I am from Montana, and grew up in the area. I have hunted those hills near the battlefield for deer and elk and spent years and years out there. I also did my graduate work in History.

Sabers were rightfully left behind in this action. With the size of the camp, getting in that close with sabers would have been fool hardy at best. There’s a really good documentary that’s now on Youtube about the battle, and it shows the rate of fire issue. As former curator of the park, I’m astounded you don’t mention this issue, and frankly, find it a bit irresponsible that you do not at least raise the issue in general.

The rate of fire issue refers to the rate that the Indian rifles could fire versus the soldier’s weapons. Archeologic findings of groupings of cartridges from repeaters and the groupings of cases near soldier positions indicate that the natives often got off three to four times as many shots as Custer’s men did. Combine that with having 3-4 times as many men in the field–albeit not all had repeating rifles, and it is reasonable to conclude that the &th Cav, was at the least, outgunned maybe 3 or 4 to one. Sabers would have made an effective charge, but only as long as surprise carried the day. With as many men as there were on the Sioux/Cheyenne side of this battle, that surprise would have been overcome fairly shortly.

There is no way that the Indians would have been killed in sufficient numbers that they would not have been able to regain control once their overwhelming superiority in weapons fire rates was brought to bear as surprise faded to hand to hand combat. Even had they not brough their overwhelming firepower to bear, sheer numbers of expert hand to hand combat veterans—as nearly all native American tribesmen were—would have overwhelmed the saber-bearing 16-22 year old soldiers. Don’t forget that these were kids.

Once they were in hand to hand, the overwhelming numbers would have crushed Custer. The only difference sabers would have made was in the location of the dead bodies. Custer attacked despite being told by Terry to wait for Crook and Gibbon. Custer did not and went to his own death. Had he waited, this battle would have likely never occurred as the camp likely would have broken up within days, with all the gathered bands scattering into their normal small groups of a hundred or so. Had this occurred, the Indians would have been slaughtered in small groups as the three columns ran across them and then the US soldiers would have had the superior numbers.

As an additional fun note….the re-enactment of the battle is held by the losers of this battle—the Crow Indians. The Crow were allied with Custer, as they were already on Reservation. The actual combatants, the Sioux and Norther Cheyenne, are on reservations in worse places, like Fort Peck and Pine Ridge. The battlefield is actually on the Crow Reservation, and the re-enactors are mostly Crow, not Sioux/N Cheyenne. To this day the Crow and Sioux do not really get along.

By MontanaNative on Feb 27, 2009 at 4:04 am

For the past week I have been struggling with this blog, which contains some fairly substantial historical errors, some of them already noted by MontanaNative.

Mr. Tabner says, “It had been proved in America’s Civil War, and previously in the Crimea (the Charge of the Heavy Brigade, for example), that when facing superior odds, cavalry had to rely on their bladed-weapon skills or use rapid shock maneuvers.”
When I went out to the Gettysburg reenactment as a member of the 2nd US cavalry I did substantial research on the history and tactics of Civil War cavalry. Mounted troops during the war were issued the best breech-loading and repeating rifles so they could skirmish with the enemy, not so that they could use their sabers. Troopers were used for raiding, recon, and skirmishing. The cavalry would go into battle and unload their seven-shooters, and after falling back might charge with a saber if they knew they would be running down and capturing retreating enemies or guns (the best use for the saber, besides its need as a status symbol). European observers wrote about their disapointment at how indecisive American cavalry tactics were (the constant skirmishing, and lack of “impact” in charges). Also, as far as the Crimean war is concerned, we should not forget the charge of the *Light Brigade*, which was a total disaster.

Mr. Tabner also says, “The size of the camp, and the fact that the troopers did not have their sabers, made Reno unwilling to make close contact with the Indians.”
In the book _Black Elk Speaks_ a Native American fellow named “Standing Bear” gives ample reason for Reno to have avoided close combat, “There were so many of us that I think we did not need guns. Just the hoofs would have been enough.” The “hoofs” refers to trampling. Close contact would have only resulted in total slaughter. This is particularly true since the plains Indians were skilled horseman who could guide their horses with their knees. This allowed them to be free to fire their bows upon buffalo while riding at a run. A mounted trooper with a saber would be worthless against a mounted Native with a bow, much less a Native with a gun. I fear Mr. Tabner’s conception of the Native American warrior is quite flawed.

