Worst Planned Operations

[pmririshman]

So now you're denigrating the historians who wrote the official histories even though the so-called evidence that you say proves Weigley was a liar comes from the official history Cross Channel Attack. Is Cross Channel Attack "historical fantasy" or is it an authoritative work that proves your ludicrous contention that Russell Weigley was a hack? You cannot have it both ways.

A couple of questions for you: What proof do you have that the official histories are actually "quasi novelised rubbish" and have you actually read them or any of Weigley's numerous well respected works?

[Aber]

Originally Posted by Jon Jordan

I shudder to suggest this one because this example (the best I could think of) involves Montgomery again, but the operation I am thinking of, one of the largest, most thoroughly planned operations after NEPTUNE, was PLUNDER, Montgomery's push over the Rhine. It required, IIRC, airborne, navy, and massive ground support and was one of the largest operations of the war. It was so massively supported there was no way it could have failed, given the opposing forces, yet it lagged behind two other Rhine crossings, one due to a stroke of luck (Remagen) and the other an old-style "find where they aren't and cross there" stroke.

The gap between the end of Veritable and the launch of Plunder was less than 2 weeks, with part of the delay IIRC due to the need to wait for the level of the Rhine to drop.

'No way it could have failed' - do you think that 3 months after the Germans launched a counter-offensive that all the Allied High Command thought was impossible that anybody was going to take the slightest risk with the main Allied offensive?

[Full Monty]

Originally Posted by pmririshman

So now you're denigrating the historians who wrote the official histories even though the so-called evidence that you say proves Weigley was a liar comes from the official history Cross Channel Attack. Is Cross Channel Attack "historical fantasy" or is it an authoritative work that proves your ludicrous contention that Russell Weigley was a hack? You cannot have it both ways.

Personally I like making use of the official histories because they can't be claimed to be biased against the US Army or its commanders. Their pov is always going to be a little partisan but then that's what they are there for. Harrison's paragraphs on the COSSAC briefing of 3rd January 1944 and its aftermath certainly suggest that Weigley's claims for Eisenhower's responsibility for the changes of the plan are on shaky ground.

I'm not sure that citing Keegan for a character reference on Weigley is wise given his opinion on David Irving. Not saying he is wrong, or that Weigley is comparable to Irving, only that some other leading historian's opinion would carry much more weight.

If this goes on we may have to start a new thread.

[Jon Jordan]

Originally Posted by Aber

The gap between the end of Veritable and the launch of Plunder was less than 2 weeks, with part of the delay IIRC due to the need to wait for the level of the Rhine to drop.

'No way it could have failed' - do you think that 3 months after the Germans launched a counter-offensive that all the Allied High Command thought was impossible that anybody was going to take the slightest risk with the main Allied offensive?

Yes, I do. Putting four divisions across the Rhine at Remagen ran exactly this risk, as did creating a very small bridgehead over the Rhine at Oppenheim. These were diversions from the "main offensive" - SHAEF's G-3, Pink Bull, protested against developing the Remagen bridgehead because it was not part of the plan - but Eisenhower backed both.

The Remagen crossing was, by definition, a "poorly planned operation" because it was opportunistic rather than deliberate - but in this case, the poorly planned operation generated good results. By contrast, might it have been better for either 2nd British Army or 9th US Army to attempt a lunge without waiting for both armies, plus 2nd Br. AB and 17th US AB (Operation VARSITY), plus naval support, to move into position? (The question is not rhetorical, but a genuine one for persons who have a better sense than I of what Montgomery was facing before and after his preparations for PLUNDER.)

In US history, it seems like river crossings, being particularly dangerous maneuvers, are susceptible to delay in this fashion - cf. Burnside at Fredericksburg. Maybe there's a better example - I don't know much about Slim's crossing FM referred to earlier.

It comes down to the old saw about a good plan now versus an excellent plan a week from now.

