confederate rear? And even had Johnston not died - what evidence is there that he was about to pull a proverbial rabbit out of his hat? The frontal attacks against the Hornets Nest had been going for what, five hours when he fell?


Indeed it was a very, very poor decision and made the basic mistake of assuming what an enemy would do rather than preparing for what he could do.


Hallack was already scheming against Grant before Shiloh - I don't think he can be taken as a reliable measure.


Hardly. By evening Grant had assembled his forces in a strong position and repulsed Confederate attacks on it. The massive reinforcements gave him a clear numerical superiority over his enemy, thus allowing him to mount the offensive the next day - but they hardly saved the army, and Grant could simply have stood on the defensive had they not arrived.

Shiloh was not Grant's finest piece of generalship but it was during the battle that his qualities probably shone most brightly. He was cool under fire, did not panic, and maintained a clear picture of the situation - a fact that allowed him to take the offensive the next day, when you suspect the vast majority of generals on both sides would have withdrawn or sat tight.

Excellent post. "Lick em tomorrow, though." Love that quote.

[TomDeFranco]

Originally Posted by Early1964

Do you think Gen. U.S Grant wanted to talk about Shiloh as a "victory"? Only the death of Albert Sidney Johnston probably saved Grant from a crushing defeat on the first day. To not put out pickets when so (known) close to the enemy was a mistake even a green officer wouldn't have made. Gen. Hallack basically stripped Grant of the command of any troops after Shiloh. I don't think Gen. Hallack thought of it as a "victory" by Grant, he was saved from a horrible defeat by the gunboats, darkness and the arrival of massive reenforcements. Sherman was even more inept in his positioning of troops and laxness in putting out pickets. They both came close to spending the rest of the War behind a desk somewhere.

A lot went wrong for both sides at Shiloh. Grant and Sherman learned the hard way about listening to reports from the pickets. Johnston really learned the hard way by allowing himself to become a glorified brigade leader. Beauregard learned he had to be closer to the front to maintain better control of events.

What really saved the Feds that day was the Federal counterattack at midafternoon at the crossroads on their right flank. That stopped the Confederate success that they had heretofore had in rolling up the Federal right.

After this, where were we on the Federal pursuit after Gettysburg?

[The Ibis]

Originally Posted by TomDeFranco

After this, where were we on the Federal pursuit after Gettysburg?

Held up recrossing the Potomac I think.

[grognard]

Originally Posted by Early1964

Do you think Gen. U.S Grant wanted to talk about Shiloh as a "victory"? Only the death of Albert Sidney Johnston probably saved Grant from a crushing defeat on the first day. To not put out pickets when so (known) close to the enemy was a mistake even a green officer wouldn't have made. Gen. Hallack basically stripped Grant of the command of any troops after Shiloh. I don't think Gen. Hallack thought of it as a "victory" by Grant, he was saved from a horrible defeat by the gunboats, darkness and the arrival of massive reenforcements. Sherman was even more inept in his positioning of troops and laxness in putting out pickets. They both came close to spending the rest of the War behind a desk somewhere.

Grant wasn't saved by Johnston's death, he was saved by a flawed Confederate plan. Attacking with each corps ona broad front created real command and control problems, and pushing on to the river was not a realistic options given the positions fo the troops and their commanders.

[D1J1]

Originally Posted by grognard

Grant wasn't saved by Johnston's death, he was saved by a flawed Confederate plan. Attacking with each corps ona broad front created real command and control problems, and pushing on to the river was not a realistic options given the positions fo the troops and their commanders.

We may know that now, I will grant you that. The problem in assessing the situation is, did they know that then? There is the rub.

None of which, as has been repeatedly pointed out, has anything to do with the pursuit after Gettysburg.

Regards,
Dennis

[The Ibis]

Originally Posted by D1J1

None of which, as has been repeatedly pointed out, has anything to do with the pursuit after Gettysburg.

Regards,
Dennis

Shiloh thread anyone? I've got some stuff I can post out of JFC Fuller's book on Grant that I find interesting.

Back to the topic at hand, err, the topic listed on the title, I'm in accord with those who say a more aggressive pursuit wasn't in the cards, particularly on July 4 or 5 given the losses to the Union leadership. And once Lee was given a day or two, he wasn't going to be caught absent serious bumbling.

[grognard]

Originally Posted by D1J1

We may know that now, I will grant you that. The problem in assessing the situation is, did they know that then? There is the rub.

None of which, as has been repeatedly pointed out, has anything to do with the pursuit after Gettysburg.

Regards,
Dennis

Agreed re pursuit, but I like to repsond to varied posts. But Grant was had an artillery line and infantry ready for an attack so even if Johnson started being an army commander again, he had problems. What would Grant's rep have been had the Rebs attacked the final line and been repulsed?

[B7B Southern]

But Grant was had an artillery line and infantry ready for an attack

Lee would surely have held his own at Falling Waters. Grant's lines would have been stretched too thin!

[grognard]

Originally Posted by B7B Southern

But Grant was had an artillery line and infantry ready for an attack

Lee would surely have held his own at Falling Waters. Grant's lines would have been stretched too thin!

Surely is too strong, don't forget Missionary Ridge. When
Grant examined the ground after Chattanooga, he said Bragg's position was impregnable.