Semper Fi in the Sky - Book Review

Ed Brown | April 24, 2007  | 0 comments  | Print  | E-mail

A very surprising realization, based on a contrary pre-conception, was how the role of Marine aviation diminished during the course of the war. From the end of 1942 through to August of 1945, Marine air was very active in the Solomons, all the way up to emasculation of Rabaul. However, they played a diminishing role deep into 1944 in the island hopping strategy. I had always assumed Marine air accompanied Marine ground all the way from Guadalcanal to Okinawa. The reality is that the nature of the strategy, and results of politics, Marine air units were not placed on front line carriers during most of the war. As a result, Marine air seldom was able to provide direct ground support to the grunts. Yet, as we are to learn from the recounts of the battles such as Peleliu, Tinian, and Guam, Marine air would be present, but not to the extent needed or expected. Marine observation planes would work from roads behind the lines, or from captured airfields to provide spotting for Naval gunfire. Officers and enlisted from Marine air would finally be sent up to the line to act as liaisons between the groundpounders and the pilots, to help direct air attacks as close as a 100 yards, and sometimes less. Lessons, good and bad were learned, rethought, reworked, and reapplied. These lessons evolved into a doctrine that would find itself transplanted to North Africa, and finally on the drive to the Rhine in 1944 and ’45, by the US Army. Marine lessons. These roles of the observers and ground liaisons were not glorious, but they were rewarding and appreciated by those they served.

Prior to these battles, Marine air was placed in forward airfields on New Georgia and Bougainville to not only support the ground units in those battles, but as stepping stones toward the isolation and wearing down of Rabaul. These fields were so close to the front lines, the pilots had barely retracted their landing gear when they were dropping ordnance on or strafing enemy troops and positions.

By the time the author completed his coverage of the Solomons Campaign, and began to cover the Gilberts, Marshals, Marianas and points in between, fully half the book, and then some, covered only this corner of the Pacific. Though large in physical scope, the Solomons area is diminutive compared to the full breadth of ocean covered by the Pacific Theater.

The balance of the book is contructed like the beginning. Astor intriduces us to the flyers, places, and events that rounded out the conflict in the Pacific. He covers how Marine aviation began to use night fighters and medium bombers late in the war. He covers how a number of Marine air units supported the US Army in the Philippines campaign, particularly in the area of close air support. And finally, how Marine squadrons finally got included as air units on carriers. The Navy’s final decision to succumb to that pressure was in response to the increased resistance as the Allied forces neared the Japanese homeland. Additional squadrons were needed to support the carrier groups against Kamikazes, as well as to support the Marine ground units, releasing Naval sqaudrons to fly other missiosn, as well as support the fleet against attack.

Astor has done an admirable job in presenting to us the men who defended our contry by facing our enemies. Not just as names in a roll, but as people with pasts and futures, beyond the scope of the conflict.

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