[Jon Jordan]

Originally Posted by Aquila Be

Widely available all those official records might have been and they were, more often than not, written much more honestly than the works churned out by many ‘official historians’ who occasionally used them as source materials for their historical fantasies.

However, in pre internet days, these records were most certainly not widely accessible.
In the pre internet dark ages it would have taken an enormous amount of time, effort and expense, for any individual to fact check some of the quasi novelised rubbish produced by ‘official historians’ that purported to be a history of this or that.
In pre internet days, outright lies might take years to be exposed, whereas today any historian that tried to make things up would be swiftly revealed as a fraud.
I’m not suggesting that the internet is the be all and end all of historiography. I am suggesting that access to the information contained in various aspects of the historical record has become much more widespread, broadly based and accessible to more people.
That’s not to say that the internet is any kind of cure all. Here’s a good example of totally fake history I found on the net without much effort:
Famous Generals
Admittedly, the American fantasy that Patton kicked Rommel out of North Africa developed and became firmly entrenched in the pre internet days, but as you can see from the link, the myth is taking an amazingly long time to die.
(You might be amused to read from the same link on ‘Famous Generals’, the summaries that describe the achievements of Bradley and Eisenhower. They’re both as comically absurd and inaccurate as the summary for Patton.)
That’s all I was trying to get at in my reference to the internet. Making things up in ‘histories’ these days is something that modern historians can’t get away with as easily as they could in the days before the internet (unless they’re willing to put up with a lot of ridicule).

Very good points. The fake history you cited was probably written by a copy editor or marketer for a movie distributer rather than someone who purported to be an historian, but I fully agree with you that the internet is bringing together greater and greater resources for checking facts. So many, in fact, that the challenge is really one of laziness - going beyond Wikipedia and whatever the first three Google hits say - and pulling up documents closer to the events they purport to record. There will always be people crowding the internet with blind or flippant comments (e.g., "Patton/Bradley was the worst general of the war," "Montgomery was the slowest general of the war," "Eisenhower was a politician who knew nothing about war," "Zhukov only knew how to launch mass assaults," etc.), which shouldn't be taken any more or less seriously than anyone else with an opinion.

Given my non-academic background, I simplistically tend to think of historical sources as running a range of great to weak - a spectrum from contemporaneous "non-hearsay" evidence (unedited diaries, low-echelon after action reports, letters home) to credible secondary or edited primary evidence (official histories, interviews, or accounts recorded when there were lots of people around to call BS) to shakier primary evidence (oral histories of octogenerian veterans, "deathbed memoirs," etc.). It's a matter of assembling the most credible first-person evidence available and building the case around those sources. Then doing the best one can to fill the gaps where the gaps need to be filled (as most histories have some subjective commentary that cannot be accurately documented).

The internet makes all that easier, though I don't think in our lifetimes historians will be able to avoid spending weeks here and there in archives squinting at old documents and trying to beat the "quitting time" clock.

(I realize this is another stray off-topic, but it is so rare that AB and I agree that I thought it was worth the detour.)

[RichardS]

Originally Posted by RichardS

Coming in late: Has anybody mentioned: Operation Rheinübung?

Operation Rhine Exercise was the sailing of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Despite sinking HMS Hood, the loss of Bismarck was comparatively of greater importance, but also not only did the Germans fail to disrupt the allied convoys; they failed to find a single merchantman. Equally unrealized was that 7 of the 9 ships sent to support the raiders with fuel and ammo were tracked down and sunk.

To sum up: Germany lost a newer and better battleship, but also lost key and irreplaceable support ships that would hamper the Kriegsmarine's surface raiding forces. While the loss of HMS Hood was a blow to the British, the loss of Bismarck meant Hitler was fearful of losing his surface battle force he had placed a lot of money and effort to recreate and modernize.

Just bringing this back into play for those who missed it the first time.