Mr. Tabner fails to even bother mentioning that Reno survived the fight only because he formed a defensive ring, fighting from cover and digging holes during the night. He says ” Only the sheer sides of the hill allowed Reno’s men to hold out for the rest of the battle, until relief by the main column arrived”, but “Standing Bear”, in the book _Black Elk Speaks_ says, “…they had saddles and other things in front of them to hide themselves from bullets, but we surrounded them, and the hill we were on was higher and we could see them plain.” The Natives were ready to let the Whites starve, but the reported movement of additional US troops caused them to pack their things and leave.

Francis Parkman, in his work _The Conspiracy of Pontiac_, gives an interesting account of the Native American resolve when engaging fortified posts. During the siege of Detroit, the British officers were about to leave the post since they assumed the fort would be quickly taken when the Natives chopping through the walls, but “Their anxiety on this score was relieved by a Canadian in the fort, who had spent his life among Indians, and who now assured the commandant that every maxim of their warfare was opposed to such a measure.” Native Americans did not do well against fortified posts, partly because they sought individual glory. The only thing that saved Reno was the fact that he did *not* attack the Native villages.

By Gerald P. Illies on Mar 10, 2009 at 3:59 am

I agree that during the Civil War, cavalry were used to find the enemy, range into the rear to disrupt lines of communication and supply, and occasionally attack enemy cavalry or disrupted enemy formations. I cannot recall battles won by cavalry attacking infantry in fixed positions. How long would Custer’s men have survived sitting 6 feet up in the saddle, making excellent targets for the Indian riflemen, while trying to close with sabers?

By CDB on Mar 10, 2009 at 2:28 pm

You make a valid point Mr. CBD. When we compare the silhouette of a mounted trooper with the total target area of a kneeling skirmisher, we have a substantial reduction in favor of the dismounted variety. When they are prone behind a saddle, they almost disappear completely.

In the Book _Black Elk Speaks_ a fellow named Iron Hawk says of Custer’s men, “There were soldiers along the ridge up there and they were on foot holding their horses.” Mr. Tabner’s reference to the loss of firepower due to every fourth man holding horses might not have application here, particularly since Iron Hawk then recalls, “We looked up and saw the cavalry horses stampeding.” It was the loose horses that caused the general Indian assault upon the U.S. troopers. It is interesting to speculate that had the fourth man been holding the horses to keep them from running, the mass of Native Americans might not have charged the hill. The Indian style of fighting was very opportunistic, as noted by Iron Hawk when he says, “We stayed there a while waiting for something…”. When the soldier’s horses ran, the “something” had occurred.

One regularly noted feature of combat against Native Americans was the fact that you could rarely get them to go into pitched battle, unless you attacked their settlements. This was common knowledge for military men who were constantly frustrated by the ghost-like nature of the Indian style of combat. It is this feature of U.S. military thinking that might have inclined Custer toward an attack upon the villages, specifically intending to hit them before they had a chance to break up and separate into a multitude of little groups spread across the plains. I am not so convinced that Custer was foolish in his attack. He perished, true, but that is a risk fairly commonly accepted in war. Colonel J.H. Kidd of the 6th Michigan Cavalry speaks well of Custer by saying, “He was not a reckless commander. He was not regardless of human life…” (Philip Katcher, _American Civil War Commanders(1)_, Osprey Pub.,2002, p.13) He was flamboyant, and graduated last in his class partly because of his constant pranks, but he was brave, and always calculated his moment for decisive victory. He did not earn his position, and the regard of many commanders, by accident.

By Gerald P. Illies on Mar 10, 2009 at 11:15 pm

Thomas Eaton Graham was my great grandmothers uncle Tom. He survived the battle as part of the 7th cav.. I was told in handed down history that Custer realized that the situation was in serious doubt. That maybe Custer thought the rest of his army would show up, but that was not possible. Graham’s company lived in fear until terry’s outfit showed up. Custer had no choice once he felt he had to dismount.

By Robert Reedy on Nov 5, 2009 at 12:49 am

It should be added that the sabers were left at the Powder River encampment partly due to the effort to keep the advance as quiet as possible. It may be that the need for them was not anticipated, as cavalry sabers were not a primary arm used in battle by cavalry in the late 1870’s. Custer anticipated flight, not hand-to-hand combat.

I have read that Native warriors were especially fearful of swords or sabers, but find such a general statement difficult to consider.

I, like most students of the battle, believe that the separated groups of soldiers were too far apart to support each other and were destroyed in a chain of collapse.

By James J. Ombrello, Jr. on Dec 10, 2009 at 5:10 pm