The final point raised by the author that was quite interesting was the role played by the Red Army transfer of divisions from the Far East and interior military districts. The argument is laid out in two parts of which the first details the Red Army’s intelligence failure prior to Typhoon where Stavka, believing that there was no longer time remaining in 1941 for a drive on Moscow, directed the bulk of its reserves to the rebuilding of the Southwest Front after the debacle at Kiev. This movement of troops away from the Moscow axis removed reserves that would be badly needed in the coming weeks. The second part of the argument is better known but perhaps cannot be repeated enough is the fact that the bulk of the November and December transfers to the Moscow theatre were not seasoned veterans but instead divisions that were simply still fully manned and equipped. Further, the bulk of these divisions were not thrown into the fight for Moscow but were withheld for the counterattack.

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In summary, this book does provide good information for those looking to learn the basics of what happened before Moscow in 1941 and does raise some interesting points, however, it cannot be a considered a major source. It is a good starting point to a more in depth study of the Battle of Moscow and that is probably all it is intended to be. At just under $20 US it is not be too steep a price to be paid.

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