[pmririshman]

Originally Posted by Full Monty

Personally I like making use of the official histories because they can't be claimed to be biased against the US Army or its commanders. Their pov is always going to be a little partisan but then that's what they are there for. Harrison's paragraphs on the COSSAC briefing of 3rd January 1944 and its aftermath certainly suggest that Weigley's claims for Eisenhower's responsibility for the changes of the plan are on shaky ground.

I'm not sure that citing Keegan for a character reference on Weigley is wise given his opinion on David Irving. Not saying he is wrong, or that Weigley is comparable to Irving, only that some other leading historian's opinion would carry much more weight.

If this goes on we may have to start a new thread.

Footnote 19 of the paragraphs describing the briefing of 3rd January 1944, states "[19] Gen McLean's interpretation. See Interv cited n. 15. Eisenhower has said that in December 1943, he instructed both General Montgomery and General Smith to "seek for an intensification of effort to increase troop lift in Overlord...." Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil)." (p. 166 of Cross Channel Attack) It would seem that the official history of the invasion actually does support Weigley's intepretation.

Weigley has a reputation among other historians besides Keegan. For example, Gerhard Weinberg cites Weigley's Eisenhower's Lieutenants as one of the books on World War II that should be consulted for the war in Northwest Europe. (p. 934 of A World At Arms) Furthermore, Carlo D'Este mentions and quotes Weigley favorably at least 12 times in the text of Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life/

Forest Pogue, one of the historians involved in the Army history project of World War II who interviewed survivors of Omaha Beach as they were being brought back from the beach, wrote this about Eisenhower's Lieutenants in The American Historical Review, Vol. 87, No. 2 (Apr., 1982), pp. 559-560:

"Russell F. Weigley's earlier writings prepared the way for this outstanding book. His histories of American military thought, of the United States Army, and the American way of war all furnished the foundation for this highly professional study of command and operations in northwest Europe, 1944-45. In an authoritative weaving together of high-level command decisions with the details of ground and air operations at lower levels, he has written the best account that we have of the World War II campaigns from Normandy to the Elbe."

Weigley's works also are included in numerous readings lists for military officers (http://www.dcmilitary.com/dcmilitary...0/1369-1.shtml and http://www.afmentor.com/info/readinglistcsa.htm) and military history grad students (http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/grimsley1/list.htm).

Here's a review of a Weigley book that was written after the invention of the internet https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=11213

[Full Monty]

Originally Posted by pmririshman

Footnote 19 of the paragraphs describing the briefing of 3rd January 1944, states "[19] Gen McLean's interpretation. See Interv cited n. 15. Eisenhower has said that in December 1943, he instructed both General Montgomery and General Smith to "seek for an intensification of effort to increase troop lift in Overlord...." Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil)." (p. 166 of Cross Channel Attack) It would seem that the official history of the invasion actually does support Weigley's intepretation.

But that isn't what Weigley said is it. He says this "His display of mastery over the professionally military challenges of his new duties began almost as soon as he received the Supreme Command. He found a preliminary plan for the amphibious assault that called for a first wave of only three divisions. He insisted on the immediate enhancement of the initial landings to five divisions." Which is not the same as asking Smith and Montgomery to 'seek for an intensification of effort'! As I pointed out, Montgomery's reaction to the COSSAC briefing is only explainable if he has been given the remit to re-shape the Overlord plan as he sees fit.

And on the original thread where we discussed that point it's exactly what I said regarding Eisenhower's 'instructions' (clearly given verbally) to Montgomery and Smith. Iirc you took me to task for daring to suggest that Montgomery had done anything other than follow Ike's specific orders!

Oh and well done for finding other historians to support the beleaguered Weigley.

[pmririshman]

Originally Posted by Full Monty

But that isn't what Weigley said is it. He says this "His display of mastery over the professionally military challenges of his new duties began almost as soon as he received the Supreme Command. He found a preliminary plan for the amphibious assault that called for a first wave of only three divisions. He insisted on the immediate enhancement of the initial landings to five divisions." Which is not the same as asking Smith and Montgomery to 'seek for an intensification of effort'! As I pointed out, Montgomery's reaction to the COSSAC briefing is only explainable if he has been given the remit to re-shape the Overlord plan as he sees fit.

