Although heavy enemy fire often forced Ryan’s men to go to ground, the U.S. destroyers and the tanks provided the command with the combat power it needed to overcome the Japanese defenses and keep moving forward. Within an hour Ryan’s Marines had cleared Green Beach to a depth of about 100 yards and had reached the beach’s southern terminus at Temakin Point.

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With Green Beach now accessible, the Marines of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment began coming ashore in their landing craft. Ryan radioed his commander, Colonel David M. Shoup, who was on Red Beach 3, and requested permission to continue his assault along Betio’s southern shoreline. Shoup, however, denied the request and ordered Ryan to deploy his command along Green Beach to protect the 1st Battalion against a possible Japanese counterattack. By sundown the reinforcements had completed their landings.

Ryan’s actions, and those of the other U.S. units on the invasion beaches, had turned the tide of battle in the Marines’ favor. Yet it took two more days – and one long bloody night during which 600 Japanese launched a desperate “banzai” charge – to finally defeat the enemy on Betio. The cost in blood was high: 990 Marines and 687 Sailors were killed, while 2,296 Americans were wounded. Nearly all of the more than 4,000 Japanese defenders died. The Marines captured only 17 Japanese soldiers and 129 Korean forced laborers.

As bloody as the battle on Tarawa was, it validated a completely new concept of operations – the amphibious assault into the heart of a defended beach. Taking the hard-won lessons of Tarawa and improving upon them, Marine, Army, and Navy forces went on to conduct similar assaults on other Pacific islands and atolls, destroying Japan’s Pacific empire.

READER SOLUTIONS
ACG judges based their selections for winning Reader Solutions and those receiving honorable mention on submissions that chose Course of Action Two: Attack South, or those whose explanations demonstrated a solid understanding of the key points for an amphibious assault. (See After Action Report.) COA Two got Ryan’s command off the isolated Bird’s Beak and moving forward, engaged the Japanese in the sector and prevented them from concentrating elsewhere against other Marine units, and contributed Ryan’s combat power to the overall invasion effort. All assault units, even those that were cut off, had to “get into the fight” quickly to maintain the landing force’s momentum. Since only a handful of tanks made it ashore during the first few days, it was imperative that the two in Ryan’s command be committed as soon as possible, as they were vital weapons that could cross the fire-swept zones and destroy the Japanese bunkers. Most important, by attacking south and clearing the Japanese defenses on Green Beach, Ryan’s composite company opened the beach for the landing of critical follow-on combat and support units.

Although Course of Action One: Attack East had the advantage of possibly linking up Ryan’s isolated outfit with other Marine units on Red Beach, it also meant that the company would have to attack through some of Betio’s heaviest Japanese defenses. (See Historical Outcome map.) If Ryan’s men ran into stiff resistance along this route, they likely would not have reached friendly lines before dark – a situation that would have left them disorganized and potentially exposed to a devastating banzai charge that night. Moreover, by approaching the flank of another Marine unit that was engaged in the attack, Ryan’s command risked incurring – and causing – “friendly fire” casualties, especially after dark.

Course of Action Three: Defend in Place was perhaps the worst possible plan, as it was simply an invitation to be thrown back into the sea. “Get off the beach” is the cardinal rule of amphibious assaults, and every effort must be made to keep the momentum of the attack moving inland.

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