And on the original thread where we discussed that point it's exactly what I said regarding Eisenhower's 'instructions' (clearly given verbally) to Montgomery and Smith. Iirc you took me to task for daring to suggest that Montgomery had done anything other than follow Ike's specific orders!

Oh and well done for finding other historians to support the beleaguered Weigley.

I disagree, but what else is new? Thanks for the thumbs up.

[Full Monty]

Originally Posted by Jon Jordan

By contrast, might it have been better for either 2nd British Army or 9th US Army to attempt a lunge without waiting for both armies, plus 2nd Br. AB and 17th US AB (Operation VARSITY), plus naval support, to move into position? (The question is not rhetorical, but a genuine one for persons who have a better sense than I of what Montgomery was facing before and after his preparations for PLUNDER.)

Having had their fingers burned at Arnhem, having incurred irreplaceable losses during the six months of subsequent campaigning and with the war close to an end there was no reason for Montgomery or his subordinates to even consider a risky 'lunge' over the Rhine. Let's not forget that Hodges just struck lucky in finding an intact bridge at Remagan and Patton's crossing point was very different in terms of geography iirc to Montgomery's (as well as being a smaller scale operation). Had Dempsey, Simpson or even Crerar (whose responsibility was more to the north) found an intact bridge you can bet your life Montgomery would have reacted in a similar way to Bradley and ensured the crossing was secure and ready to be exploited.

[Full Monty]

Originally Posted by pmririshman

I disagree, but what else is new? Thanks for the thumbs up.

Well, you can if you want but you haven't got a leg to stand on in terms of evidence. Eisenhower himself doesn't claim he gave specific instructions and Smith's recollections are that he, Ike and Monty were all agreed that the three division concept was just too small. Indeed Smith recalls Ike's first reaction as being 'My God, if I were going to do it I would want ten or twelve divisions'. Montgomery's memoirs claim that Ike only issued very vague instructions and that there was not much of a plan at all (not that this version is to be trusted of course). Carlo D'Este is probably fairest where he states - "Although it was Montgomery who became the principal architect of the changes that were initiated, credit for recognizing the defects and insisting on alterations must go to all three men." ('Decision In Normandy - p.57). Clearly this does not sit well with Weigley's insistence on giving the credit to Eisenhower alone.

[pmririshman]

Originally Posted by Full Monty

Well, you can if you want but you haven't got a leg to stand on in terms of evidence. Eisenhower himself doesn't claim he gave specific instructions and Smith's recollections are that he, Ike and Monty were all agreed that the three division concept was just too small. Indeed Smith recalls Ike's first reaction as being 'My God, if I were going to do it I would want ten or twelve divisions'. Montgomery's memoirs claim that Ike only issued very vague instructions and that there was not much of a plan at all (not that this version is to be trusted of course). Carlo D'Este is probably fairest where he states - "Although it was Montgomery who became the principal architect of the changes that were initiated, credit for recognizing the defects and insisting on alterations must go to all three men." ('Decision In Normandy - p.57). Clearly this does not sit well with Weigley's insistence on giving the credit to Eisenhower alone.

of course I really mean

[Full Monty]

Originally Posted by pmririshman

of course I really mean

Of course.

Brave Sir Robin

[skipperbob]

Would like to make another entry - sorry if someone else already said this, did not find it in this thread - but I believe Operation Shingle, the invasion at Anzio, was planning at it's worst. Not enough troops, not enough ships, poor intelligence, and a general put in charge who didn't believe in the operation. When they finally were able to break out in May, Mark Clark ruined any chance of final success by turning the breakout army north towards Rome instead of cutting off the German retreat. A sad end to a terrible plan.